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PREFACE 
Open market operations are generally acknowledged as the main 
instrument of monetary management. In 1953, the Federal Reserve System 
established the policy of restricting its open market transactions to 
short-term securitieso Whether this policy is referred to as the 
11bills only11 doctrine or the "bills preferably" policy is~ to a large 
extent, a matter of economic conviction. The former term has usually 
been used by critics of the policy, while Federal Reserve officials 
have described it as the "bills preferably" policy. 
During the 1950 1s, no other issue in monetary policy, I believe, 
has been the subject of so much debate as the bills only policy. The 
study of the different points of view on this issue per~ is of interest 
to monetary policy. Since, however, the Federal.Reserve abandoned the 
bills only policy in 1961, the most pertinent question would seem to 
be whether there was any substance to the arguments presented by the 
critics and the defenders of this policy. My analysis of this question 
suggests that there~ substance to certain of these arguments as the 
following pages will reveal. 
To make this study, it was necessary to make use of certain sta= 
tistical techniques, some of which required extensive calculations. I 
wish to express my gratitude to the Oklahom~ State University Computing 
Center for their assistance in carrying out the statistical tests. 
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My primary indebtedness, however, is to Dr. Frank G. Steindl, my 
dissertation adviser, whose guidence and suggestions in preparing this 
study have been invaluable. 
Thanks are also due to my wife who typed the various drafts and the 
final copy of this dissertation. 
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CIIAP!'ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 7, 1961, the Federal Open Market Committee authorized 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York " ••• to acquire·for the. System 
Open Market Account intermediate- and/or longer"'.'term U.S. Government 
Securities having maturities up to 10 years ••• "l 
Although the Committee's decision to authorize such purchases 
was not unanimous, it nevertheless·brought to a close one of the most 
controversial issues in open market policy that had occupied the 
attention of academic economists and Federal Reserve officials for 
the. previous eight years. In the early part of 1953 the Federal Open 
Market Committee had adopted the policy of restricting open market 
operations in all cases other than "correcting disorderly conditions" 
to short-term securities which in practice meant Treasury bills. In 
addition, the Federal Open Market Committee in 1953 had ruled that 
open market intervention should be kept to a minimum and should be under-
taken only to provide increases or decreases in the money supply by 
changing member bank reserves. It was felt that these restrictions 
would result in an improvement of the technical performance of the 
1 o· s i Board of ·overnors of the Federal Reserve ystem, Forty-e ghth 
Annual RePort (1961), p. 39. 
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securities markets and also that the cost of credit under these condi-
tions would reflect the unimpeded forces of supply of and demand for 
loanable funds. 
The policy of restricting open market operations to short-term 
securities and keeping such operations to a minimum has generally been 
referred to by academic economists as the "bills only" doctrine. 
Federal Reserve spokesmen, on the other hand, have, with a few excep-
tions, referred to it as the "bills preferably'' policy. 
Ever since it first became known, the bills only doctrine attracted 
the attention and the scrutiny of a great number of economists and 
other students of monetary policy. For the most part, it was severely 
criticized as a needless impediment in the execution of monetary ob-
jectives which was arbitrarily imposed upon monetary authorities by 
none other than these same authorities. 
The bills only doctrine was terminated in 1961 in order to enable 
monetary policy to meet certain domestic and international problems. 
The establishment and termination of the bills only policy gave rise to 
certain pertinent questions. First, was the bills only doctrine es-
tablished on realistic assumptions? Second, did the bills only doctrine 
achieve its objectives? Third, had the abandonment of bills only made 
any contributions to the attainment of the objectives that monetary 
authorities pursued since 1961? 
The consideration of these questions is the primary purpose of 
this dissertation. In addition, since open market policy with and with-
out the bills only doctrine has been subject to lengthy discussions 
in recent years, the present dissertation is designed to provide a 
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description of the different points of view regarding open market policy 
and a record of open market operations in recent years. 
Hypothesis of the Dissertation 
The overall hypothesis of this study is that the arguments pre-
sented by the Federal Reserve in defense of the bills only doctrine were 
based upon erroneous assumptions and that the termination of this 
policy in 1961 resulted in greater flexibility in the use of open mar-
ket operations as an instrument of monetary man~gement which contri-
buted to the achievement of certain monetary objectives during the 
period 1961-64. 
The arguments presented in favor of bills only have been classi-
fied into theoretical and technical arguments. Theoretical arguments 
centered around the assumption that arbitrage and speculation trans-
actions would quickly spread the effects of open market operations in 
short-term securities to other maturity sectors of the market. Tech-
nical arguments were associated with the Federal Reserve's desire to 
improve the functioning of the market for Government securities. On 
this point, the Federal Reserve notion was that System intervention in 
the open market should be held to a minimum and limited to bills only 
because uncertainty among dealers and other market participants as to 
when and in what maturity sectors the System may intervene prevented the 
development of "depth, breadth, and resiliency" in the market. The 
present study hypothesizes that the effects of operating in the short-
term sector do not spread promptly to other maturity sectors and that 
the funct ioning of the securit ies market is not adversely affected 
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by either increased Federal Reserve intervention in the open market or 
by operations in longer-term issues. 
With respect to the obJeetives of monetary policy during 1961-64, 
the hypothesis is that the efforts to raise short-term interest rates 
relative to long-term were generally successful and that the termin-
ation of bills only was one of the factors contributing to.the attain-
ment of these obJeetives. 
Methodology 
Various methods have been used to test the different issues in-
volved in the overall hypothesis of this study. 'fhese methods are 
described in detail when the specific issues are evaluated. In a 
summary form, however, the methodology used is as follows: 
(l) The question of whether the effects of operations in short-
term securities spread to other maturity sectors has been 
evaluated by (a) the observance of weekly yield movements 
in security issues varying from a maturity of 91 days to 
over 10 years and throµgh (b) simple and multiple correla-
ti0n of the weekly yields and yield changes. High corre-
lation among yields is considered as evidence that the 
effects of operations in Treasury bills permeate the other 
sectors of the ma.rket. 
(2) 'fhe question of whether operations outside the short-term 
area have adverse effects in the technical functioning of 
the securities market has been evaluated on the basis of 
evidence offered by (a) dealer transactions and dealer 
inventory positions in Government securities during the 
period 1960-64 and by (b) the comparison of yield fluctua-
tions in various maturity issues for the periods 1956-60 
and 1961-64. 
(3) To determine whether or not the Federal Reserve was able 
to achieve its stated objectives during the period 1961-64, 
the author examined interest rates, yield curves, and other 
charts. The significance of the termination of the bills. 
only policy is appraised by taking into account the existing 
theory of the term structure of interest rates and by exam-
ining the possible consequences that the continuation of 
the bills only policy might have had on the outcome of the 
1961-64 monetary objectives. 
Scope of the Dissertation 
The scope of this dissertation is limited to the evaluation of 
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issues and problems arising from Federal Reserve open market operations. 
Consideration has been given in certain cases to Federal Reserve 
actions involving the use of reserve requirements, discount rate 
changes, and selective credit controls. No attempt, however, has been 
made to evaluate the impact of these factors on the objeQtives of mone-
tary policy. They have been considered rather briefly, primarily for 
the purpose of pointing out the relative reliance of the Federal Re-
serve on the different tools of monetary ma~agement during the period ~ 
1961-64. 
Another important factor that influences the course of monetary 
objectives is Treasury debt management policies. This factor, also, 
has been left out of the scope of this study, primarily because debt 
management and its relation to the Federal Reserve is an entirely 
different study. 
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The U terat_ure associated with open market operations since the 
introduction of the bills only policy has been quite extensive., es-
pecially during the period 1953 .. 6o. The most important writings on the 
subject are reviewed in Chapters II and III. In addition, Chapters II 
and III are designed to provide the essential background for the 
appraisal of recent open market policies. Thus, Chapter II deals with 
the development of the bills only doctrine and examines the arguments 
presented in favor of this policy both at the time of its adoption and 
when the doctrine was reappraised in 1958, while Chapter III examines 
some of the most important controversies arising out of the bills only 
policy and summarizes the theoretical issues involved in the term 
structure of interest rates. 
Chapter IV examines the factors which led to the abandonment of the 
doctrine and reviews the economic conditions and the monetary policy 
developments of the period 1961-64. Particular emphasis is placed on 
open market operations. The annual volume of open market transactions 
for the.period l954-6o are compared wit}). those of the period 1961-64. 
Also, open market operations according to maturity are contrasted in the 
two periods. Finally, in this chapter the issues which are to pe 
tested are restated. 
In Chapter V the first part of the hypothesis posed by this disser~ 
tation is subjected to examination. This is the part involving the 
question of whether changes in the short-term sector of the sec~rities 
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market spread to other maturity sectors. Th.is question is examined in 
great detail, mainly because the implications of this question are of 
utmost importance to monetary policy. 
Chapters VI and VII deal_with the other two questions of the hypo-
thesis, namely the questions of whether the Federal Reserve succeeded 
in raising short-term yields relative to long-term and of whether the 
extension of open market operations to longer-term issues has affected 
adversely the.performance of the securities market • 
. _Chapter VIII preQents a summary of findings and conclusions emerging 
from the study. 
CHAP?ER II 
THE DEVELOPMEl'f AID RATIONALE OF THE BILlS ONLY DOCTRINE 
Introduction 
The bills only doctrine beeame public knowledge for the first time 
on April 13, 1953, during an address at a luneheen meeting of ~e 
Eeonomie Club of Detroit by William McC. Martin, Jr., Chairman of the 
Board of Governo~s of the Federal Reserve System. This address was 
published, shortly thereafter, in the Federal Reserve Brllletin.l 
Chairman Martin briefly commented upon the role of the Treasury-Federal 
Reserve accord in establishing a free market in Government securities, 
and, in general, expressed his satisfaction with the way monetary 
policy had performed in the two years following the accord. The role 
of monetary management, as Chairman Martin saw it, was strictly that 
of providing bank reserves consistent with the needs of economic 
growth and price stability. In this respect, open market operations 
were not to be conducted for the purpose of influencing security 
prices, but rather for the purJ?OSe of maintaining an adequate amount 
of credit in the economy. Since securities of short duration are the 
closest substitutes for cash and their prices are least affected by 
1w11liaJn Mee. Martin, Jro, "The Transition to Free Markets," 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 39, No. 4 (April, 1953), PP• 330-335· 
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open market purchases or sales, the Federal Reserve had tried to confine 
its n ••• operat:tons to short-term securities, in practice largely Treasury 
bills. "2 
Martin also mentioned, rather vaguely, that during 1952 an ad hoc 
subcommittee, under the authority of the Federal Open Market Committee, 
had been reviewing the Federal Reserve operations in the Government 
securities market 11 .... -with a view to determining -what might be done 
to develop and improve those operations under the changed conditions."3 
He closed his address by indicating that a return to pegged markets 
-would. be undesirable and the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy 
-would be capable of maintaining the ttvalue of the d0llar." 
This chapter of the dissertation -will be devoted to examining 
the reasons for the adoption of the bills only doctrine in 1953 and the 
re-evaluation and reaffirmation of the doctrine in 1958. 
The Report of the Ad Hoe Subcommittee 
The ad hoc subcommittee -which Chairman Martin briefly mentioned 
in his speech -was authorized by the Federal Open Market Committee on 
May 17, 1951, and its purpose -was "o •• to study and report on the 
operations and functioning of the Open Market Committee in relation 
to the Government securities market."4 This subcommittee -was organized 
2Ibid .. , p. 333. 
3 Ibid., p. 332 .. 
4United States Congress, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 
Subcommittee on Economic Stabiliz~tion, United States Monetary Policy~ 
Rece:o.t Thinking~ Experience, Hearings, Eighty-third Congress, Second 
Session (Washingtcm., 1954 j. · · 
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in April and May, 1952 with William McC. Martin, Jr. as chairman, Be-
ginning June 9, 1952, it held 29 sessions and ~eetings wit$ securities 
dealers an~ other indiYiduals familiar with the Government securities 
market. Gn Nove~ber 12, 1952 the ad hoe subcommittee presented its 
findings and recommendations to the Federal Open Market Committee. ~he 
ad hoe subcommittee's report, however, was not made public until De-
cember 9, 195'+, when another subcommittee--the Subcommittee on Economic 
Stabilization of the Joint Eeonontic Committee on the Economic Report--
held hearings on the efficacy of United States mooetary policy. Du.ring 
tho~e hearings the Federal Reserve's policy of bills only was dis-
cussed, and since the ad hoe subcommittee's report had provided the 
foundation of this policy, it: was decided that that report should be 
released for publication. It subsequently was published in the same 
document which contained the hearings of tb.e Subcommittee on Economic 
Stabilization.? 
Findings of the Subcommittee 
Starting with the proposition that an effective execution of open 
market policy requires the services of a well-organized Government 
seeurities market, the ad hoc subcommittee found that the eJd,sting 
organization of the securities market possessed the necessary elements 
for ,.performing adequately its functions in every respect except one. 
The exception was in connection with the market's breadth, depth, and 
resiliency. The market lacked these :Characteristics. There seemed to 
11 
be a great deal of u ••• con:f'usion among professional operators in the 
market with respect to the elements they- should take into consideration 
in the evaluation of future market trends, and to their apprehension 
over the attitude toward prices in the market on the part of the Fed~ 
' 
eral Open Market Committee and of its representatives on the trading 
desk."6 And in the subcommittee's opinion, this kind of confusion 
" ••• would not characterize a market that possessed real depth, breadth, 
and resiliency."7 
The terms depth, breadth, and resiliency were explained as follows: 
In strictly market terms, the inside market, i.e., the mar-
k~t that is reflected on the order books of specialists and 
dealers, possesses depth when there are orders, either 
actual orders or orders that can be readily uncovered, both 
above and below the market. The market bas breadth when 
these orders are in volume .and eome from widely divergent 
investor groups. It is resilient when new orders pour 
promptly into the market to take agvantage of sharp and 
unexpected fluctuations in prices. 
The absence of depth, breadth, and resiliency, according to the 
subcommittee, was the result of ambiguities and contradictions in 
Federal Reserve actions and pronouncements. On several occasions, the 
Federal Open Market Committee by its actions had g.1.ven the impression 
to. market participants that while it was willing to. allow yield and 
price fluctuations in the market, it was at the same time prepared to 
intervene in the market whenever the Committee considered it appro-
priate.;· Such actions, the sub~ommittee felt, caused a great deal of 
6Ibid., P• 26~.h 
7Ibid. 
8rbid. 
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uncertainty among professional dealers and other market participants. 
'fhe dealers could only c~nclude that they were operating in a market 
which, besides being subject to fluctuations resulting from the forces 
of supply and demand for funds, was also subject to unpredictable in-
terven.tions by the Open Ma.~et Committee. Thus, tbe dealers would no.t 
only have to bear the ~ ••• risk of being wrong in their evaluation of 
economic and market trends, but also of being wrong in guessing at 
what point the Ope~ Market Committee might feel it n~cessary to in-
tervene."9 The net effect of these conditions, the subcommittee con-
eluded, is that deaJ,.ers become reluctant to take positions, Le., to 
maintain sufficient volume of securities in their inventories., and the 
establishment @fa broad, deep, and resilient market could net be 
realized. 
No sector of the market is entirely characterized by breadth, 
depth, and resiliency, the subcommittee asserted. But, the short-term 
secto:J;' comes veey close to meeting these characteristics. It is in 
the market for bonds that breadth., depth, and resilie~cy are entirely 
absent. In these long-term issues, " ••• quotations have fluctuated 
widely, either in response to relatively small. buy or sell orders, or, 
more frequently, as a result of professional efforts to stimulate in-
terest by marketing quotations up or 4own."10 
Recommendations of the Subcommittee 
In accordance with its findings, the subcommittee made certain re-
commendations centered around the development of greater breadth, depth, 
9Ibid., p. 267.. 
10 . Ibid., p. 266. 
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and resiliency in the market. First, for the problem of the existing 
uncertainty and confusion among dealers with regards to Federal Re-
serve intentions, the subcommittee recommended that the Federal Open 
Market Committee "•ookeep its intervention in the market to such an 
absolute minimum as may be consistent with its credit policy.nll 
The dealers then would know that tbe Federal Reserve could not un-
expectedly and arbitrarily intervene for the " ••• purpose of estab-
lishing particular prices, yields, or pat,$erns of yields~nl2 
As to the case where intervention becomes necessary, that is, whEn 
the Federal Reserve needs to alter the volume of member banks' re-
serves through open market operations in order to influence the avail-
ability of credit in the economy, the technical functioning of the 
market in terms of breadth, depth, and resiliency would be disturbed 
the least if the intervention takes place at the short end of the market. 
The long-term sector is characterized, as indicated earli.er, by wide 
fluctuations in yields and intervention in th.is area would undoubtedly 
result in greater reluctance on the part of the dealers to take risks. 
In the judgment of the subcommittee, therefore, an assurance given t.o 
the dealers by the Federal Open Mar~et Committee to the effect that 
open market operations besides being kept at a minimum would also be 
restricted (with the exception of two cases to be noted below) to very 
short-term Government securities, ioe., Treasury bills n.o.would be 
reflected in greater depth, breadth, and resiliency in all sectors of 
the market.,r113 
11Ib:1d., po 266. 
12Ibid., p. 267. 
l3Ibid,. 
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The Two Exceptions 
The first of the two exceptions for intervention outside bills was 
in connection with the then existing practice of the Open Market Com-
mittee intervening in the open market to support the prices of maturing 
issues for the purpose of enabling the Treasury to market new issues 
of comparable maturity with those that were maturing. The subcommittee 
felt that this practice could not be discontinued abruptly, but as 
soon as Federal Reserve and Treasury officials could work out new 
procedures for Treasury finan~ing the Open Market Committee should re-
frain from such actionso This practice was abandoned in March, 1953.14 
The second, and the most important, exception would be in con-
nection with ''disorderly markets o '' The executive committee of the 
Federal Open Market Committee was operating at the time the ad hoc 
subcommittee study was taking place under a directive which allowed in-
tervention "for the maintenance of orderly conditions'' in the securi-
ties market.15 But such a directive, the subcommittee felt, "ooocan 
mean all things to all men, and in effect constitutes a blanket dele-
gation of discretionary authority which c~n be interpreted to cover 
almost any action by the L,executi vi/ committee in the market. ,,l6 
The Federal Open Market Committee, therefore, should change the 
14 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Fortieth 
Annual Report (1953), p~ 88. 
l5United States Congress, Yn;ited States Monetary Polic¥: Recent 
Thinkin_g and Experience, p. 268. 
16Ibido 
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directive to provide for the "correction of disorderly conditions" rather 
than the "maintenance of orderly conditions" in the securities market. 
when: 
The subcommittee described "disorderly conditions" as the case 
••• selling feeds on itself so rapidly and so menacingly 
that it discourages both short coverin~ and the place-
ment of offsetting new orders by investors who ordin-
arily would seek t<> profit from purchases made in a weak 
market. There are occasions when such really disorderly 
reactions occur in the market. They may lead, if left · 
unchecked, to the development of panic conditions. These 
must be corrected. In the judgement of the subcommittee, 
it is these .circumstances, and these circumstances only, 
that the Federal Open Market Committee would be impelled, 
by its basic responsibilities for the maintenance of 
sound monetary conditions, to intervene, and intervene 
decisively, in other than the ve9: short-term sector of 
the Government securities market. 7 
The Efficacy of Bills Only 
The subcommittee recognized that the restriction of open market 
operations to bills only would impose a serious limitation on the 
Federal Reserve's freedom of action. '!'his limitation, however, should 
not impair the effectiveness of monetary policy. As far as the sub-
committee was ooneerned, the effects of open market operatiens, al .. 
though initiated in the short end of the market, would spread quickly 
to other sectors in the form of price and yield chaµges. 
These changes would come about as a result of market ar-
bitrage, ioeo, the exercise of market skill by professionals 
who make up the market, the dealers who specialize in match-
ing bids and offers and the professional managers of port-
folios who are constantly balancing their investments to 
17 Ibid., P• 268. 
take advantage of shifts in prices an~ yields between 
the different sectors of the market. l 
16 
Furthermore, the confinement of open market intervention to bills only: 
••• would fall within, not without, the boundaries of 
the best central banking traditiens ••• Traditional prin-. 
ciples of central banking made no provision for opera-
tions in the intermediate or long maturities of any 
borrower.19 
The Ad.option of the Subcommittee's Recommendations 
Although the ad hoc subcommittee presented its report on Novem-
ber 12, 1952, it was not until March 4-5, 1953, that the Federal Open 
Market Committee took action upon the subcommittee's recommendatiens.20 
The recommendations were unanimously approved by the Committee and 
correspondingly a new directive was issued to the executive committee 
outlining the rules which were to govern future open market policy. 
It was again emphasized that the restriction of open market operations 
to bills in other than disorderly situations would greatly enhance the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and would also lead to the develop-
ment of a "freer" and more'self-reliant" market~ that is, a market in 
which " ••• the allocation of available funds among various uses is 
affected through eompeti tion in th~ market. n2l 
18 Ibid., p. 267. 
l9Ibid .. 
ao Board of Governers of the Federal Reserve System, Fertieth Annual 
Report, PP• 86-92. 
21Ibid., p. 6. 
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The Beaffi:rma.tion of the Doctrine in 1958 
The establishment of the bills only policy raised strong objections 
and criticisms from various quarters. But the Federal Open Market 
Committee continued to assert its confidence in the policy. During 
the l957-58recession, however, the criticism of the doctrine was in-
tensified and the Federal Reserve was compelled to reappraise this 
policy. In this respect, an article appeared in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin ef November, 1958, whose explicit purpose was to: 
•• oprovide back.ground against which to evaluate the sugges-
tion that direct System intervention in the long-term mar-
ket for United States Government securities might be help-
ful in situations other than those calling for correction 
of disorderly cond.1 tions in the market. 22 · 
The importance of this article lies in the fact that the Federal 
Reserve for the first time since the adoption of the doctrine presented 
to the critics a justification of bills only which was based almost 
entirely on theoretical e0nsiderations. Unlike the:. report ef the sub-
committee which started its analysis by examining the technical tune-· 
tioning of the securities market,~· Riefler's article began by con-
sidering the theoretical implications of open market operations with 
regards to security yields and prices in the various, sectors of the mar-
ket. Biener observed that operations in Government securities affect 
the credit situation by bringing about changes in (a) the volume of 
available securities, (b) the volume of member bank reserves, and (c) 
22-_ 
vlinfiel4 W .. Riefler, ,.Open Market Operations in Long-'?~rm Se-
curities,,. Fed(llral Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 44, No .. ll (November, 1958), 
p. 1262. .•·. . . 
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the state of market expectations held by professional dealers and other 
investors. 
Changes in Outstanding Securities 
Federal Reserve intervention in the securities market will initially 
alter the.~ sµ.pply'-dema.nd relationship.:of aeclarities. · The change 1µ_ sµpply 
and demand will, in turn, affect the yields of securities. This would 
be true because when the Federal Reserve purchases securities in the 
market the volume of outstanding securities will decrease and the price 
of those securities remaining in the market will rise. Supply and 
demand changes will affect primarily the. price of the particular issues 
that are bought or sold. Eventually, however,. price changes will be 
registered " ••• in some degree throughout all maturity sectors of the 
market by reason of actual or anticipated substitution and arbitrage 
in the market. 1123 
The way arbitrage works is illustrated in the following quotation: 
.... a -withdra-wal by, outs:ide:.i:nveat0Z"s of ·funds from .the .. Tr.ea-
sury bill sector would be ref).ected in a rise in bill rates, 
both absolutely and in relation to rates on Treasury certi-
ficates. This might induce professional operators simul-
taneously to sell certificates and buy bills, a transaction 
which would tend. to restore the previous relationship be-
tween yields on bills and certificates. At the same time, 
it would tend to leave both yields higher than they were be-
fore the initial action took place.24 
Generalization of yield movements among all sectors is also faci-
litated because of " .... the high degree of substitutability of security 
instruments that ,E!x:lsts · for many lenders ·;a:q.d borrowers in the credit 
23Ibid., p. 1262. 
24Ioid., p. 1264. 
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and capital markets."25 Lenders will want tQ place their loans in the 
sector of the market that offers the highest yield.26 Borrowers, on 
the other hand, will try to minimize costs and will want to borrow from 
the sector where yields are the lowesto If they think that the cost 
of borrowing long-term funds is 1'1t00 high" they may decide to wait and 
meet their needs through short-term borrowing from banks or other 
lenderso By so doing, the potential demand for long-term funds will 
be curtailed and the demand for short-term borrowing will be increased. 
Subsequently, the short-term interest rate will rise vis-a-vis the 
long-term rate. 
Arbitrage and substitutability, according to Biefler, are the 
forces responsible for the high degree of "fluidj,.ty" which character-
izes the market for Goverpment securities. 
Insofar as the bills only policy is concerned, a market charac-
terized by a high degree of fluidity would imply that changes in yields 
and prices brought about by Federal Reserve intervention i:n. .I' o ••. the 
bill sector of the Goverpment securities market soon spread to other 
sectors. 1127 
25rbido, p. 1265. 
26According to Riefler., large commercial banks and managers of . 
investment portfolios for insurance companies, trust funds, and pension 
funds will readily restructure their investments between maturity 
sectors if they think that such actions will increase their income •. 
27 66 Riefler, p. 12 ·· .• 
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Changes in :Bank :Reserves 
Open market operations affect prices and yields of securities not 
only because they change the supply or demand for securities but also 
because they change the reserves of member. banks. Unlike the supply 
and demand changes where the relationship of open market operations to 
additions or subtractions of outstanding securities is one-to-one, that 
is, .ene dollar's purchases i:o. the open market decreases by ene dollar 
the amount of outstanding securities., the relationship ef reserve 
changes to the potential change in the money supply is approximately 
one-to-seven, according to Biefler. This is so because the banking 
system operates on fractional reserves and Federal Reserve purchases or 
sales of securities add or subtract rough.ly seven times the amount of 
the purchase or sale to the potential supply of loans which becomes 
available through the member banks. Changes in the supply of loanable 
funds would, of. course., influence the terms of lending, that is., the 
rate of interest. This is how variations in the reserves of member 
banks, in Riefler~s view, affect the prices and yields of debt instru-
ments. These effects on loans and ;yields will take place without re-
gard to the way the change in reserves was accomplished. Reserves 
may have changed because of a change in reserve requirements, or a 
change in float, or open market operations. Their effects on loanable 
funds and security prices will not change. Riefler, therefore, con-
eludes that "•oothe effects are the same irrespective of whether open 
market operations are conducted in the short• or the long-term sector 
of the market fer Government securities."28 
28 Ibid., Po 1263. 
21 
This conclusion is not e~tirely correct. As was mentioned earlier, 
security yields are also affected by changes in the suppl.y- of securi-
ties and a direct intervention, for example, in the long-term sector 
by changing the supply of long-term bond's will have a different im-
pact on long-term yields than if the intervention had taken place in 
s:tiort-term instruments in which case the supply of bonds would have 
remained unchanged. But, according to Riefler, the impact on inter-
est rates or security yields of a change in the volume of securities 
is by far much weaker than the impact on these two factors of a change 
in reserves,. because the impact of a change in outstanding securities · 
reflects a one-to-one relationship whereas the impact of a change in 
reserves is a multiple one, Thus: 
••• if the Federal :Reserve System buys or sells a given 
dollar amount of Treasury bills at a time when effective 
required reserves average one-seventh of demand deposits, 
something like seven-eighths of any resulting effect on 
market yields should reflect the changes in the volume 
of reserves available to the banks and only one-eighth 
the fact that the operation was executed in bills and 
therefore changed t~e volume of bills available for in-
vestment in the market.29 
The policy implication of this analysis is that .insofar as the 
yields of the long-term sector are concerned, not much of an advantage 
would accrue to monetary policy by executing operations directly in 
the long-term sector which could not be realized through operations in 
the short end of the market. 
29 Ibid., p. 1269. 
The "Sluggish" Response of the 
Long-Term Sector 
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Critics of the bills only doctrine o~en contended that the long-
term sector may not respond quickly to changes in the short-term sector. 
This contention, according to Biefler, can be explained by recognition 
of the fact tlaa.t it takes time for banks whose reserve position has 
suddenly improved to start ma.king loans available in the intermediate-
or long-term area. "F.ase in reserve position will not be quickly re-
fleeted in an increase of commercial bank investments in the long-term 
capital markets if banks generally are concerned about an insuffi.ciency 
of short-term liquid assets or a high loan-deposit ratio."30 If either 
condition prevails, it takes some time before the commercial bank:·can 
extend direct support to th.e long-term sector. But commercial banks 
" ••• would need this time interval before extending such support even 
if the Federal Reserve System itself operated in the long end of the 
market. 1131 Again, the bills only policy is not to be blamed for any 
"sluggish.'' response in the long-term market with respect t® changes in 
the availability of funds in the short-term market. 
Changes in Expectations and Operations 
in the Long-Term Sector 
If no significant advantages can be anticipated by the extension 
of open market operations to long-term securities, are there any dis-
tinct disadvantages in such an action? Indeed, there are, asserted. 
Mr. Riefler. Open market operations, besides affecting the volume of 
30Ibid., P• l2p6. 
31Ibid. · 
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outstanding securities and the reserves of member banks, also affect 
the expectations of market dealers and other professionals. Often the 
expectations held by market professionals do not materialize, and the 
consequences of mistaken expectations are most serious when they con-
eern the long-term market. Open market operations in the long-term 
sector " ••• give rise to expectations not only regarding the. direction 
of general monetary policy but also regarding specific prices and yields 
of long-term securities."32 This situation involves the risk that 
market professionals may take wrong positions which can lead to lower 
yields in the long-term sector than the actual supply and demand re-
lationship in that sector would justify. When this happens, it becomes 
extremely difficult for the Federal .Reserve to evaluate the effective-
ness of its own actions and to determine its future operations. Con-
fining open market operations to bills only does not present these pro-
blems because expectations in the long-term sector are not affected. 
~hue,· .i.'w::1:t)l. :r_espe_c:t to the merits or the susgestion that open 
marke<t:~:ope:rations ·oe exteti.ded0ct.o,;,the;Jil.oilg,.te:nn:.·sectot-9.:;·14t.:cR1el'ler .:.,· 
con.eluded that: 
••• the lasting contribution of such additional use of 
direct intervention would be small, and under certain 
conditions there would be considerable risk that such 
action might not only obstruct t~e functioning of the 
market but also make it more difficult for the Federal 
Reserve to Judge the adequacy of its own actions.33 
32 Ibid., P• 1264. 
33Itid. 
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Some Brief Comments on the Doctrine's Rationale 
The introduction of the bills only policy came at a time when the 
bitter controversies with respect to pegging were still fresh in the 
memories of Federal Reserve officials and securities dealers~: It~is not 
surprising, therefore, that the. ad hoc sub:commi ttee · study .. Justified its 
recommendations primarily on the belief that their adoption would re-· 
sult in a freer Government securities market in which interest rates 
would be established by the forces of supply and demand for loanable 
funds. The subcommittee members were apprehensive of the idea of 
allowing the Federal Reserve to intervene in any sector of the market 
it chose. Such discretionary power, they felt, contained the danger 
of a return to a pegged :market. 
The analysis which led to the recommendations of the subcommittee 
was mainly based on technical considerations. Th.at is, considerations 
which were related to the technical functioning of the securities mar-
ket as measured by the degree of breadth, depth, and resiliency in the 
market. The theoretical considerations were limited to some brief re-
marks about traditional central banking practices and the role of ar-
bitrage in the spreading of yields from one sector to another. At any 
rate, these theoretical points were only considered by the subcommittee 
in anticipation of criticisms of its recommendations and not as cri-
teria for recommendations. 
The 1958 reappraisal and reaffirmation of the doctrine was 
different from the 1953 justification of bills only in this respect. 
Whereas the 1953 ease stressed the technical merits of bills only, the 
1958 case stressed the short-comings of intervention in the lQng-term 
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sector. But there i.s a.lso one similarity to be noted. In both the 
1953 and the 1958 cases the idea of open market operations in long-term 
securities was in the final analysis rejected on the basis of be-
havioral assumptionso The 1953 report assumed that open market opera-
tions in the long-term sector create uncertainty among professional 
dealerse This is not much different from Mr. Riefler's assertion that 
intervention in long-term securities could give rise to mistaken ex-
pectations on the part of the dealers. 
CHAP.FER III 
MAJOR CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING BILLS ONLY 
Introduction 
As is often the case with important policy decisions, the bills 
only doctrine attracted a great deal of attention from those interested 
in monetary policy. Of those who studied the issues and the impli~ 
cations of the doctrine, very few failed to reach definite conclusions 
one way or the other. By far, the majority of academic economists 
expressed disapproval of the doctrine while Federal Reserve officials 
and securl ties dealers were in favor of· it. 
The writings approving or disapproving of the bills only policy 
are numerous. The present chapter is designed to review the most im-
portant of these writings. 
In general terms:, the controversies surrounding bills only may be 
classified into two main categories: Those dealing with the technical 
f'unctioning of the securities market; and those considering the theore-
tical aspects of the doctrine. 
Technical Arguments 
Technical arguments were i.nvariably linked to the performance of 
the securities market. Here again, two distinct types of controversies 
developed. One type was centered around the Federal Reserve's views on 
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breadth, depth, and resiliency in the securities market. The other 
dealt mainly with the question of whether the measur,s prescribed by 
the Federal Reserve for improving the technical performance of the 
market can also be consistent with the economic objectives of monetary 
policy. 
The Question of Depth, Breadth, 
and Resiliency 
The ad hoc subcommittee study, as indicated earlier, had asserted 
that the lack of depth, breadth, and resiliency was the result of 
dealers' uncertainty with respect to Federal Reserve intentions and, 
as a remedy, it had recommended the restriction of open market opera-
tions to short-term securities. The notion was promptly challenged by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its review of the subcommittee's 
report~l The New York Bank, first, questioned the validity of the 
subcommittee's conten~ion that a high degree of uncertainty existed 
among dealers but could not offer any empirical evidence on the ques-
tion. Even by assuming the existence of such uncertainty, however, 
the Federal Reserve Bank denied that the Federal Open Market Committee 
was responsible-for it • 
• q .it is the appraisals of the outl.ook for interest rates 
and security prices by dealers and investors, much more 
than any fear (or hope) of intervention by the System in 
the market for particular securities, that determine the 
1united States Congress, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 
Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, United States Monetary Policy: 
Recent Thinking and Experience, Hearings, Eighty-third Congress, 
Second Session (Washington, 1954). 
!?depth, breadth, and resiliency" of the market at any 
given time. Fear of adverse trends,, or uncertainty as 
to what the trend is likely to be, is the :predominant 
reason for thin markets, rather than apprehensions con-
cerning System intervention in particular sectors to 
limit price movements.2 
The remedy, then, that the ad hoc subcommittee recommended for im-
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proving the technical performance of the market would seem to be ill-
founded. For, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the 
confinement of open market op,:~'ations to bills would have no effect 
on the dealers' appraisals of :~ nterest rate trends and consequently it 
would also have no effect upon the market's depth, breadth, and re-
siliency, 
It is not very easy to evaluate empirically these claims. The 
position of the ad hoc subcommittee, as well as that of the New York 
Bank, is based primarily upon assumptions related to the actual dealers' 
and investors' states of mind with regard to carrying larger inyen-
tories and making greater 0use of the Government securities markets. 
One is, therefore, tempted to accept the opinions of experts in this 
matter. But here, again, there is no unanimity. During the 1954 
hearings of the Subc<:>rnmi ttee on Economic Stabili.zation, for example, 
Chairman Martin stated: "Without any intervention from the Federal 
Open Market account, except in the short end, the market for United 
States Government securities has become progressively broader, stronger, 
and more resilient throughout all maturity ranges. 11 3 Allan Sproul, 
2Ibid., P· 310. 
3rbid.f) P· 16. 
on the other hand, who at that time was president of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York and vice chairman of the Federal Open Market 
Committee made this comment with respect to Chairman Martin's state-
ment: 
The answer of the Chairman asserts that the market has 
become increasingly stronger, broader, and more resil-
ient since the Committee adopted the "bills only" tech-
nique ••• I think it ha.s l©st depth, breadth, and resil-
iency, whether you view it in terms of dealer willing-
ness to take position ri{ks, volume of trading, or 
erratic price movements. 
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In spite of the difficulties involved in measuring the degree of 
depth, breadth, and resiliency in the market., some economis.ts have 
tried to appraise the effects of the bills only policy on the technical 
performance of the securities market.5 The results of these attempts 
have been extensively reviewed by Daniels. Ahearn.6 He concluded that: 
The available stati.stical evidence and the view of , 
market participants suggest that despite the "bills 
only" policy and contrary to Chairman Martin's asser-
tions, the Government bond market in recent years 
has been thin and artificial. Thus the nbills only" 
policy would seem to have failed in one of its main 
purposes.? 
4 Ibid., p. 226. 
5see for example, Dudley G. Luckett, 11Bills Only: A Critical 
Appriasal," Review of Economics~ Statistics, XLII (August, 1960), 
PP• 301-306. 
6nan1el s. Ahearn, Federal Reserve Policy Reappraised, 1951-1959 
(New York, 1963), PP• 53-64. 
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Bills Only and Conflicts in Goals 
The Federal Reserve 1s stated objective of improving the securities 
market in terms of depth, breadth, and resiliency was also criti-
cized on the grounds that it might be inconsistent with other objec-
ti.ves of monetary policy such as the control of credit. As was 
mentioned earlier, one of the reasons given for the justification of 
the bills only policy was that such a policy would reduce the dealers' 
risk and would enable them to carry larger inventories of securities, 
thus enhancing the functioning of the market. But, should the Federal 
Reserve be concerned with measures which tend to reduce the dealers' 
.risk and uncertainty? During the period of pegging, for example, there 
was no risk involved since the dealers and other investors were 
assured that security yields would not changeo The dealers., there-
fore, could carry a large volume of securities in their inventories 
without fear of incurring capital losses. ~egging the yields is quite 
obviously an excellent way of promoting depth, breadth, and resiliency 
in the market, but hardly consistent with the promotion of national 
economic objectives. Moreover, the dealers' self-interest is not always 
in harmony with t~e.maintenance of orderly conditions in the securities 
market. In this respactJ the Federal Reserve Bank of New York pointed 
out that, 
, •• it must be remembered that the dealers are operating 
primarily with a view to making profits, and consequently 
tha·t their inevitable tendency is to sell short and back 
away from offerings in a declining market and extend 
their positions in a rising mark~t. Thus, instead of 
exerting a stabilizing influence on the market, they 
tend to ~ccentuate its swings--at least over short 
:periods. 
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Therefore, the argument continued, the Federal Reserve should not 
be responsible for the technical functioning of the market, but in-
stead it should concentrate on its economic objectives. The bills 
only policy, however, placed the improvement of the market on a 
higher level of importance than the promotion of credit and monetary 
policies needed to meet the problems of the economy. As the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York correctly pointed out, " ••• where the two 
L.market and economi~ considerations conflict, it must be assumed that 
the Federal Open Market will wish to follow the course of action most 
favorable to the latter. 119 
Theoretical Arguments 
By far.v the most severe criticisms of the bills only doctrine came 
out of theoretical considerations related to the term structure of 
interest rates. The importance of the rate of interest has, of course, 
seldom been underemphasized in economic theory. Most classical and 
neo-classical economists considered the rate of interest a real phenom-
enon. They thought that its determination depended entirely on the 
supply of real savings and the demand for investment. Furthermore, in 
their view, there was nothing the central bank could do to influence 
"the rate of interest. it This idea, however, has been challenged in 
8united States Congress, United States Monetary Policz: Recent 
Thinking ~ Expe_~ence, p. 310. 
9Ibid .. 
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re.cent years--prill\arily because of the works of John Maynard Keynes--
and the possibility of the central bank exerting a positive influence 
in the determination of the interest rates has achieved wide accep-
tance among economists. Along the lines of classical and neo-classical 
thought, the ad hoc subcommittee had stated that the bills only 
policy '' ••• would fall within, not without, the boundaries o:f' the 
best central banking traditions."10 Most academie economists, and 
a few from the Federal Reserve; accepted the truth of that statement 
and, accordingly questioned the wisdom of the doctrine. 
There were two points of debate with respect to interest rates. 
First, there was the question of whether the Federal Reserve could 
pursue successfully the objectives of monetary policy by controlling 
the level of member bank reserves and letting the interest rates be 
determined by the market. Second, and most important, there was the 
question of whether the explanation of the relationship between the 
short-term and t~e long-term interest rates that the Federal Reserve 
had presented was correct. 
Bank Reserves Versus Interest Rates 
On many occasions the Federal Open Market Committee had indicated 
that the objectives of monetary policy are best implem.ented through the 
Federal Reserve's manipulation of member bank reserves. Even more em-
phatic was the Federal Reserve's assurance that it had no intentions 
of intervening in the open market for the purpose of establishing any 
10 Ibid • ., p. 267. 
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particular yields or patterns of yields. These pronouncements, how-
ever, do not imply that the Federal Reserve was not influencing yields 
and security prices. Bank reserve changes, as Riefler had explained, 
exert powerful influences on interest rates. The Federal Re$erve pro-
nouncements imply either that the Federal Reserve's conception of its 
responsibilities did not include any provisions for the use of in-
terest r_ates as an instrument of monetary management or that the 
"rate of interest" may not be of central importance. 
During the late l940's and early 1950's, however, a new theory--
primarily under the sponsorship of Robert V. Roosa--began to receive 
attention. 11 The new theory envisioned the possibility of the central 
bank exerting strong influence on the liquidity of the economy by 
slight changes in interest rates, and especially in the yield on long-
term bonds. Unlike the Federal Reserve belief that the effects of 
changes in the bank reserves are mainly felt by the borrowers in the 
economy, the new theory stressed the importance that Federal Reserve 
actions have upon lenders. When, for instance, the Federal Reserve 
sells securities, the prices of these securities drop and their yields 
increase. Tb.e increase in yields (drop in prices) discourages security 
holders such as banks and other financial institutions from sellin~ 
their securities because they are reluctant to incur capital losses. 
Without the increase in yields, however, these holders might have sold 
some of their securities and used the proceeds to make loans to private 
ll Ahearn, pp. 23-31; and Robert V. Roosa, ninterest Rates and the 
Central Bank., n in Money., Trade9 and Economic Growth (New York, 1951), 
PP• 270-295° 
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businesses. The assumption that bond holders are reluctant to sell 
when faced with a rising interest rate becomes more important when one 
considers the number o;t' financial intermediaries that a.re not part o:f' 
the Federal Reserve System and therefore cannot be controlled by the 
central bank so long as such control is limited to bank reserves. But, 
when the central bank's control extends to interest rate manipulations, 
all these financial intermediaries would come under its influence 
since financial intermediaries, as a rule, are important holders o:f' 
Government secu~ties. 
For maximum effectiveness, the Federal Reserve should be willing 
to buy or sell long-term securities in the open market.i2 In addition, 
the new theory would lead to the implication that the Federal Reserve 
recognize the long-term interest rate as an important tool of monetary 
control. This theory of monetary control attracted wide popularity 
during the time the bills only doctrine was being considered. It has 
been referred to in the literature most often as the navailability 
doctrine: but it has also been known as the nRoosa doctrine" and as the 
"lock-in effect." Although many shortcomings of this doctrine have 
been exposed at various times, 13 it nevertheless constituted an impor-
tant alternative to the actual policy adopted in March, 1953. 
12 Ahearn., p. 28. 
l3see Ibid., pp. 29-32; and James Tobin, "A New Theory of Credit 
Controlg The Availability Thesis," The Review ef Economics and Sta-
tistics, Vol. XXXV, lfo. 2 (May, 1953hPP• 118-127. · - -
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In fact, during the 1952 ad hoc subcommittee bearings a poUey 
providing for Federal Reserve intervention in the long-term sector bad 
been proposed as an alternative to the bills only doctrine. Under 
this policy, the Federal Open Market Committee would: 
••• permit the interplay of market forces to register 
on prices and rates in all the various maturity sectors 
of the market but would La.ls~ stand ready to inter-
vene with direct purchases, sales, or swaps in any 
sector where market developments took a trend that the 
Committee considered was adverse to high level econo-
mic activity. 1 
This plan, however, was rejected in preference to bills only because 
0 
••• it did not appear to offer real promise of removing obstacles to 
improvement in the technical behavior of the market. 1115 
It has also been suggested that the real reason for the Federal 
Reserve's reluctance to extend its influence on interest rates di-
rectly was the fear that such an action would inevitably result in 
pegged mar·kets, 16 and a fair amount of evidence has been presented in 
this respect. But.~ regardless of the merits of this suggestion and 
the technical considerations with respect to the securities market, the 
Federal Reserve could in the last resort claim that no direct inter-
vention on interest rates was necessary by reason of Riefler's argument 
with respect to bank reserves and its own conception of the role of 
l4tJn1ted States Congress, United. States Monetary Policy: Recent 
Thinking and Experienc_§ p. 22. 
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arbitrage. It was, thus., 1.n this area--the relationship between short-
and long-term yields--that a substantial part of the case for bills 
Qnly could be effeciti vely evaluated .. 
The Term Structure of Interest Rates 
The relationship between short-term yields and long-term yields 
has usually been referred to as the term structure of interest rates. 
The understanding of the determination of this relationship ·is ex-
tremely important for prescribing any particular open market policy. 
Both the ad hoc subcommittee study and Riefler's analysis in 1958 
placed a great deal of emphasis on the .mechanism of arbitrage for 
transferring yield movements from one sector of the. market to another. 
But in the last 20-25 years a number of theories have been advanced 
regarding the determination of the term structure of interest rates 
which are not always consistent with the notions that the Federal Re-
serve accepted on this matter .. 
The question of the determination of the term structure of in· 
terest rates was originally investigated by F. A. Lutzl7 and J. R. 
H:I:cks.18 In more recent times among those who have dealt extensively 
l7F. A. Lutz., nTb.e Structure of Interest Rates,n Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 55 (November, 1940), pp. 36-63. 
18J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital, 2nd Ed. (London, 1946), 
Chapter 11. 
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19 20 with this subject are J.M. Culbertson, Joseph W. ~onard, · and 
DavidMeisel.man.21 Common to all these works is the "expectations 
theory" of the term structure ef interest rates.22 According to this 
theory, " ••• the yield to maturity on any long-term security will be 
approximately equal to an average of the short-term rates expected to 
rule over the remaining life of the seeurity."23 More explicitly, 
the yield of a security issued teda.y and maturing three years from 
now ·should be approximately equal to the average of: (a) the present 
yield on securities issued today and maturing one year from now; (b) 
the'expected yield on securities to be issued one year from now and 
maturing two years from now; and (c) the expected yield on securities 
to be issued two years from today and maturing three years from now. 
This conclusion follows from the assumption of the existence of ar-
bitrage and speculation in the.securities market. The following 
exa.,mple clarifies this point. Suppose that the rate of interest (r1) 
19.r. M. Culbertson,. nThe Term Structure of Interest Rates, u 
Quarterly Journal £! Economics., Vol. 71 (November, 1957), · pp. 485~517. 
20Joseph w. Conard, An Introduction to~ Theory of Interest 
(Berkeley, 1959), PP• 287-367. ·' · 
21navid Meisel.man, The Term Structure of Interest Rates 
(Englewood Cliffs, No J. ;-f 9b2): -
22 The terminology employed by the different authors is by no 
means uniform. What, for example, Meisel.man ealls the "expectation 
theory" has been referred.to by Conard as.the "neoclassical theory." 
See C_onard, P• 294 .. 
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on one-year loans due one year from now is two percent and the expected 
rate _of interest (r2) on the one-year loans due two years from now is 
four percent. Then on the basis of the expectations theory the in-
terest rate(~) on the two year loans due two years from now should 
be: 
+ re ~ = r1 · 2 = 2 + 4 = 3 percent 
2 2 
Instead of~ being three percent, assume that it is two percent. lfhen 
through arbitrage, profits can be expected to be realized by simultan-
eously borrowing for two years and lending for the first year at two 
percent and for the second year at four peroent. If the amount in-
volved was $100 the borrowing cost would come to. $4 while the expected 
lending income would be $2 + $4::: $6, thus netting a profit of $2. Of 
course, ~ cannot remain indefinite;ty at two percent. The increasing 
demand for two-year loans on the part .of those engaging in arbitrage 
will eventually force~ te three percent. Only at this rate borrowers 
as well as lenders will be indifferent between one-year and two-year 
loans. 
The policy implication of the expectations theory is that, since 
long-term rates of interest depend upon expected future short-term 
ratesJ open market operations in long-term securities will not in~ 
fluence the structure of interest rates if such operations do not alter 
expectations •. Changes, however, in short-term rates will alter long-
term rates. 
The Federal Reserve did not explicitly present the expectations 
theory as a theoretical justification of its open market policy, but 
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its notions and remarks regarding the relationsh:t.p .of short- and long-
term s~curities would indicate a substantial degree of agreement with 
the expectations theory. 
The validity of the expectations theory is ultimately linked to 
the question of whether perfect arbitrage is possible in the securities· 
ma1ket. And there are a variety- of reasons why arbitrage may be 
prevented from materializing. The dealers' commission costs ,and the 
cost of maintaining a staff of specialists to watch for yield differ-
entials in the various sectors of the market may prevent idle funds 
from entering the securities market. A second reason is that many 
institutions have funds available for only short periods of time and 
in such cases it may be customary to invest only in short-term seeuri-
ties. Another reason arises from what Conard refers to as nmarket 
segmentation.n:24 Certain institutions: 
••• place their funds in investments whose maturities are 
similar to the life of their own liabilities so that the 
likelihood of a forced prematurity sale on the one hand, 
or frequent reinvestment on the other, is small. Life 
insurance companies, for instance, typically invest in 
long-term securities, commercial banks in short and in-
termediate bonds (mostly governments), and so forth. 25 
Besides the institutional factors, there are other important con-
siderations which make the expectations- hypothesis unsatisfactory. In 
this respect, J. R~ Hicks has presented the argument26 that while 
certain borrowers who are embarking on long-term prejects may wish to 
24Ibid., p. 304. 
26 Hicks, pp. 146-147. 
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sec:ure funds on long-term basis in order to avoid the risk of fluctu-
ating interest costs which would be inherent in short-term borrowing, 
lenders in general will not want to comm~t their funds for long periods 
of time unless some ext.ra compensation was offered to them. And: 
••• If no extra return is offered for long lending, most 
people · ( and institutions) would prefer to lend short, 
at least in the sense that they wouln prefer~ hold 
their money on deposit in some way or other. · But this 
situation would leave a large excess of demands to 
borrow icing which would not be met. Borrowers would 
thus tend to offer better terms in order to persuade 
lenders to switch over into the long market ••• 27 
This analysis leads to the conclusion that long-term rates do not equal 
the average of expected future short-term rates but they exceed this 
average by a liquidity or risk premium which is necessary to .induce 
lenders to enter the long-term market. 
There have been several empirical studies concerned with the 
structure of interest rates--especially in recent years. F. A. Lutz 
in his 1940 article rejected the expectations hypothesis and one of 
his conclusions was that, u ••• the central banks must try to influence 
the long rate directly, if they want to regulate fa1vestment. n28 
Similarly, J.M. Culbertson after studying the behavior of short- and 
long-term yields for the period 1920-1957 found the expectations theory 
unsatisfactory in the explanation of the term structure of interest 
rates and, instead, he stz:essed the importance of insti tutiona.l factors 
27 . Ibid., p. 147. 
28 Lµtz, p. 60. 
as well as the "liquidity premiumu argument.29 On the other hand, a 
study of yields and yield curves by J. w. Conard covering the period 
1951-54 led him to the conclusion that, despite the institutional 
rigidities of the market, the market participants operating on the 
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basis of expectations control a llilrge enough proportion of total trans-
actions in the market so that the expectations theory constitutes an 
accurate description of the term structure of interest rates.30 
Another empirical study which has received considerable a~ten-
tion in recent years is that of David Meiselman. Meiselman tested a 
number of theories concerning the term structure o.:f' interest rates by 
making use of annual data on. basic yields of default-free corporate 
bonds for the years 1900-1954. The tests indicated that neither the 
"segmentation" argument nor the Hicks:tan risk-premium argument are 
very important in the determination of.the structure of interest rates, 
and the theory consistent with the evidence is the expectations h.ypo-
thesis.31. 
Insofar as the bills only doctrine is concerned, Meiselm.an's 
findings indicate that any Federal Reserve policies which alter the 
maturity composition of the System's portfolios will have no long-run 
effect upon the term structure of interest rates unless such actions 
also affect expectations of future rates.32 Expectations as to future 
?9 
- Culbertson, pp. 488-489. 
30conard, pp. 356-360. 
31Meiselm~n, P• 60. 
32Ibid., P• 49. 
42 
rates, according to Meiselman, will be revised by the market partici-
i 
pants if their previously held expectations do not materialize. That 
is, market participants learn from their mistakes and when their anti-
cipations about future rates are not realized they revise their pre-
sent estimates regarding :future rates,.33 The advisability, therefore., 
of Federal Reserve operations in long-term securities under the ex-
pectations hypothesis would seem to hinge on whether or not such op-
erations cause a revision of expectations about future rates. Meiselman 
does not explore this question, but Jo H. Wood, while reviewing 
Meiselman 1 s work, expressed the view that open market operations in 
lo~g-term securities by altering the maturity composition of these-
curities held by the Federal Reserve will cause a change of expecta-
tions on the part of market participants. In Wood's words: 
Meiselman 1 s model provides us with the description or a 
mechanism by which such government activities ~.e • ., those 
changing the composition of Federal Reserve portfolio!7 
must affect expectations and there'fore the structure of 
rates. If the Federal Reserve performs a swapping opera-
tion whereby long rates are driven upward and short 
driven downward, Meiselman' s error termOO owill be affected, 
causing a different revision of' expectations than would 
have been the case in the absence of government activities 
and thereby inducing a different relation between long and 
short rates than would have existed had the swapping 
operation· not occurred.34 
From this Wood concludes that the expectations hypothesis 11 ••• does ncrt 
33 · Ibid., p. 30. 
34J .. H •. Wood, 11Expectations, Errors, and tb.e Term Structure of 
Interest Rates., 11 The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXXI (April., 
1963), PP• l70-l7Y:- . . , ~ 
imply that changes in the maturity composition of outstanding debt will 
have no influence on the.term structure of interest rates. 1135 
In closing, it may be useful to point out that while exponents and 
opponents of the expectations hypothesis have devoted a great deal of 
their efforts to presenting arguments and empirical evidence contra-
dicting and supporting the assertion of perfect arbitrage in these-
curities market, hardly any attention at all has been given to the ques-
tion of how much time is required before arbitrage can transfer the 
yield changes in the short-term sector to .the long-term sector of the 
market, Le., the fluidity consideration. It would seem that the 
length of the time-lag involved in yield changes between short- and 
long-term securities should be of the utmost import~nce in monetary 
management--especially in cases where the timing of mo~etary policy 
actions plays a crucial role. For some reason, · 'however, this time-lag 
has been neglected in the ·studi_es of interest rate relationships. 
A Recapitulation of the Arguments 
The present chapter dealt with maJor issues of controversy in the 
bills on1-y doctrine. These issues were divided into technical and 
theoretical. ln the technical eate-gory, the Federal Reserve's diag-
nosis of what causes the lack of depth, breadth, and resiliency in the 
market and the remedies prescribed by the Federal Reserve for the pro-
motion of greater depth, preadth, and resilie:Q.cy-'cwere examined by the 
35 Ibid., p. 171. · 
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The New York Bank argued that the 
Federal Reserve's conception of the reasons for the lack of depth, 
breadth, and resi,liency were erroneous. The de;Pth, breadth, and re .. 
silieney of the market, according to the New York Bank, was determined 
by the dealers' evaluation of future interest rate trends, and not by 
the degree of confidence or certainty that these dealers held with 
respect to Federal Reserve intentions for open market intervention. 
In addition, the acceptance of the technical improvement of ~he se-
curities market as one of the major objectives of the Federal Reserve 
could conceivably run into conflict with other major goals of mone-
tary policy. 
The -tl:ieoretical arguments were concentrated areund the questions 
of (a) whether the Federal Reserve should try to control both bank re-
serves and interest rates and (b) whether arbitrage is sufficiently 
strong to transfer yield changes from the short- to the long-term 
sector of the market. The availability doctrine and others along the 
·; 
same lines implied that the goals of monetary policy are better served 
when the Federal Reserve extends its responsibilities to iqclude some 
control of interest rates. The answer to the second questien involves 
the censideration of the term structure of interest rates. The Fed-
eral. Reserve's notions in this_respect were related to the expectations 
hypothesis which generally views short- and long-term securities as 
perfect substitutes. 
Empirical studies on the expectations hypothesis are again in 
disagreement. The most systematic of these studies--the on~ by 
Meiselman--indicates that the expectations hypothesis can efplain 
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adequately the relationship between short- and long-term securities. 
But as Wood has pointed out, Meiselman's conclusions do not destroy 
the case for open market operations in long-term securities. It would, 
therefore, seem that an open market policy based entirely on operations 
of short-term securities--apart from technical considerations--cannot 
be defended strictly on theoretiGal grounds. 
CHAPrER IV 
THE TERMINATION OF BILIS ONLY AND THE ECONOMIC 
AND MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS OF 1961-1964 
Introduction 
The development of the bills only policy and some of the major 
controversies surrounding this policy have been reviewed in the pre-
ceding two chaptersq The present chapter examines the events that led 
to the termination of bills only and the underlying reasons for this 
action. 
In addition, the economic problems that confronted monetary 
policy during the period 1961-64, as well as the Federal Reserve actions 
taken to meet these problems, are also reviewed in this chapter. 
These two seemingly unrelated topics are essential to the prin-
cipal objectives of the overall study. Along with some of the dis-
cussions in Chapters II and III they will provide the background 
against which the appropriateness of bills only can be evaluated. 
The Abandonment of the Doctrine 
Up to 1958, the cri tic:i.sms of the bills only policy had been 
almost entirely directed against the doctrine's implications on the 
domestic sector of the economy. But in the latter pa,;rt of 1957 the 
United States economy was facing serious balance of payments difficulties •. 
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Economists could now claim another argument in the ease against the 
bills only policy. 
The international implications of the bills only doctrine can be 
readily perceived wh~n one assumes that the-central bank has the power 
to influence the term structure of interest rates. When a country ex-
periences-a balance of payments deficit, short-term capital outflows 
may be reduced by raising the short-term interest rate sufficiently so 
that foreigners acquire securities in the deficit country's money 
market. But if open market operations are confined to short-term se-
curities, the deficit country may be unable to increase short-term 
rates if at the same time it is engaged in an expansionary domestic 
policy. In such.a case, the central bank in order to increase domestic 
liquidity will buy sl:lort-term securities in the opeumarket--an action 
which reduces short-term. interest rates. But if the central bank were 
allowed to buy long-term securities instead of short-term alone, both 
the international and domestic objectives could be pursued simultan-
eously. Instead of buying short-term securities, the Federal Reserve 
could rely on purchases of long-term securities when liquidity in-
creases are desired. This should have a depressing effect on long-
term interest rates with a minimum of downward pressure on short-term 
rates. Lower long-term rates, ;~ccording to economic theory, should b~ 
expected to act as a stimulant to domesti.c investment.· The minimum 
downward pressure on short;..term rates, on the other hand, will offer 
a minimum of encouragement to short-term capital outflows. Thus, on 
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the basis of this reasoning, the bills only policy was viewed by somel 
as an impediment to economic stabilization at both the domestic and the 
international fronts. 
In addition to the balance of paYlflents prQblems, the year 1958 was 
one in which ~here was a rather severe recession in the American 
economy. Again, the Federal Reserve policies were criticized--mostly 
for their failure to bring about a reduction in the long-term rate. 
In March, 1959, the Joint Economic Committee began a series of 
hearings on the performance of the economy since the end of the Korean 
War. The report of t.b;is committee was made available on January 26, 
196o.2 In it, the Joint Econemic Committee took the position that the 
bills only policy had been a hindrance to the Federal Reserve's freedom 
of .action and recommended that it be abandoned.3 
Another important and widely-discussed study, which advocated 
abandoning the bills only policy., was the Report of the Commission on 
Money and Credit. Concerned with the problems o:f' employment and ade-
quate growth as well as with the continuing balance of payments de . .,. 
ficit, this Commission recommended that the Federal Beserve instead of 
relying on the bills only policy " ••• should be. willing, when domestic 
or international conditions warrant, te influence directly the structure 
1see for example, Joseph Ascheim, 'recbniques !! Monetary Contl,"ol 
(Baltimore, 1961), pp. 81~82. 
2united States Congress, Report of .the Joint Economic Committee, 
Employment, Growth, and Price·tevels, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second 
Session, Report No. 1043 (Washington,· 1960). · 
3 Ibid., P• 34. 
as well as the level of interest rates in pursuit of countercyclical 
monetary policies and should deal in securities of varied maturities."4. 
On February 7, 1961, the Federal Open Market Committee issued a 
directive to the effect that the Federal Reserve Bank of New 'X'ork was 
au~horized " ••• to acquire for the System Open Market Account inter-
.. :~?~ . 
mediate--and/or longer-term u. s. Government securities having maturities 
up to 10 years, or to change the holdings of such securities, in an 
amount not to,"exceed $500 million. n5 Furthermore, this. directive, 
according to the 1961 Report of the Board of Governors, included pro~ 
visions for "swapping'' operations. 
Within the terms of the JJ.ebruar., 7, l96f/ policy 
directive it was possible, for example, that short-term 
interest rate considerations might $uggest the sale of 
short~term securities at a time when the System did not 
want to absorb reserves. ln such a circumstance, .it 
might be expedient to buy longer-term securities simul-
taneously with the sale of shorte+~term securities or 
to make olfsett;Lng transactions within an interval of a 
few days.· · 
Although.the Federal Open Market Cowm:Lttee's action constituted 
a departure from the bills only policy, it was taken rather cautiously 
and more or less on aµ experimental basis in order to determine:7 
(a) whether it would be feasible to provide bank reserves without 
4:aeport of the Commission on. Money and Credit, Money and Credit 
(Englewood .Cliffs, N •. J ., 1961), p. E;4. -. - · 
5Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Forty-eighth 
Annual Report (1961), P• 39. 
6Ipid., pp. 41-42. 
7Ibid., PP• 4o-4l. 
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exerting downward pressure on short-term. interest rates; (b) whether · .. 
the purchase of long-term. securities would have a moderating influence 
on long-term. interest rates and thus promote more investment in long-
term. projects; and (c) whether the criticisms of the System's policy 
o~ operating exclusively in sho.rt-term. securities were warranted. It 
was understood that the authorization to buy long-term. securities con-
tained in the directive of February 7, 1961, was only a special author-
ization subject to review and reaffirmation in subsequent Federal 
Open Market Committee meetings. But in the final Committee meeting 
of that year--on December 19, 1961--the Federal Open Market Committee 
decided to discontinue from its directive all statements prohibiting 
open market transactions in longer-term securities and, instead, to 
give continuing authority to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
buy and sell intermediate- and longer-term securities under the terms 
of the February 7 directive.a Thus, the era of bills only was formally 
terminated on December 19, 1961. 
Economic Conditions, Economic Problems, and 
Monetary Policy: 1961-64 
When the year 1961 began, the United States economy was and had 
been experiencing a recession for nearly eight months.9 The trough of 
8xbid., pp. 93-940 
9The following sources of information have been used in this part: 
Board. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report for the 
years 1961-1964; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Annual Report for 
the years 1961-1964; and u. S. Department of Commerce, Survey .2.f. Curreni 
Business, various issues. , 
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this recession was reached in February, 1961, when the index of indus-
trial production stood at.102.l {based on 1957-59=100) or eight per-
centage points below 1 ts January, 1960 peak. By early spring, 1961, 
economic indicators pointed toward recovery. 
In terms of severity, the 1960-61. recession proved to be the 
mildest the Americ-an economy had experienced since the end:of World 
War II.. .The only significant drop in GNP occurred in the first 
quarter of 1961. The GNP was then $501 billion, about $5'~illion less 
than the peak reached in the second quarter of 1960. By the end of 
196).., however, the GNP had risen to $542 billion. Other economic in-
dicators had also registered gains in 1961. The index of industrial 
production rose from 102.l in February to 109.8 in December. For the 
first time in the history of the United States, the per capita dispos-
able income passed the $2,000 mark, increasing from $1,940 in the 
first quarter to $2,032 in the fourth. 
An unex.pectf:ld characteristic of the 1961 recovery was the high de-
gree of price stability in view of the substantial increase in econo-
mic activity. The consumer price index rose only l.l percentage points 
while the wholesale price index registered a slig~t decline. 
Two serious problems persisted in 1961. Despite the rise of out-
put after the first quarter, ,the unemployment rate remained close to 
seven percent through most of the year and only in the last two months 
did it begin to decline. As 1961 came to an end, the unemployment rate 
was still above the six percent mark. In addition, t~e balance of pay-
ments remained in deficit. At the end of 1961, the country I s inter-. 
national transactions showed a $2.4 billion. excess of U. s. payments 
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over U.S. receipts. This was considerably less than the deficit of 
$3·9 billion in 1960. However, the decrease in the deficit material-
ized mostly in the first half of 1961. In the second half, the rate 
of deficit was comparable with that of 1960. The gold outflow for 
1961 amounted to $1.7 billion. 
Monetary policy in 1961 was confronted with two major objectives. 
One of these was to stimulate business expansion, Toward this end, the 
Federal Reserve System supplied sizeable amounts of member bank reserves 
which, at the end of the year, resulted in an increase of total loans 
and investments by commercial banks of $14.6 billion. 
The second objective of monetary policy was to di~courage as much 
as possible the outflow of short-term funds in order to reduce the de-
ficit in the balance of payments. The departure from the bills only 
policy in February enabled the Federal Reserve to purchase securities 
in the open market outside the short-term area. This provided member 
bank reserves with a minimum of downward pressure on short-term interest 
rates. In addition, on December l., 1961., the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System and the directors of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation approved an increase, effective January l, 1962, 
in the maximum interest rates. allowable on time deposits under Regula-
tion Q.. The maximum rate payable by member banks on certificates 
ha¥ing a maturity of at least six months was raised to three and one-
half percent. Similarly, the rate on deposits with at least a year t~ 
maturity was increased to four percent. In the announcement of the 
change in Regulation Q., the Board of Governors indicated that the pur-
pose of this action was to permit commercial banks to compete more 
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effectively for savings and other time deposits and to prevent funds 
from moving abroad in search of higher returns. 
Developments in 1962 
The two basic problems ef 1961 persisted through 1962. Unemploy-
ment declined somewhat, but it still averaged 5.6 percent of the labor 
force. Similarly., the balance of payments deficit was reduced slightly 
in.'1962, but at a. level of $2.2 billion it continued to rem.a.in a pro-
blem. 
Under conditions such as these, Federal Reserve pelicy was again 
caught in the dilemma of achieving domestic and international economic 
objectives. As.'in 1961, .the Federal Reserve ma.d,e reserves readily 
;-
available to banks so that they could provide credit for economic ex-
pansion. The loans and investments of the commercial banks increased· 
by $19 billion during 1962, a gain of 8.5 percent over the previous 
' ' 
year. 'fhe increase in loans.to business and consumers amounted to $14 
billion. At the same time, there was a continuing concern that in-
creasing ;Liquidity to encourage domestic expansion would aggravate 
further the balance of payments problem. As a d~£ense against short~ 
term capital outflows the System eontinued1 whenever possible, t~ 
provide b~nk reserves through open market purchases autside the short-
term sec.tor of the securities market. A substantial pa.rt of excess 
member bank reserves was also made available when, in, October., 1962, 
the Board of Governors of the Federal, Reserve System reduced the re-
, 
serve requirements against time deposits from five to four percent. 
This action resulted in a $780 million increase in excess reserves. 
The GNP during 1962 approached $555 billion, about seven percent 
above the previous year. Whereas, however, in the last three-quarters 
of 1961 the GNP increased by an average of $12 billion per quarter, the 
comparable figure in 1962 for all four quarters was only $6 billion~ 
The index of industrial production at the end of 1962 stood at 119.2 
(based on 1957-59 = 100) as compared with an index of 199.8 for Decem-
ber, 1961. 
Consumer prices showed a somewhat ~arger increase in 1962 than in 
1961. The l.2 percentage points rise in the consumer price index was 
primarily due to the increase in the prices of certain agricultural pro-
ducts, notably meats. In 1961 food prices had declined. 
Finally, 1962 was the year in which serious consideration was 
given to the possibility.of tax reductions as a means to stimulate the 
economy. The persistence of substantial unemployment, along with the 
presence of excess capacity in industry, was looked upon as the re-
sult of insufficiency in aggregate demand. Gove:rnm~nt economists and 
some politicians, therefore, reasoned that the lowering of personal 
income tax rates and the effects of this action on disposable income 
offered the best prospect of reaching higher levels of employment and 
resource utilization. 
Developments in 1963 
By several measures, the performance of the United States economy 
in 1963 showed an improvement. Production, employment, per capita 
personal income, corporate profits, all these showed gains in 1963. 
But the familiar problems of unemployment and balance of payments dis-
equilibrium continued to exist. 
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In more specific terms, the GNP continued to increase throughout 
1963, climbing to $585.1 billion for the year as a whole. This re~ 
presented an increase of over $30 billion or 5.5 percent from 1962. 
Disposable income on per capita basis for the entire year rose above 
the $2,100 mark. 
The increased output in 1963 brought about an advance in employ-. 
ment. Total civilian employment averaged 68.8 million for the year, 
and this figure was approximately one million greater than th.at of 
1962. The level and rate of unemployment, however, showed little 
change during the year. The average number of unemployed was slightly 
above four million, or 5.7 percent of the labor force~ 
The consumer price index rose by 1.3 percentage points over 1962. 
This was approximately the same increase that took place in each of 
the two previous years. On the other hand, the index of wholesale 
prices for all commodities declined from 100.6 percent in 1962 to 
100.3 percent in 1963. This overall decline was priJnarily the result 
of the fall in wholesale prices for farm products from 97.7 t@ 95.7 
during the same period. 
An important development in 1963 was the sharp decline in the 
balance of payments deficit from the first to the second half of the 
year. At a seasonally adjusted annual rate, the deficit on regular 
transactions decreased from around $4.5 billion during the first six 
months of the year to $1.6 billion in the last silt months. For the 
year as a whole, the adverse balance on regular transactions was $3.3 
billion. 
The Federal Reserve during 1963 continued to pursue policies de-
signed to meet the needs of the expanding domestic economy and of the 
deficit in the balance of payments. Credit was, therefore, abundant 
in 1963. The loans and investments of commercial b~nks increased by 
$18.6 billion. The increased strain on the balance of payments con-
dition during the firs~ half of the year forced the monetary authori~ 
ties to move toward a policy of somewhat less ease after mid-year. 
The change was signaled on July 16, 1963, when the discount rate at 
the New York and six other.Federal Reserve Banks was raised to three 
and one-half percent from the three percent rate that had prevailed 
since the middle of 196o. At thf;l same time, the Board of Governors 
raised to four percent the maximum interest rate that .member banks 
could pay on time deposits and certificates of deposit with maturities 
from 91 days to one year. The effects of these actions were re-
fleeted in the reserve position of member banks. Free reserves in 1963 
averaged around $200 m11i1on as compared to $424 million in 1962. 
. . . 
Finally, in November, 1963, the Board of Govenors in seeking to 
prevent exce~sive use of stock market credit increased the ~rgin re-
quirements on loans for pu:t!chasin.g' listed seeuri ties from 50 to 70 
percent of the market value of the securities. 
Developments in 1964 
The economic gains of 1963 were equaled and, in some cases, even 
surpassed during 1964. In addition, 1964 was the fourth successive 
year of high and rising economic activity. 'fhe expansion from the 
:,,, 
cyclical trough in February, 1961, had become by the end of 1964 one 
of the longest periods of advance on record. 
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After a rather lengthy, discussion, the United States Congress 
early in 1964 approved a personal and corporate income tax reduction. 
The income tax reduction brought about an increase in dj,sposable in-
=·· ' 
come and a rise in consumer spending. At the end of the year, dis-
posable personal income had increased by $29.5 billion over 1963 while 
personal consumption expenditures went up $24.5 billion. dur;ng the 
same period. 
The GNP increased by an annual rate of more than $10 billion a 
quarter during the first three-quarters of 1964. In the fourth quarter 
the rate of increase was only $6 billi,on, but this was mainly due to 
lapor strikes in the automobile industry which began in the final week 
of September. For the year as a whole, GNP was $622.5 billion, an 
increase of $38.5 billion, or 6.5 percent at prevailing prices, over 
Price changes during 1964 were not markedly different from those 
experienced in the previous three years. The consumer price index ad-
vanced about l.25 percentage points over 1963,, while the wholesale 
price index remained virtually unchanged. A major factor contributing 
to the rise in the consumer price index was the increase in the 
prices for services. 
The expansion of the economy during 1964 had,· as it would be ex-
pected, favorable effects upon employment. Total employment in 1964 
reached 70.4 million. The increase of 1.5 million in employment over 
1963 more than kept pace with the 1964 growth in the labor force of 1.3 
million. Unemployment averaged 5.2 percent of the labor force. 
The reduction in the balance of payments deficit which had 
occurred during the second half of 1963 continued into the first quar-
ter of 1964; thereafter the size of the deficit increased. Neverthe-
less, the $3 billion deficit on regular transactions in 1964 was $300 
million lower than that of the previous year. The decrease during 
1964 in the gold reserves amounted to $125 million. This was the 
smallest gold drain in seven years. 
In 1964 the major obJectives of monetary policy were again to 
provide credit for continued expansion and to reduce incentives for 
short-term capital to flow out of the country. To implement the first 
objective the Federal Reserve supplied sufficient reserves to member 
banks to permit an expansion in bank credit of $19.5 billion during 
the year. On the other hand, when toward the end of 1964 the inter-
national payments system was disturbed because of the sterling cri.sis, 
the Federal Reserve did not hesitate to take precautionary action 
against possible capital outflows. When the British bank rate was 
increased from five to seven percent on November 23, the Federal Re-
serve discount rates were raised from 3.5 to 4.0 percent and a simul-
taneous upward adjustment was made in ceilings of time deposit interest 
rates. 
The brief year-to-year description of the state of the United 
States economy during the early sixties may be summarized as follows~ 
Since the beginning of the business expansion in February, 1961., the 
annual rate of increase in GNP has been more than 6.5 percent in 
current prices and more than five percent after allowing for price 
increases. Some gains were also registered ;i.n the level of employment 
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and the size of the deficit in the balance of payments was somewhat re-
duced. Nevertheless, these two problems--the unemployment rate and 
the balance of payments deficit--continued to remain unsolved through-
out the 1961-64 period. During the same period, the major objectives .. 
of monetary policy were to provide reserves for economic expansion and 
to discourage the outflow of capital. 
Open Market Transactions, 1961-1964 
Practically all changes in member bank reserves during 1961-64 
were brcmght about through the use of open market operations. The 
Federal Reserve reduced reserve requirements once in the period 1961-64. 
This occurred in the fall of 196g when the Board of Governors reduced 
the reserve requirement on time deposits from five to four percent, 
thereby increasing excess reserves by $780 million. 
Volume of Open Market Transactions 
The bills only policy, besides limiting open market operations to 
short-term securities, also provided for a "mini.mum of intervention" 
in the open market. Its termination, therefore, in 1961 enabled the 
Federal Reserve to pursue a more active open market policy for the 
period 1961-64 than it had pursued in earlier periods. Table I indi-
cates how open market transactions have been conducted d~ring the 
1961-64 period. 
Total Federal Reserve transactions--outright plus repurchase agre~~ 
ments--for this period amounted to $118.4 bi.llion. This is a greater 
a.mount than the total of $104.4 billion of the seven-year period 1954-60. 
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In terms of annual averages, the 1961-64 average of $29.6 billion re-
presents an increase of almost 100 percent over that of the 1954-60 
per:1.0do 
TABLE I 
VOLUME OF SYSTEM TRANSACTIONS IN U. s. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 
Year or 
Period 
1954-60 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1961-64 
Annual 
Average 
l954-6o 
1961-64 
Total 
104.4 
24.7 
28.6 
31.4 
33.7 
118.4 
Repurchase 
Out;ri ht_8 . reements 
Billions of Dollars· 
39.0 65.4 
15.2 9.5 
16.6 12.0 
13.3 18.1 
15.9 17.8 
61.0 57.4 
8 0pen market purchases and sales taken together. 
bincludes $295 million of maturing coupon issues. 
Rede tions 
9.1 
1.3b 
l.4 
1.2 
2.1 
6.o 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 7 (July, 1964), p. 825; 
and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual 
Reports for the years 1961-1964. · 
Beth outright transactions and repurchase agreements increased 
during the 1961-64 period. But, of the two, the greatest growth has 
been realized in 9utrigbt transactions. The average of outright trans-
, 
actions for the period 1961-64 was almost three times greater than the 
equivalent figure of the previous seven-year period. The substantial 
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growth in repurchase agreements was mainly motivated by the Federal 
Reserve's concern to minimize fluctuations of short-term interest rates. 
Repurchase agreements are usually,~ndertaken when the System wants to 
increase member bank reserves on a temporary basis •. A similar reserve . 
effect to that of repurchase agreements would be realized if the Fed-
eral Reserve bought bills outright and then sold them after a speci-
fied period (Le., same period as that specified under repurchase 
agreements). But, outright purchases of bills may put direct downward 
pressure on short-term interest rates and also may reduce the inven-
tories of the dealers below the desired levels. When this occurs, 
dealers cannot be certain that the System will sell soon after it 
buys and they may decide to increase their inventories, thereby driving 
the short-term rate further down. When the temporary ne~d for re-
serves is over and the System decides to sell the bills it had bought 
earlier, the bill-rate w11i be driven up. However, much of the flue-. 
tuat:,ion :tn the bill-rate could have been a.voided if repurchase agree-
ments were used instead of outright transactions. If the System were 
to purchase securities from dealers under the condition that these 
securities would be repurchased by the same dealers within a cer,tain 
p{:;riod., there would be no need for any increases in dealers' inven-
tories because the dealers would know that their securities would 
soon be available to satisfy customer demands. Thus, there would be 
less fluctuation in interest rates when repurchase agreements would be 
used@ 
Maturity Distribution of Outright 
Transacti.ons 
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The departure from the bills only policy in early 1961 was followed 
by open market transactions outside the short-term sector. For the 
period 1961-64, purchases of securities with maturities greater than 
one year totaled over $7.1 billion, while sales of such securities 
during the same peri.od amounted to only $255 million. The greater 
volume of purchases as compared to sales in this period was in accor-
d.ance with the Federal Reserve's objective of providing adequate bank 
reserves and minimizing downward pressure on short-term interest rates 
at the same time~ 
As Table II shows.~ only twice in the preceding seven-year period 
had the Federal Reserve dealt in securities with more than a year to 
maturity. In 1958, the Federal Reserve intervention in the longer-term 
area was in response to the 11disorderly conditionsn of the securities 
market that developed in the summer of that year.lo The other occasion 
was in 1960 when the Federal Reserve bought $113 million of inter-
mediate-term securities and sold $14 million of such securities. The 
author has been unable to find a statement as to the reasons for the 
1960 intervention outside the bill sector. It should be noted, however, 
that the volume of securities with maturities of more than a year in-
volved in Federal Reserve transactions during 1958 and 1960 was quite 
low. During the two occasions purchases and sales were only $178 and 
$14 million, respectively. 
10Board of Governors of ·the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report 
(1958L P· 7. 
TABLE II 
MATURITY DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL OUTRIGHT TRANSACTIONS OF THE SYSTEM 
Treasury~Bills ......... - -------------- -------
.. Coui!§n-Issii.es Mafurin~ ,/:. 
Redemp- l Year l-,2 Years Over ,2 Years 
Year Purchases Sales tions Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Saies 
{In Millions of Dollars) 
1954 2,903 1,:354 1,978 
195.5 2,009 1,416 1,257 167 
-- -- -- -- --1956 3,12.5 2,018 888 
1957 2,407 2,161 984 
--
153 
1958 5,489 2,63.3 l,590 1,200 
--
10 
--
55 
1959 2,866 1,574 937 
1960 ~ ~ 1.44.2 202 218 113 14 Total. 23,l 9 13,7 7 9,079 1,569 371 123 14 55 
1961 5,794 4,486 1,015 600 l,474a 1,92.3 97 788 
1962 6,81.3 6,211 1,35.3 1,085 402 1,569 108 .362 
1963 7,291 4,360 1,232 56 54 844 50 609 
1964 92433 & ~ ~ -- ~ -- .....22! Total 29,331 20, 9 5, 93 1,930 , 1 255 2,310 
aExcludes $29.5 million of maturing issues. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 7 (July, 1964), P• 837; and Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report for~the years 1961-1964. 
"' L,..) 
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Table III shows the maturity distribution of open market purchases 
and sales. 
TABLE III 
MATURITY DISTRIBUTION OF SYSTEM PURCHASES AND SALES 
Transaction 
by Maturi t;y: 1954-60 1961 1962 1963 
(Percent) 
1964 1961-64 
Total Purchases 100.oa 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
'.rreasury bills 93.0 63.6 69-3 82.9 90.2 76.8 
Coupon issues 
maturing 
l year 6.3 6.6 ll.O .6 4.8 
l-5 years .5 21.1 16.0 9.6 4.4 12.6 
Over 5 years .2 8.7 3.7 6.9 5.3 6.o 
Total Sales 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Treasury bills 97-3 74.l 92.4 97.7 100.0 90.5 
Coupon issues 
maturing 
l year_ 2.6 24.3 6.o l.2 8.5 
l-:5 years .1 l.6 l.6 1.1 l.l 
Over 5 years 
a 
not always add to 100 percent because Detailed percentages may 
of rounding. 
It can be seen from thi.s table that the overwhelming majority of 
Federal Reserve purchases for the pericid 1954-60 as a whole were 
Treasury bills; 93 percent of such purchases were in bills. In con-
trast, during the 1961-64 period, this percentage had dropped to 
76.8 percent. The percent of System purchases of intermediate- and 
long-term securities for the years 1961-64 was 18.6. The largest pro-
portion of purchases in this area took place during 1961. Almost 30 
percent of all the purchases during that year were maturing in more 
than a year. In comparison, considerably less than one percent of the 
purchases during the 1954-60 period were in the longer-term area. 
Federal Reserve sales for both periods were concentrated in 
Treasury bills. For the period 1961-64, bills accounted for 90.5 
percent of open market sales as compared to 97.3 percent for the pre-
ceding seven years. The somewhat lower percentage for the years 1961-
.. 
64 results from the 1961 sale of $1,474 million coupon issues maturing 
within one year; otherwise the percent of bill sales for both periods 
would have been about the same. Security sales in the intermediate 
sector of the market were small, constituting only l.l percent of sales 
during 1961-64. During the same period, no sales were undertaken in 
the maturity range of five years or more. Thus, the fundamental differ-
ence in the maturity distributions of open market purchases and open 
market sales during this four-year period can be found in the fact that, 
in terms of volume, the purchases of. intermediate- and long-term se-
curities were greater than sales. This was in line with the Federal· 
Reserve objective of providing ample bank reserves while, at the same 
time, keeping the long-term interest rate from rising and the short-
term rate from falling. 
Some Unsettled Issues 
The remainder of the chapter sets the stage for an enumeration of 
certain iss~es connected with recent open market policies. It was in-
dicated in Chapter II that the most important reason for the confine-
ment of open market operations to bills 01',J.ly was the argument that 
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such confinement would improve the technical functioning of these-
curities market in terms of depth, breadth, and resiliency. Federal 
Reserve officials (e.g., Winfield Riefler) also presented this argu-
ment in a negative way. They argued that the extension of o~en market 
operations to the long-term s_ector of the market could result in mis-
taken expectations on the part of security dealers, thereby jeopardizing 
the stability of interest rates in the Government securities market. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, on tne, other hand, maintained 
that factors other than Federal Reserve actions in the open market de~ 
ter.mine the depth, breadthy and resiliency of the securities market. 
Since open market operations were,, in fact, ex.tended to long-term se-
curities, it appears possible to examine whether the views of the 
Federal Reserve officials regarding the technical functioning of the 
market were warranted. 
Another issue which needs further investigation is the quest:i.on of 
subs ti tutabili ty among securities of various me.turi ties. The Federal 
Reserve 1s view on this point is that short- and long-term securities 
can generally be treated as near-perfect subst;!tuteso This is based· 
on the assumption that the forces of speculation and arbi~rage will 
transmit yield changes which are initiated in one·particular sector to 
other sectors of the securities mark.eto In Chapter III several views 
are presented claiming that arbitrage and speculation are not capable 
of' transmitting yield changes from one sector to another. Thus.i 
whether the actual behavior of interest rates in securities with 
different maturities corresponds with the Federal Reserve 1 s views is 
an hypothesis which can be verified empirically. 
Finally, it is also of importance to know whether monetary po~icy 
succeeded, during the 1961-64 period, in raising short-term rates and 
thus reducing the difference between the yields of short-term issues 
and the yields of longer-term securities. 
These questions will be subjected to an evaluation in the following 
three chapters. 
CHAPI'ER V 
THE ISSUE OF' PARALLEL YIELD CHANGES 
Introduction 
It was generally argued by the advocates of bills only that yield 
changes in the short-term sector of the Government securities market 
would be followed by similar rapid changes in other sectors. The re-
port of the ad hoc subcommittee, as was indicated in Chapter II, re-
lied upon this argument to defend the proposition that longer-term 
yields could be controlled by actions that affect short-term yields. 
Riefler' s analysis in 1958 also assumed or argued that long-term yi.elds 
would respond to changes of short-term yields. He wrote that, although 
".,.open market operations have been confined almost wholly to Trea-
sury bills, the response to those operations in the long-term capital 
markets and in movements of long-term interest rates has been in 
general anything but lethargic. 111 
Both the ad hoc subcommittee report and the Riefler analysis em-
phasize that the forces behind the transfer of yield movements from one 
sector of' the market to another are arbitrage, speculation, and the 
substitution of security instruments of various maturities that is 
1winfield W. Riefler, nopen Market Operations in Long-Term Securi-
ties, n Federal Reserve Bulleiin, Vol. 44, No. 11 · (November, 1958}, 
P• 1260~ . ,. .. . .. . . .. . 
68 
undertaken by insurance companies and other financial institutions wh~n 
there a.re opportunities for higher returnso 
Under conditions such as these it would be possible to bring about 
cha.ngef in long-term. rates simply by changing short-term rates. The 
opposite is, b;y implication, also true. Should there be a change in 
long-term yields, the forces of arbitrage, speculation, and substitu-
.. . 
tion would bring about a change of the same direction in abort-term 
yields. Furthermore; such analysis implies that as long as yield move-
ments are transferred from one sector to another any attempts by 
•· . 
monetary authorities to bring about a lasting change in the relation-
ship between the levels of short- and long-term yields will fail. If, 
for example, the System through open market purchases lowered .long-
term yields relative to short-term yields, this situation cannot be 
maintained because the transfer of funds from the long- to the short-
term sector will lower short-term yields and raise long-term yields so 
that the net effect of the original change in long-term yields will be 
to leave both short- and long-term yields lower than they were at the 
time the open market purchases took place. 
There are important policy implications in such analysis. During 
the 1961-64 period, as was indicated in the preceding chapter} one of 
the main Federal Reserve objectives was to raise short-term interest 
rates in relation to long-term. Under the assumptionJ however, that 
yield movements are easily transferred from one sector to another the 
attainment of such an objective would have been impossible because in-
creases in short-term rates would have been followed by similar in-
creases in long-term rates, and all that monetary policy would have 
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been able to achieve would be to raise the levels of both the short-
and long-term rates. Thus, the attainment th.roµgh monetary policy of 
higher short-term rates relative to long-term would seem to depend upon 
- . ··- .......... ,.... .., . 
the ineffectiveness of arbitrage, speculation, and substitution to 
transfer yield movements from one Inf:~ket s!etor to another. 
Tm.e present chapter will be devoted to:testing the hypothesis that 
.. ·'· ' '•' 
yield changes in one sector are followed by similar changes in other 
maturity sectors. 
Methods of Testing the Rypoth._esis 
The hypothesis can be tested in at least two different ways. One 
of these is to observe yield changes for a given time period in a parti-
• r '... • ,, 
cular maturity sector and determine whether the yields of anpther see-
tor during the same time period have changed in the same direction. 
Under the assumption that the securities market is characterized by 
arbitrage, speculation, and substitution it should be expected that 
yield changes in two different maturities sectors will be in the sa~e 
. ,· , .. 
direction. If, for example, short-term yields during a given week de-
elined, long-term yields, also, should have declined during the same 
week. Such e~ectation also depends upon how quickly yield changes in 
the short-term sector are transferred to the long-term sector. In 
general, the proponents of bills only thought that the yield movements 
from one sector to another are brought about without much delay. Dur-
ing the 1954 ad hoc subcommittee hearings, for instance, Chairman Martin, 
in response to a question by Senator Flanders o~ the subject of arbi-
trage, gave the following answer: nwell, I think the process of 
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arbitrage, whicll is the adjustment which Mr. Sproul thinks has more of 
a lag than I think it has, takes place very quickly in the market for 
Government securities. 112 
The other method that can be used to determine whether yield move-
ments are transferred from one sector to another utilizes correlation 
analysis. It is based on the proposition that the size of the corre-
lation coefficient (r) or the coefficient of determination (r2) between 
the yields of two debt instruments of different maturities can serve 
as an indicator as to the degree of exactness by which yield movements 
in the two instruments parallel each other. If, for example, yield 
changes in the short-term sector are followed by the same percentage 
changes in the long-term sector, i.e., if the bill rate during acer-
tain period doubles the bond rate also doubles., then the correlation 
coefficient as well as the coefficient of determination for short- and 
long-term yields would have maximum values, that is, both would have 
a value equal to unity. On the other hand, should the yield movements 
in the long-term sector be independent of the movements in the short-
term sector the correlation coefficient would l;le on.ly a small fraction 
of one and this would indicate that the forces of arbitrage, specula-
tiony and substitution are not very effective in transmitting yi.eld 
changes from the short- to the long,-term sector of the market. 
2united States CongressJ Joint Committee on the Economic Report.v 
Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization1 United States Monetary Policy: 
Recent Thinking and Experience» Hearings;, Eighty-third Congress, Second 
Session (Washington~ 1954):, p. 230. 
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The Evidence from Weekly Yield Changes 
To determine the extent by which yield movements in two different 
maturity sectors parallel each other, different yields for the period 
1956-64 have been observed and their changes recorded. All yields 
are weekly averages. They are shown in Appendix Table I. 
Table IV summarizes the direction of yield changes on Treasury 
bills and long-term bonds for the years 1956-64. 
The first column shows the number of weeks that the yields on 
Treasury bills and long-term bonds changed in the same direction. 'l?hat 
;s, either both yields increased during a given week or both yields 
decreased. In the same way, if one of the two yields increased wh:ile 
the other decreased then such change is registered under the column 
"changed in oppos:i te direction." Weeks in which only one of the two 
yields changed or neither of the two rates changed are recorded in the 
last two columns. 
As Table IV indicates, during the period 1956-60 the number of 
weeks that the yields of bills and bonds moved in the same direction 
varied from 26 weeks per year to 36 weeks per year. In percentage terms 
such changes varied from around 51 percent to about 68 percent. For 
the period 1956-60 as a whole, 151 weekly changes were in the same 
direction, 75 in the opposite direction, and for 34 weeks there was 
either no yield change from the preceding week or only one of the two 
yields changed. In terms of percentages, yields on bills and bonds 
moved in the same direction in 58.08 percent of the weeks during this 
period and in 28.85 percent of the weeks they moved in opposite di-
rections. 
Year or 
Period 
1956 
1957 
19.58 
19.59 
1960 
19.56-60 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1961-64 
TABLE IV 
DIRECTIONS OF WEEKLY YIE1D CHANGES ON 9l=DAY TREASURY BILLS AND LONG-TERM BONDS 
Changed in Changed in Oppo= Only One of the 
Same Direction site Direction Two Chan~ed Neither Chan~ed 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
of of of of of of of of 
Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks 
26 .50.98 17 33.33 8 1.5.69 0 
30 57.69 17 32.69 4 7.70 1 1.92 
29 5.5 .. 77 14 26.92 8 1.5.38 1 1.92 
JO .57.69 16 30.77 6 11..54 0 
36 67.92 11 20.75 6 11.32 0 
1.51 ,58.08 7.5 28.8.5 32 12.31 2 0.77 
2.5 48.08 18 34.62 9 17.31 0 
2.5 48.08. 1.5 28.8.5 12 23.08 0 
22 42.31 8 1.5.38 20 J8.46 2 3.85 
14 27.45 7 13.73 2.5 49.02 .5 9.80 
86 41.54 48 23.19 66 31.88 7 3.38 
-..J 
w 
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For the period 1961-64, yield changes i.n the same direction as 
well as yield changes in the opposite direction were less frequent than 
in the 1956-60 period. This difference may be partly attributed to 
the rise in the percent of weeks that only one of the two rates changed. 
For 1956-60 this percentage was 12.31, in contrast to 31.88 for the 
period 1961-64. 
For the period 1956-64 as a whole, yields moved in the same di-
rection 237 times and 123 times in the opposite direction. It may be 
said, therefore, that for every tllree weekly changes in th~ yields · of 
bothj bills and long-tenn bonds,.· about two such changes were in· the 
same direction and one in the opposite. Such behavior is certainly not 
consistent with the assumption that the forces of arbitrage, specula-
tion, and substitution will cause parallel yield changes from one 
sector to another. Contrary to such an assumption, for the period 
1956-64 o.ne-third of the weekly changes were in the oppos:i te direction. 
The validity of this assumption is further weakened when the weeks in 
which only one of th« yields changed are considered as evidence against 
the hypothesis. Such interpretation can be based on the argument 
tb.l;l,t if one of the twe> rates changedj arbi tra,ge and speculation sbo:u.ld 
have transmitted a similar change to the other sector. Then for the 
period 1956-64, the total of the weeks in which either changes in the 
opposlte direct:1.on occurred @r only one of the two yields changed comes 
to 221 (See Table IV). This is only slightly.less than th~ total of 
237 weeks :in which the two yields changed in the same direction. 
In addition to Treasury bills and long-term bondsi the yield be-
havior of another combination of maturities has, also, been analyzed. 
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This combination includes th~ yields of 3-5 year issues and long-term 
bonds. The results are shown in Table V. 
The yield movements in this combination differ from the yield 
movements. of bills and long-term bonds in one important respect. 
During both the 1956-60 and 1961-64 periods, the yields on 3-5 year 
issues and long-term bonds changed more often in the same direction and 
less frequently.in the opposite direction than did the yields of bills 
and bonds. The ratio of the number of weeks that yields of 3-5 year 
issues and long-term bonds moved in the same direction to the number 
of weeks that these yields moved in the opposite direction is 5 to l 
for the 1956-60 period. and 6.63 to l for 1961-64. In comparison, the 
corresponding ratios for bills and long-term bonds were 2 to l for both 
the 1956-60 and 1961-64 periods. Even when the number of weeks in 
which the yields on 3-5 year issues and long-term bonds changed in the 
opposite direction are added to the .weeks that only one of these two 
yields changed, the total is less than the number of weeks that wit-
nessed. yield changes in the same directiono For the period 1956-64, 
as a whole, the number of weeks with opposite yield changes plus the 
number of weeks with only one of the two yields c~angin~ comes to a 
total of 146 as compared with a total of 311 yield changes in the same 
direct:lt.on. In eontrasti the corresponding figures for bill-bond yield 
changes were 237 in the same direction and 221 either in the opposite 
direction or change i.n one only. The empirical evidence leads to the 
Year or 
Period 
19.56 
19.57 
19.58 
19.59 
1960 
19.56-60 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
J.,961-64 
TABLE V 
DIRECTIONS OF WEEKLY IlEIJ) CHANGES ON 3=.5 YEAR ISSUES AND LONG-TERM BONDS 
Changed in Changed in Oppo- Only One of the 
Same Direction site Direction Two ChanB;ed Neither Chan~ed 
Nllillber Percent Nllillber Percent Nllillber Percent Nllillber Percent 
of of of of of of of of 
Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks 
36 70 • .59 .5 9.80 10 19.61 0 
39 7.5.00 8 1.5.38 4 7.70 l 1.92 
34 6.5.38 9 17.31 8 1.5.38 l 1.92 
38 73.08 7 13.46 7 13.46 0 
38 71.70 8 1.5.09 6 u.32 1 1.89 
18.5 71.1.5 37 14.23 3.5 13.46 3 1.1.5 
37 71.1.5 .5 9.62 9 17.31 l 1.92 
3.5 67.31 8 1.5.38 9 17.31 0 
29 .5.5 • .58 2 3.8.5 18 '.34.62 3 5.77 
25 49.02 4 7.84 19 37.25 3 5.88 
126 60.87 19 9.18 55 26.57 7 3.38 
-....] 
Cl'\ 
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conclusion that the exterit to which yield changes move in the same 
direction depends upon the combination of the two maturity issues.3 
'fbis analysis _of yield movements on 3-5 ye~r issues and ~ong-term. 
bonds indicates that the extent of parallel yield changes within these 
two maturity classes is much greater than between Treasury bill~ and 
long-term bonds. Although this evidence is not entirely consistent 
3The question of whether the direction ~f yield changes is inde-
pendent of the particular combination of maturities can be subjected 
to statistical testo The yield changes in the same direction and the 
opposite direction for the period 1956-64, as a whole, can, along with 
the two different maturity combinations, form the following contingency 
table: 
Number o.f Weeks Number of Weeks 
Yields Changed Yields-Changed 
Maturity in Same in Opposite 
Combinatio:ti Direction Direction Total 
Bills and Bonds 237 123 360 
3-5 Years and Bonds 311 '5(5 367 
Total 548 179 727 
The Chi-square statistic ~n be used to test the hypothesis.that the 
two characteristics (direction of yield change and maturity combina-
tion) are independent. For the above table the value of the Cbi-
square statistic is: 
x2 _ [""I (~37)(56) ~ (123)(311)1 -: 1/2(727)]2 _ 33•8 
· - (360)(548)(179)(367) · -
For one degree of freedo~, the theoretical ;;995, :~!lat is., when 0(: 
.005, is 7.88. The hypothesis ef independence in 'the ~wo tra.its 
must be rejected, ioeoj, tlil:ere is sufficient evidene;e ·_to believe that 
the direction of yield changes depends upon or is in.flueneed by·the 
maturity c<>mbination. · · - :· 
with the arbitrage-speculation-substitution hypothesis, it, ne~erthe-
less, suggests that if arbitrage, speculation, and substitutien are 
the forces which transmit yield movements from one sector to another 
then these forces must be more effective in transferring yields between 
the intermediate- and the long-term sectors of the me.rket than between 
the short- and long-term sectors. 
The Evidence from Correlation Analysis 
I 
A number of simple correlation coefficients have· been computed 
using yields of different maturities as variables. This method of de-
termining the responsiveness of yield changes in a certain sector to 
the yield changes of another sector has the advantage over the method 
of simply observing and analyzing yield changes between sectors, in that 
it takes into account the magnitude of changes. For example, if the 
yields on bills and bonds both inc~eased during a certain week, under 
the method of simply analyzing this change, the conclusion would be 
the same, no matter if the change in the bond yield was three times 
greater than the change in the bill yieldo In correlation analysis, 
~ 
however, the magnitude of such changes will affect .the value of! and, 
therefore, the conclusions that are derived from it. 
The variables which have been used in deriving the correlation co-
efficients are weekly yields on 91-day Treasury bills, 9-12 month 
Treasury bills, 3-5 year note and bond issues, and long-term bonds 
maturing or callable in 10 years or more. Correlation coefficients for 
three different time periods have been computed. The time periods 
79 
selected are 1956-64, 1956-60, and 1961-64. The values4 of the cor-
relation coefficients are shown in Table VI. 
The valµes of the correlation coefficients depend upon the maturi-
ties of the independent and dependent variables. For clarity of 
analysis, these correlation coefficients will be examined in three 
separate categories. 
Yields on 91-Day Bills a$ the 
Independent Variable 
The values of the correlation coefficients resulting from the use 
of yields on 91-day bills as the independent variable--with ene 
~he observed values of r have been tested for significance by 
the t statistic: 
t : r y'ii:g 
\jl-r where n: sample size. 
The smallest sample size i.n this study is that of 203 w~eks for the 
period 1961-64. The theoretical t-value with ~Ol degrees ef freedom 
at the .Ol level of significance is 2.576. Substituting this value 
in the above formula and solving for !'.. it b foun.d that: 
2 • 576 = r \/203-2 
\/l-r 
r: t .18 
Thus, any r. with an absolute value greater tharf .18 is significant, 
1.e., the population correlation coefficient: :rs riot equal to zero. 
It should be noted, howeverp that one of ,tlie:reqtdred )issumptioris 
for tests of significance is that the samples were taken by a random 
method. The samples for the period's 1956 .. 60 a.rid 1961-64 were se-
lected on the basis of their relevance. to the present study. No 
random process was used for selecting the; data. Thus, the assump-
tion of random sampling may have been violated. 
TABLE VI 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG SECURITY YIELDS OF DIFFERENT MATURITIES 
De~rident_Variables 
Independent 9-12 Month- Issues - ~=,? Year_ :Css:u.es long-Term Bonds 
Variables !256-64 . 1956-60. · l96l::t4 . 19,26~6- 1956-60. . 1961=64 1956=64 1956-60 1961-64 
91-Day 
Bills 
9=12 Month 
Issues 
3=5 Year 
Issues 
.9340 .9.533 .9166 .8290 .8.536 
.9352 .9515 
.7188 • .5409 • .5453 .7721 
.8.595 ..• 6267 
.7147 .8737 
.8068 .8698 .8988 
00 
0 
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exception"'.'-have a tendency to become smaller and smaller as the maturity 
of the dependent variable increases. The exception is the correlation 
coefficient between the yields of bills and long-term bonds for the 
period 1961-64. 'rlds coefficient has a value of .7721 which is 
., 
greater than the value of the correlation coefficient of the same 
period between yields on bills and 3-5 year issues. 
The correlation coefficients between.yields on 3-month bills and 
9-12 month Treasury bills varied from .91.66 to .9533. There ~n hardly 
be any doubt that correlation coefficients such as these indicate a 
high degree of association between the two variables. The .9340 cor-
relation coefficient, for example, for the 1956-64 period indicates 
that the coefficient of determination (r2) has a value of .8727; that 
.,, .'• •• •·• ,,I;.. .• ' . 
is, 87.27 percent of the variation in the yields of 9-12 month issues 
. . . 
can be eXPlained by the v~~ation in the y:;l.elds ef 91-day bills. Such 
evidence, of course, implies that yield changes in the 91-day bill 
sector are closely followed by similar changes in the 9-12 m,onth bill 
sectoro 
The eorrelatien coefficients between the yields of 91-d.ay bills 
and the yields of 3~5 year issues, except tor the coefficient of 
1961-64, suggest a definite relationship althoJJ.gh the degree of 
association is less precise th.e!.n in the previous case. For the 
periods 1956-64 and 1956-60, approximately 70 percent of the. vari~-
tion in 3-5 year yields is e:iq>lainable by the variation in bill rates. 
For the period 1961-64, the coefficient of determination is only 50 
percent, thus suggesting a rather poor relationship;between the two 
variables. 
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The coefficients of correlation between 3-month bills and long-
term bonds for 1956-64 and 1956-60 suggest that less than one-third 
of the variation in bond yields for the two periods was associated 
with changes in 3-month yields. The somewhat higher correlation co-
efficient for the period 1961-64 can be partly explained by the fact 
that long-term yields during t]ais period, as it will be shown in the 
next chapter, re.mained relatively stable. Even so, a correlation 
coefficient of .772i would indicate that some 40 percent of the varia-
tion in bond yields was not associated with changes in bill yields.5 
Yields on 9-12 Month Issues as 
the Independent Variable 
The values of the correlation coefficients between the yields on 
9-12.month issues.and 3-5 year issues for all three time periods in-
,··) 
dicate that there is indeed a great de;al of association between the 
two variables. In every time period the size of the correlation co-
efficient was greater than the ease where the 91-day bill yields were 
used as independent variable (see Table VI). 
The correlation coefficients between the yields of 9-12 month 
issues and long-term bonds also increased over those with 91-day bill 
yields as the indepeadent variable. But, except for the 1961-64 
period, these correlatton coefficients do not suggest a great degree 
5rn con·trast with correlation coefficients obtained from weekly 
data, a correlation· coefficient of .7901 has been reported between 
monthly yields on 3-month bills and long-term bonds for the period 
1951:.59. See Daniel's. Ahearn, Federal Eeserve Polity Reappraised, 
1951-1959 (New York, 1963).;, P• 87. · · 
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of paralleLyield changes in 9-12 month issues and long-term bonds. 
The .8737 correlation coefficient for the period 1961-64 can again be 
attributed to the relative stability of long-term yields during this 
period. 
Yields on 3-5 Year Issues as the 
Independent Variable 
Although the correlation coefficients between yields on 3-5 year 
issues and long-term bonds is not unity, the values of these coefficients 
indicate that a large part of the variation in long-term yields is 
associated with changes in yields on 3-5 year issues. With correla-
tion coefficients ranging from .8068 to .8988, approximately 65 to 
0 80 percent of the variation on bonds can be attributed to the varia-
tion in the yields of 3-5 year issues. 
It may, therefore, be concluded that of the three independent vari-
ables used, it is the yields on 3-5 year issues .. whose movement~ are 
most closely associated with those on long-term bonds. 
Relationship Among Yields in 
Percentage Terms 
Table VII contains a series of correlation coefficients which have 
been computed after the data on yields were converted into logaritb,ms. 
The transformation of data was undertaken in order to consider the re-
lationship between percentage changes rather than absolute changes. 
In general, the r values obtained from the converted data a.re 
similar to those obtained from the original data as sho~n in Table VI. 
Therefore, the conclusions reacheGl in the previou.s sections· are not 
altered. 
TABLE VII 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG SECURITY YIELDS WITH DATA CONVERTED INTO LOGARITHMS 
Dependent Variables 
Independent t-12 Mori.th Issues· · ······ ~ ···· ······· ·t::5 Year Issues· · . Long-Term Bonds 
Variables 1956-6 1956c60. 1961-64 · 1956-6 195620 1961-64 195e5.;.64 1956-60. 1961-64 
91-Day 
Bills 
9=12.Month 
Issues 
3-.5 Year 
Issues 
.9.512 .9635 .9076 .8210 .8332 
.9163 .9254 
.6877 .4997 .4657 .7803 
.8458 .5906 .6218 .8736 
.7992 .8393 .88.54 
00 
.i::-
Correlation of the First Differences 
There is still another approach to the question of parallel yield 
changes in the varioU$ maturity sectors. This approach examines the 
relationship between the weekly differences in the yields of one matur-
ity issue and the weekly yield differences in other maturity issues. 
To establish the extent by which yield differences from week-to-week 
in a given issue are associated. with the corresponding differences in 
another issue, the first differences in the weekly series of yields 
for the four different maturity classes have been correlated. The 
first difference for any ma.turi ty class is defined as follows: 
dt = Yt - Yt-l 
where: 
<it= the difference in yield for a given maturity issue; 
Yt = the actual yield for week. t; and 
Yt-1= the actual yield for the week preceding week t. 
The results of the correlation are shown in Table VIII. The values 
of the correlation coefficients suggest that there is little associa-
tion among the first differences in yields. The values of these co-
efficients vary from .7142 to .1165. At best., therefore, only about 
one-half of the variation in the first differences of the dependent 
variable can be attributed· to the first di.fferences of the independent 
variable. At 'vOrst, the amount of the explained variation is L23 
percent. 
Under the assumption that arbitrage and speculation transfer yield 
changes from one maturity sector .to another, it would be expected that 
TABLE VIII 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG FmsT-DIFFERENCES IN IlEI.DS OF VARIOUS MATURITY ISSUES 
Dependent Var=ia=b~l~e~s~~~~~~~ 
Independent 9-12 Month Issues ~ ... 5 Year Issues . . . . Long-Term Bonds 
Variables 1956-64 195g:60. 196124 1956=6 1956-60 1961-64 1956-64 1956..60 1961::64 
91-Day 
Bills 
9-12 Month 
Issues 
3-5 Year 
Issues 
.6907 .7099 • .5264 • .3640 • .54.54 
.484.5 .7142 
.116.5 .2377 .2382 .2382 
.1918 .2832 .2790 • .3386 
.3112 .41.57 .2.519 
00 
0\ 
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the first differences are closely associated. This, however, is not 
the case as the evidence of low correlation in these differences· shows. 
Multiple Regression 
In addition to simple correlations, multiple regression has been 
used--mainly to study the relationship between long-term bond yields 
as the dependent variable and the other three yields as the independent 
variables. 
The regression model which has been used is of the form: 
where: 
y.: yield for long-term bonds; 
xi:: yield for 3-month Treasury bills; 
~ ::: yield for 9-12 month issues; and 
x3 : yield for 3-5 year issues. 
Two different regression equations have been computed--one using 
data for the period 1956-60 and another. for the period 1961-64. Data 
are again averages of weekly yields. The regression equations and 
multiple correlation and determination coefficients are as follows: 
Period 1956-60: 
y = 1.1032 - .253ox1 - .2310~ + 1.1002x3 
R: .9512 R2 : .9048 
Period 1961-64: 
y: 2.5672 + .063ox1 + .0038~ + .33123x3 
R : .9182 R2 : .8431 
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The regression coefficients (b1 1s) in the above equation are the 
actual values; that is, they have not been standardized. Their s~and-
ardized values6 are as follows: 
1956-60 equation: 
tl:: -12.0 
t2: -22.9 
t3: 142.9 
1961-64 equation: 
tl:: 319.3 
t2 = 11.3 
t 3 = 1214.o 
For both, the 1956-60 and 1961-64 equations, the standardized re-
gression coefficient with the greatest value is the one for the 3-5 year 
6 . The standardized values (~1 1s) are the actual values (b1 1 s) 
divided by their standard errors (Sbi's). The standard error of the 
.! regression coefficient is: 
where: 
S. : ~!(Y - f)2 
Y n - k - l 
c11 : the inverse matrix element for bi. 
The values for SY and c11 are as follows: 
1956-60 equation: 
2.1344 
~00009765 
.00002222 
.00001324 
1961-64 equation: 
.0480 
.00001693 
.00004954 
.00001693 
yields ( t 3). This suggests tl\13.t the most important of the independent 
variables in the regression equation is 3-5 -year yields (x3).7 
The multiple determination coefficient (R2) indicates that 90.48 
percent of the variation in long-term yields for the period 1956-60 is 
associated with the yield changes in the other three independent vari-
ables. The highest correlation coefficient for the period 1956~60 
having long-term yields as dependent variable was obtained from the 
correlation of long-term yields as a function of 3-5 year yields. 
The value of this coefficient was .8068 (see Table VI) which means 
that the use of the two additional independent variables in multiple 
regression increased the explained variation of long-term yields by 
about 16 percent. 
For the period 1961-64 the value of the multiple correlation co-
efficient (R) was only slightly greater than the value of the simple 
correlation coefficient between yields on 3-5 year issues and long-term 
bonds. Thus, the use of the multiple regressian produced only about a 
four percent increase in the explained variation eif long-term yields. 
Lags in the Variables 
The values of the simple correlation coefficients indicated that 
in many cases the degree of association between two yields of different 
maturities was low. The lowest degree of association found was between 
7statistically, all the regression coefficients are significant 
at the .. 5 percent level of significance. The theoretical t-value for 
~= oOO~ is 2.576. However, as in previous eases, the assumption of 
random samnling may have been violated. · 
- . ' 
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the yields en 3-month bills and long-term bonds, where only a small. 
·1 
percentage of the variation of bond yields was explained by the changes 
. . . 
in bill yields. These findings give rise to the question as to 
whether there is a time-lapse before yield changes in bills are trans-
' 
mitted to the long-term sector. 
Generally, the advocates of the bills onq doctrine thought that 
yield changes in the short-terJi sector would permeate the longer-t~rm 
sect())rs "very quickly." How long a· time period that involved, they 
did not say. That is, they failed to specify in exact or even approxi-
mate terms how much time it takes before yield changes in the short-
term sector reach the long-term sector. 
If there is a time interval involved between yield changes in the 
. I . 
short-term sector. and t~e yield changes in the longer-term sectors, 
the l?resenee of such an inte:rva.l should be reflected in the degree of 
association between short-term yields and the dela7ed or lagged yields 
. I 
in the other sectors. If, for example, it takes two weeks before yield 
changes in 91-da.y bills are transmitted to the long-term yields, 'the 
value of the correlati0n eeefficient between the yields· ef 91-day 
bills and yields of long-term bonds lagged for two weeks saould be 
greater than the value of the correlation coefficient between the two 
·, 
variables but without any lags in the long-term yields.8 
8r.iore precisely, the value ~f the correlation coefficient obtained 
by correlating the series of weekly yields for the period 1956-64-, 
using as the first pair of observations tlle. yields of 91-day bills and 
those of long-term bonds for the first week of January., 1956, and as 
the second pair ef observations the yields e;,f these two variables fol;' 
the second week of January, 1965, and so on until the end of the series, 
should be sma.ller--assuming a two-week lag in long-term yields--than 
. . . ~ ~ 
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Table IX shows the results of correlating yields of 91-day bills. 
with lagged yields of the other three maturity issues~ The simple cor-
relation coefficients presented in this table are for the period 
1956-64. The yields of 9-12 month issues, 3·5 year issues, and long-
term bonds have bee~ lagged for a maximum of eight weeks. 
TABLE IX 
SIMPLE CORRELATIOlf :COEFFICIEN1'S imrwEEN THE YIELDS ON 
9l~DAY BILIS AND THE LAGGED YIELDS ON 9-12 MOJTB:. 
ISSUES., 3-5 YEAR ISSUES, AND LONG-TERM BONDS 
. . FOR THE PERIOD 1956-64 
Number of Lagged Variables 
Weeks 9..:12 Month · ·3-5 Year 
L!gged. Issues Issues 
0 .934 .829 
l .926 .817 
2 .911 .803 
3 .890 .783 
4' 
.871 .762 
5 .853 .741 
6 .833 .719 
7 .811 .696 
8 .787 .673 
Leng-:Term 
Bends 
.541 
.534 
.;23 
.510 
.498 
.485 
.471 
.458 
.446 
the value of the correlation coefficient obtained from the series having 
as first pair of observations tl:3.eyield of 91-da.y bills for the.first 
week ·. of January, 1956, and the l$:rig-term yield for the third week ef 
January, 1965. ·rn practice., the'calculation ef a correlation eeefficient 
with a two-week lag for the period 1956-64 between bill and bond yields 
involves the deletion from the equation the yields of 91-day bills 
for the last· two ·weeks ef' December, ·· 1964 and the deletion of' the 
bond yields for the f':Lrst two-weeks· of January, 1956. · Thus., when one 
considers as the beginning of the series the first week of January, 
1956, it is the long-term yields that lag behind the yields of 91-da.y 
bills. But, if the 'beginning of the series is taken to be the last · 
week gf December., 1964, it might app~~r'that the bill.yields lag.be-
hind the long-term yields. The author.takes as the beginning of the 
series the first week of 1956~ · 
The values of the correlation coefficients tnstead of increasing, 
as would be expected if any actual time intervals between yield changes 
were involved, decreased consistently as the number of weeks by which 
the variable was lagged increased. This was the case for all three 
maturity issues. When the 9-12 month yields were lagged the value of 
the correlation coefficient decreased from .934 with no lag to .785 
with an eight-week lag. In the case of 3-5 year issues and long-term 
bonds the values of the correlation coefficients declined from .829 
and .541 to .673 and .446, respectively, as the lags in these two 
variables reached eight weeks. 
Similar evide~ce was obtained by lagging the yields of the three 
longer maturity issues behind Treasury bills for the periods 1956-60 
and 1961-64 (see Table X). 
TABLE X 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE YIELDS ON 
91-DAY BILLS AND THE LAGGED YIELDS ON 9-12 MONTH 
ISSUES, 3-5 YEAR ISSUES AND LONG-TERM BONDS 
FOR THE PERIODS 1956-60 AND 1961-64 
Lagged Variables Number · of · 
Weel,{.s 
Lagged 
9-12 Month Issues 
1956-60 ·. 1961~64 
· ·3-·5 Year Is$ties ·· · ·1ong.;.;Term Bonds 
0 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
.953 
.943 
.925 
.901 
.879 
.856 
.917 
.916 
.911 
.905 
.900 
.896 
. ;r956;60'- _ 1961~64 .·· ;i..95p;;.60 . · 1961-64 
.854 .719 .545 .772 
.841 .718 .539 ,]72 
.823 .717 .529 .772 
.801 .715 .515 .773 
.777 .710 .502 .769 
.752 .704 .488 .763 
One more attempt has been made to discover whether there are any 
lags involved in the yields ef short- and longer~term securiti~s. In 
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this case, the first differences in the weekly yields of 91-day bills 
have been correlated with the lagged first differences in the yields 
of the other three maturity issues. The values of the simple correla-
tion coefficients are shown in Table XI. 
TABLE XI 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE FIRST-DIFFERENCES 
IN YIELDS FOR 91-DAY BILLS AND THE LAGGED FIRST-DIFFERENCES 
IN YIELDS FOR 9-12 MONTH ISSUES, 3-5 YEAR ISSUES, AND 
LONG-TERM BONDS FOR THE PERIOD 1956-64 
Number of Lagsed Variables 
Weeks 9-12 Month 3-5 Year Long-Term 
Lassed Issues Issues Bonds 
0 .691 . 364 .238 
2 ·.226 .134 .082 
4 -.061 .008 .022 
6 .122 .040 -.027 
8 . 045 .010 .005 
The degree of correlation between the first differences in 91-day 
bills and the first differences in the other three variables is small 
as the values of the coefficients in the first .row of Table XI show. 
Lagging the first differences of 9-12 month issues, 3-5 year issues, 
and long-term bonds behind the first differences of 91-day bills did 
not increase the correlation coefficients. In fact, the values of the 
correlation coefficients decreased as the lag in weeks increased. When 
the first differences of 9-12 month issues were lagged the value of 
the correlation coefficient decreased from .691 with no lag to .045 
with an eight-week lag. Similar decreases were observed when lags 
were introduced in the first differences with yields of 3-5 year issues 
and long-term bonds (see Table XI). 
In short, the statistical evidence presented does not suggest the 
existence of time lags in yield changes between short- and longer-term 
issues. Since this study did not explore relationships beyond a lag 
of eight weeks, the question remains as to whether a lagged relation 
~xists beyond eight weeks. In that event, however, the question arises 
as to the effectiveness of a monetary policy which has to wait more 
than eig~t .weeks for desired changes in long-term yields to be brought 
about by open market operations in short-term securities. 
Sununary and Conclusions 
The present chapter dealt with the issue of whether yield changes 
originated in a particular maturity sector of the market will be 
followed by similar changes in other maturity sectors. 
The analysis of weekly yield changes between 91-day bills and 
long-term bonds indicated that about 50 percent of the weeks such 
changes were inconsistent with the arbitrage-speculation-substitution 
hypothesis. Yield changes on 3-5 year issues and long-term bonds were 
far more consistent with the hypothesis. The conclusion was reached 
that if there are forces which te~d to transfer yield movements then 
these forces are more effective when applied to yield movements be-
tween intermediate- and long-term bonds than when applied to bill and 
bond yields. 
Correlation analysis showed that the degree of association became 
greater as the maturity of the dependent variable approached the maturity 
of the independent variable. Thus, a high degree of correlation was 
found to exist between the yields on 3-month bills and 9-12 . month 
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issues. Strong evidence of correlation was found between the yields 
of 9-12 month issues and 3-5 year issues, and 3-5 year issues and long-
term bonds. 
The statisti.cal evidence showed that very little correlation exists 
between yields on 3-month bills and long-term bonds. The analysis also 
indicated that little evidenc~ of correlation exists for yields on 
9-12 month issues and long-term bonds. Thus, the statistical evidence ..-..--
seems to contradict the Federal Reserve contention that yield changes 
in the short-term sector will be transmitted promptly to other sectors. 
Furthermore, the failure to find any time l~gs suggests that it is 
far from certain that changes in bill yields are the most important 
determinant of changes in long-term rates. 
With respect to intermediate- and long-term yields, there is some 
evidence from the analysis of yield changes and both the simple and 
multiple correlation that a relationship exists between the two vari-
ables. Thus, monetary actions which affect intermediate-term yields 
can, also, be expected to affect leng-term yields. However, the evi-
dence of low correlation between the first differences in intermediate-
and long-term rates makes it clear that the exact size Gf magnitude of 
any changes in the intermediate yields will not be transmitted in the 
long-term sector. 
CHAPl'ER VI 
OPERATION TWIST AND THE EVIDENCE FROM 
TIME SERIES AND YIELD CURVES 
As was indicated in Chapter IV, the monetary authorities during 
1961-6~ adopted a policy which was directed toward raising short-term 
interest rates relative to long-term interest rates. In recent years, 
this undertaking has been referred to as the policy or operation 
"twist."l Apparently, the term twist was chosen to describe more 
accurately the general policy aims of twisting the term structure of 
interest rates by raising short-term yields and lowering, or keeping 
from rising, long-term yields. By so changing the term structure of 
interest rates, the monetary authorities hoped to reduce short-term 
capital outflows and to attract inflows without discouraging long-term 
domestic investment. 
One of the purposes of the, present chapter is to examine recent 
interest rate trends and to determine to what extent the actual be-
havior of short- and long-term interest rates during 1961-64 bas been 
consistent with the goals of operation twist. Another is to dete.rmine 
what contributions the abandonment of the bills only policy has made 
1see, for example, Harry G. Johnson, "Major Issues in Monetary 
and Fiscal Policies," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. ll 
(November, 1964), p. 1409. 
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in the attainment of the Federal Reserve objectives with regards to the 
structure of interest rates. 
Interest Rates in Recent Years 
Both short- and long-term interest rates rose during the business 
expansion of 1961-64. Such behavior was not unusual for this period. 
Interest rates traditionally tend to rise during cyclical upturns. In 
the decade of the l950's, interest rates fluctuated cyclically around 
a rising trend, thus reaching new highs in each successive cycle. In 
each cyclical low, interest rates were higher than in the preceding 
cyclical low. 
Apart from the rising trend, interest rate movements during 1961-64 
were different from previous experiences in many important respects. 
These differences are pointed out in the pages that follow. 
Short-Term Interest Rates 
Rates on 91-day Treasury bills showed a steady increase during 
1961-64. In terms of annual averages, this increase amounted to 118 
basis points--from 2.36 percent in 1961 to 3.54 in 1964 (Table XII). 
Table XII also shows certain weekly rates. These rates increased 
from 2.35 percent for the week ending on December 31, 196o to 3.86 for 
the final week of 1964. There was also a similar advance in the bill 
rate from the recession low of 2.11 percent which occurred in the week 
ending October 29, 196o. From that time to the final week of 1964 the 
Treasury bill yield increased 175 basis points. 
TABLE XII 
SELECTED RAT~ ON 3-MONTB TREASURY BILLS, 1961-64a 
Increase from: 
Annual Final Final Week Recession 
Year Average Week of Previous Year Low Week 
(Percent) 
1961 2.36 2.66 .31 .55 
1962 2 . 77 2.89 .29 .78 
1963 3.16 3.52 .63 l.41 
1964 3.54 3.86 ,34 l.75 
~arket yields. 
Source : Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
Long-Term Interest Rates 
Yields on long-term Government bonds also increased during the 
period 1961-64 although this increase was much smaller than the in-
crease in yields on Treasury bills for the same period. As Table XIII 
shows, the average annual yield on long-term bonds rose from 3.90 per-
cent in 1961 to 4.15 percent in 1964. 
The same can be concluded by observing weekly rates. Except for 
1962., year-end to year-end advances in long-term yields were small. 
In the final week of 1962 bond yields were ,22 percent lower than a 
year earlier. 
Long-term bond yields reached a recession low of 3.75 percent 
during the week ending August 6, 1960. At the final week of 1964 the 
bond rate stood at 4.14 percent--.39 percent higher than the recesaion 
low. In contrast, Treasury bill rates increased from their recession 
low to the end of 1964 by 1.75 percent. 
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TABLE XIII 
SEL~TED RATES ON LONG-TERM GOVERNMENT BONDS, 1961-64 
Increase from: 
Annual Final Final Week Recession 
Year Average Week of Previous Year Low Week 
(Percent) 
1961 3.90 4.07 .25 • 32 
1962 3.95 3.85 -.22 .10 
1963 4.oo 4.16 .31 .41 
1964 4.15 4.14 .02 .39· 
Source : Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
Short- Versus Long-Term Rates 
Since 1961, the spread between yields on short- and long-term se-
curities has received considerable attention. '!'his interest has been 
prompted mainly by the balance of payments problems. 
Table XIV shows. the actual yields and spreads between 91-day bills 
and long-term bonds for the years 1961 and 1964. Observing the last 
two columns of this table, it can be seen that the menthly spread be-
tween the bili and bond yields during 1961 was much greater than in 
1964. The 1961 mGnthly spread ranged from approximately two to five 
times greater than that of 1964. The smaller spreads during 1964 can 
be attributed mostly to the rise in short-term yields from 1961 to 
1964. This can be deduced from the data in Table XIV. While both 
short- and long-term yields increased during the period 1961-64, the 
advance of long-term yields was smaller than the rise in the yields of 
Treasury bills. 
Compared to the 1958-60 expansion, the spread between yields on 
Treasury bills and long-term bonds during 1961-64 expansion has been 
TABLE XIV 
COMPARISON OF MONTHLY nELDs ON 91-DAY BILLS AND 
LONG-TERM BONDS FOR 1961 AND 1964 
Spread: 
100 
Long-Term 
91-Day ~illsa Lon~-Term Bondsb Less Bill Yield 
Month l9bl 19b4 l9bl l9b4 l 1 19 
Percent Percent Percent 
January 2.24 3.52 3.89 4.15 1.65 .63 
February 2.42 3.53 3.81 4.14 1.39 .61 
March 2.39 3.54 3.78 4.18 1.39 .64 
April 2.29 3.47 3.80 4.20 1.51 • 73 
May 2.29 3.48 3.73 4.16 l.44 .68 
June 2.33 3.48 3.88 4.13 1.55 .65 
July 2.24 3.46 3.90 4.13 1.66 .67 
August 2.39 3.50 4.oo 4.14 1.61 .64 
September 2.28 3.53 4.02 4.16 l.74 .49 
' 
October 2.30 3.57 3.98 4.16 1.68 .59 
November 2.48 3.64 3.98 4.12 1.50 .48 
December 2.60 3.84 4.06 4.14 l.46 .30 
aMarket yields. 
bBonds maturing or callable 1~ 10 years or more. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
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somewhat smaller. As Figure l shows, this spread throughout 1961-64 
was around 1.5 percent. In contre.~t, during the middle part of 1958 
the spread in yields exceeded two percent. 
Figure 1 also shows another difference in the behavior of yields 
between the periods l957-6o and 1961-64. During the former period, 
yields on Treasury bills, 3-5 year issues, and long-term bonds ex-
perienced wider fluctuations than in the period 1961-64. 
Bates on short- and long-term Government securities in the recent 
business cycle differed from those in the two previous cycles in two 
respects. First, Treasury biil yields and bond yields, at their cycli-
cal lows, remained well above the lows reached in 1954 and 1958 
(Figure 2)~ Second, during the"current expansion, both advanced less 
than the yields of the two earlier expansions. 
Figure 2 also shows that the rates on bills during the latest 
cycle reached a bottom about five months before the cyclical trough 
and remained almost unchanged for over a year. In the two previous 
recessions these rates reached their lowest points very close to the 
time that the cyclical trough occurred (see Figure 2). 
Long-term yields, on the other hand, continued their decline for 
almost five months after the current expansion had begun and only in 
the last quarter of 1961 did they rise noticeably. In the 1954 and 
1958 recessions long-term rates started their climb simultaneously 
with the beginning of the economic expansion. 
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The Evidence from Yield Curves 
So far, the examination of empirical evidence has been limited 
to time series data. Another useful source from which empirical 
evidence regarding the structure of interest rates may be obtained is 
the study of yield curves. A yield curve shows the relationship be-
tween yields and maturities at: a given point in time. In graphical 
presentations, yields are normally measured on the vertical axis and 
maturities along the horizontal axis. Yields of securities with differ-
ent maturities are plotted in the graph and.ca smooth curve is drawn 
through the yield plot~--usuall y by eye. 
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Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 48, No. 3 (September, 1962), 
PP• 1105 apd 1108. 
Figure 2. Yields on Short- and Long-Term U. S. Gevernment Securities 
During Recent Cycles. 
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Yield curves for four different dates during the period 1958-60 
are shown in Figure 3. The first curve, dated May 29, 1958, indicates 
that interest rates on short-term issues were considerably lower than 
those of longer-term securities. Consequently, the curve rose quite 
rapidly , from yields of about .6 percent on 3-month issues to l.6 per-
cent on 1.5-year securities. Therea~er the rate of increase began 
to decline until maturities reached about 17 years at which point 
yields were approximately 3.1 percent. For securities maturing in 
more than 17 years the yield curve became virtually flat. 
The yield curve on December 31, 1959 illustrates an entirely 
different yield pattern. On +.hat date, yields on short-term securi-
ties were, as a rule, higher than the yields of longer-term issues. 
The yield curve, therefore, acquires a negative slope as it extends 
beyond the short-term area. This curve is of interest, also, because 
it demonstrates the general type of yield curves that operation twist 
was supposed to achieve. A downsweeping yield curve was thought to be 
desirable for both international and domestic considerations. Never-
theless, yield curves such as that of December 29, 1959 were infrequent 
during the period 1957-64. Only for a short period of time--towards 
the end of 1959 and early 1960--short-term yields, as Figure l on 
page 102 shows, stood above the bond yields. By December 30, 1960, 
the yield curve had moved again to an upsweeping position which was 
quite similar--although not as low in the shorter-term area--to that 
of May 29, 1958 (Figure 3). 
Around the time the bi lls only policy was abandoned, the yield 
curve was still upward slopi ng, starting at 2.6 percent yields for 
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3-month maturities and rising by about 1.0 percent by the time it had 
reached the 5-year issues. 
Figure 4 shows four more yield curves for certain dates during 
the period 1962-64. A year after the termination of bills only, on 
February 28, 196?, the general shape of the yield curve had changed 
very little. It simply had moved up to higher yields for every matur-
ity l ·evel. By the end of 1962, however, the yield curve became 
slightly flatter. This resulted from a rise in the short- and inter-
mediat e-term yields and a fall in long-term yields. 
The yield curve on December 31, 1963 has shi~ed further up along 
the short-term maturities. The long-term section of the curve had also 
moved up, but in comparison to the; yield curve of a year earlier this 
advance was only about one-third as great as that of the short-term 
section. 
Finally, the upward shift of yields in the shorter-term part of 
the yield curve continued into 1964. As the yield curve of December 31, 
1964 in Figure 4 indicates, the long-term section was only .30 per-
centage points higher than the section in the short-term maturities. 
Thus, in the four-year period--from February 28, 1961 to Decem-
ber 31, 1964--the yield curve became progressively flatter, as it 
shi~ed up at all maturity levels. But the flattening of the curve 
was for the most part the result of the greater upward movements in 
t he short- and intermediate-area of the yieid curve. The long-term 
section of the curve during the four year period moved up by something 
like 0.4 percentage points, whereas the short-term section advanced 
by about 1.2 percentage points. 
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Insofar as operation twist is concerned, the evidence from time 
series and yield curves demonstrates that the term structure of in-
terest rates during 1961-64 was altered in the desired direction. That 
is, yields on short-term instruments did rise relative to long-term 
yields. 
This change, however, came about mainly by the large advance in 
short-term yi elds, and not by simultaneous increases in short- and de-
creases in long-term rates. 
The Role of Open Market Policy in 
Recent Interest Rate Movements 
The departure from the bills only policy was to a large extent in-
duced by the belief that such action would enable the monetary authori-
ties to achieve certain interest rate objectives during the expansion . 
The question that remains to be examined is this: Has the abandonment 
of bills only made any positive contributions in the interest rat e 
patterns that materialized during the period 1961-64? 
Before this question is evaluated, however, it should be noted that 
open market operati ons are only one of the many factors that influence 
i nterest rate movements. In this context, other Federal Reserve 
actions that may have affected the actual behavi~r of interest rates 
since the 1961 upturn are the changes in discount rates, the change 
in the definition of legal reserves, the change in reserve requirements 
with respect to saving deposits, and the increases in the maximum in-
terest rates that member banks are allowed to pay on saving deposits . 
These factors, being outside the scope of the present study, will not 
be considered i n this section and the analysis will be entirely re-
stri cted to the effects of open market ;operations . 
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The departure from the bills only policy produced two major 
changes i n open market practices , One of these was the discontinuing 
of the minimum intervention principle and the other the extension of 
purchases and sales into longer-term securities. The significance of 
the first change lies i n the fact that it enabled the monetary authori-
ties to increase t he volume of both outright transactions and repur-
chase agr eements duri ng 1961-64. As was i ndicated in Chapter IV, the 
increased use of repurchase agr eements was desi gned to eliminate un-
necessary fluctuations in short-term yields , On an a priori basis, 
then, one of the factors contri buting to t he relati ve stability i n 
short-term yi elds since 1961 was the i nt ensi!"'ied use of r epurchase 
agreements , 
The assumpti on t hat changes i n the supply of securities have an 
i nfluence on the prices and yields of these securiti es would lead to 
the conclusion that open mar ket operations outside the bil sector for 
the period 1961-64 had a depressing i nfluence on long-term yields, The 
i nfluence mus have been depressing because open market purchases, as 
Chapter IV showed, of longer - erm issues were gr eat er than open market 
sales andJ therefore, t he net result of Federal Reserve i ntervention in 
longer-term securities was to reduc.e t he supply of these i ssues. Thus, 
the ext ension of operations to the longer-term sector may have kept 
long-term yi el ds from r eachi ng higher levels t han those that prevailed . 
Purchases of i nt ermedi ate- and long-term securities duri ng 1961-64 
may also have i nfluenced t he behavior of short-term yi elds. If the 
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monetary authorities had npt been allowed to buy long-term securities 
in order to provide reserves to member banks, it is conceivable that 
the authorities may have done so by purchases of bills, thereby raising 
their prices. 
Under the expectations theory of the term structure of interest 
rates, changes in the supplies of securities brought about by Federal 
Reserve actions are not expected to have any effects on security 
yields unless such changes cause expectations about the futuTe course 
of short-term interest rates to change. J. H. Wood2 claims that such 
expectati ons are altered when changes in the relative supplies of short-
and long-term securities occur. Even if it is assumed, however, that 
open marke~ operations in long-term securities do change expectations, 
it is not easy to establish how these operations would affect yields. 
Only by knowing in what direction expectatiohs changed can the yield 
effects be determined. Thus, under the expectations theory, the signi-
ficance of the extension of open market operations to long-term securi-
t i es during 1961-64 cannot be evaluated. 
Another line of explanation, but one again that is difficult to 
verify, is that Federal Reserve actions or announcements in connection 
with its objectives have direct effects upon the market's expectations. 
Thus, by announcing its intentions to raise short-term rates relative 
to long-term, the Federal Reserve may have caused people's expectations 
to change in a way consistent with Federal Reserve objectives. 
2J . H. Wood, "Expectat ions, Errors, , and the Term Structure of 
Interest Rates, " The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXXI (April, 
1963), PP• 170-171. 
lll 
Furthermore, the strength of these effects w0uld seem to depend·upon 
the kind of instruments that the Federal Reserve is prepared to use in 
order to implement its objectives.· In this sense, the abandonment of 
the minimum intervention principle and the expansion of open.market 
operations.to include long-term securities can be. yiewed as having en-
hanced the potency of the announcement effects. Lsoking at interest 
rate movements during 1961-64 from such a perspective, it can be 
argued that one of the ways that the abandonment of the bills only 
policy contributed to bringing about the change in the term structure 
of interest ,rates .was. · through its effects on expectations. 
' ' 
Federal Reserve opinion also seems to recognize the effects that 
Federal Reserve actiens have upon expectations. The following passage 
illustrates this point: 
The supply of short-term issues avail~ble to the 
public in the firf!t·5 menths of 1961 was also augmented 
by net sales of about $lo7 billion from the portfolios 
of. Federal Reserve System and of Federai agencies arid' 
trust fundso At the same time, these official accounts 
made offsetting purchases of longer-term securities, in-
cluding over $1.l billicon of issues due in more than 
5 yearso These,purchases, and the expectations "1>f 
further purchas·es they created, c:ontri buted to the de-
cline in yield.is on longer maturities and thus helped 
to rE;;duce the·' yield spread between short- and long-term 
Treasury obligations.j 
The above quotation also indicat~e that the Federal Reserve con-
aiders purchases ofl0nger-term securities as .a factor contributing 
to lpng-term yield declines. 
3nRecent Interest Rat.;e Trends," Federal Reserve Bulletin? Vol. 49, 
No. ll (November:> 1963).v p. 1503, (authar's underlining).· 
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Fi.ndings and C@ncl.usions 
The study of empirical evidence regarding the behavior @f short-
and long-term interest rates in recent years has shown that: 
(1) Both short- and long-term rates advanced during 1961-64; 
the.advance in short-term yields, however, was greater 
than the advance in long-term yields9 Consequently, the 
spread between short- and long-term rates became pro-
gressively smaller. 
(2) In the two previous cycles, short- and long-term rates 
in their cyclical troughs reached much lower levels than 
in the present cyclical trough. 
(3) The shape ef yield curves changed considerably during the 
four-year period. In February, 1961 the yield curve had 
an upsweeping position indicating a wide spread between 
the yields of shorter- and longer-term securities. In 
December3 1964 the yield curve had become almost flat. 
This was the result of steady rises in short- and inter-
mediate-term yields. Long-term yields during 1961-64 
rose only slightly. 
These findings suggest that the behavior of short- and leng-term 
rates was generally consisten·t with the objectives of operation twist. 
The. change in the structure of interest rates materialized in the 
short- and intermediate-maturity areas. Yields in these areas rose 
considerably, thereby bringing abo1.J1,t a diffeit'ent relationship between 
short- and long-term yiel.dso 
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The contributions ef the abandonment of bills only cannot be de-
termined accura~ely. Under the assumption that changes in the supply 
of securities affect their yields, it can be c0ncluded that the open 
market purchases of long-term securities has had a depressing effect 
on yields of long-term securities. Yields 0f short-term securities 
may also have been affected b~cause the Federal Reserve ceuld provide 
bank reserved by purchases of long-term bonds. Thus, short-term 
yields may have been lower and long-term yields higher had the bills 
only policy not been abandoned. 
Additional consideration of the effects of Federal Reserve actions 
on market expectations and official Federal Reserve opinion also 
suggeet that the terminatien of bills only facilitated the achievement 
ef monetary objectives during 1961-64. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE TECHNICAL FUNCTIONING OF THE SECURITIES MARKET 
Introduction 
There is one more issue related to open market policy which must 
be evaluated. This is the technical functioning of the market for 
Governmen,t securities. In Chapter II., it was pointed out that the 
main argument which was presented by the Federal Reserve in favor of 
bills only was based on technical considerati0ns of the Government 
securities market. The question that is of, relevance to the present 
study is the one 0f whether the extension of open market operations 
. , to long-term securities has affected the technical performance of 
the securities market in an adverse way. 
There are., as was indicated, two different views as to the im-
portance of the technical functioning.of the securities market.· The 
Federal Reserve, at the time of the adoption of the bills only doc-
trine, considered the technical performance of the market as a very 
important factor in the execution of monetary policy. The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, on the other hand, took the position that 
the Federal Reserve System 1 s primary responsibility should lie in the 
application of appropriate monetary policies in order to facilitate 
the a.chievement of major econom1.e objectives rather than in the tech-
nical functioning of the securities market. 
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The evaluation of the technical performance of the market is' 
undertaken for the sole purpose of determining whether the Federal Re-
serve claims that open market operations in long-term securities have 
adverse effects on the functioning of the securities market are correct. 
Whether the Federal Reserve views or those of its critics with respect 
to the role of the securi.ties markets in monetary policy are valid 
isj of course, a different issue. 
Criteria of Evaluation 
Previous attempts to appraise the technical functioning of the 
securities markets have run into difficulties. As was indicated in 
Chapter III, part of these difficulties stem from the way the Federal 
Reserve defined depth, breadth, and resiliency, that is, the standarda 
upon which the performance of the market was judged. The ad hoc sub-
committee made it clear that in its definitions of these terms it was 
referring to the 11inside market" which is reflected on the order books 
of securities dealers, and under such conditions besides being diffi-
cult to obtain the relevant data, there is, also room for value judg-
ments~ The term depth, for example, was defined as the case when 
11 
••• there are orders» either actual orders or orders that can be 
readily uncoveredj beth above and below the market. ul The amb:1.guity 
of tlµs definition is quite obvi:~us. 'The volume of orders that can 
be readily uncovered would be: a matter of opinion or judgment on the 
1united States Congress, Joint Committee on the Economic Report., 
Subcommittee on Econ@mic Stabilization, United States Monetary Policy: 
Recent Thinking and Experience, Hearings, Eighty-third Congress., Second 
Session {Washington, 1954), p. 265. 
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part of the securities dealers. Thus, it is hard to establish accurate 
or unbiased measures to evaluate the extent of depth'that the market 
possesses. Similar problems are encoµntered with the definitions of 
breadth and resiliency. "The market- has breadth when these orders are 
in volume ••• 112 What constitutes a satisfactory volume of erde~s the 
. . . 
subcommittee does not say. Presumably this again would depend upon 
dealer opinion. In the same way, the market is resilient "when new 
orders pour promptly ••• u3 Again the word promptly could be subJeet to 
different interpretatiens. 
More precise standards for appraising the technical performance 
of the market in terms of depth, breadth, and resiliency have been 
suggested by Allan Sproul. Sproul ha~ expressed the opinion that the 
market had lost depth, breadth, and resiliency " ••• in terms of dealer 
willingness to take position risks, volume of trading, or erratic price 
movements. 114 Sproul's criteria are far less subject to ambiguity .and 
,. 
individual opinion than those a'dvanced by the ad hoc subcommittee. The 
extent 0f d~alers' willingness tE> take position risks can be measured 
by the volume of inventories that the securities dealers carry. The 
other two standards--volume of trading and erratic price movements--
can, also, be measured objectively. 
!e be sure, Sproul's criteria have alse been recognized at one 
time or anether by the Federal Reserve. The subcommittee report had 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., P• 226. 
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argued that the uncertainties of Federal Reserve intervention in the 
long-term sector prevented dealers from. carrying sufficient inventories. 
Both the ad hoe report and the Riefler analysis pointed out that open 
market operations in long-term securities carry the danger of creating 
wide fluctuations in security yields and prices. 
D~ta . for price and yieldi movements, have, ef course, been avail-
able for a le.ng time. In recent years, the Federal Reserve has also 
made available data on dealer inventory positions and dealer trans-
act.ions .. 5 
The present evaluation of performance of the securities market 
will be based on the criteria that Sproul has suggested. Before, how-
ever, the empirical evidence is analyzed a brief description of the 
securities market will be required. 
The Gevernment.Securities Market 
Transactions in Government eecul,"ities are handled by a sm.ali group 
of securities dealers, most of whom have offices in New York CitY_ 
wi_th branch of:t.'ic.es and representatives throughout · the country. 6 
!here are at the present time 20 primary securities dealers. Of these, 
six are commercial banks. !he rest are securities aouses, usually 
5The Federal Reserve Bu.lletin has been publishing such data'sinee. 
September, 1960~ 
6In the discussion ef this section the auther has drawn heavily 
upon Robert v. Roo~a, Federal Reserve Operations~ the M0ney and 
Gevernment Securities Market (New York, l956)f and Ira o .. Scott, Jr., 
Government Securities Market (New York, 1965), PP• 75-117. · 
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referred to as nonbank dealers. With two exceptions, all of the bank 
and nonbank dealers are incorporated. The two ex.peptions--both non-
bank--are organized as partnerships. A few ef the non bank dealers, 
in addition to handling securities, also engage in a wide range of 
investment banking activities. The rest confine their activities 
almost entirely to Government securities. 
The willingness of dealers to operate in all maturity issues de-
pends largely upon the sizes of their firms. The larger firms are 
usually willing t® do business in all maturities. Some of the smaller 
firms, however, restrict their activities te Treasury bills only. 
The organization of each of the dealer firms may be divided into 
the fol_lowing categories: Trading, selling, clearing, camputing, and 
research. Trading is the most important function in the firm. The 
trader of the dealer firm is responsible for setting the terms upon 
which the firm is willing to buy or sell securities. Firms which 
handle securities in all maturity issues usually have several traders, 
each specializing in a particular maturity seet@r. There may be, for 
example, a bill trader, a trader in netes and certificates, a trader 
in intermediate- and long-term bonds, etco To set the terms according 
to which securities will be bought and sold a trader must have a 
thorough knowledge of the factors which influence the securities mar-
ket. To acquire and maintain such knowledge the trader foll0ws press 
releases by the Treasury and Federal Reserve, shifts in institutional 
portfoli0s, the views expressed by congressmen,· and other news affect-
ing the market. Often a trader may exchange views about market de-
velopments with traders of ether firms. 
.. ll9 
Selling involves the soliciting of orders from. customers and re-
porting them to the traders. In the home office, si:Llesmen .are situated 
in close proximity to the trader so that they can request information 
regarding bids and offers and relay it to interested parties. The 
sales department in the heme office also serves as a link with repre-
,· 
sentatives an~ sub-offices located outside New York City. Communiea-
tions be.tween the home office and its branches are carried primarily 
through telephone and teletypeo The use ef telephone is quite indis-
pensable in the dealer's operations .. Certain negotiations because of 
their complexity cannot be carried through by teletype and must be com-
pleted by telephone.7 
An0ther important unit in the operati0ns of the dealer firm is 
the department fer financing, clearing, and accounting. Purchases and 
sales ef securities are cleared and recorded by this depart~ent. It 
is the responsibility of this jepartment also to see hew the purchases 
are financed. As will be shown later, dealers depend heavily upon 
borrowed funds fer the financing of their operations. 
The departments for computations and research complete the organ-
ization ef the dealer firm. The former is the department where yields 
and prices for various maturities are .calculated with the help of 
·1· .. • 
computers, while the latter is resp0nsible for gathering and analyzing 
,r~ 
information related to Oevernment securities. Such information ls 
1rn fact, the use of telephone by dealers is so extensive that 
I. O. Sc0tt, Jr. remarked that " .... the ever-the-counter market in 
'oevernment securities is primarily an 0ve1."-the-te;Leph0ne market." 
Scott, P• 80. · · · · 
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useful to traders and salesmen as well as to these charged with formu-
lation of the overall peliey of the firm. 
Federal Reserve and Dealer Relatiens 
The main.link between. the Federal Reserve System and the securities 
dealers is provided by the Trading Desk of the Securities Department 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It is through the Trading 
Desk that open market policy decisions made by the Federal Open Market 
CGmmittee are executed. If'., fer example, the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee wishes to decrease the level of member bank reserves, the 
,,, 
manager of the Open Market Account through the Trading Desk will sell. 
securities to deaiers. Nenbank dealers pay for the+r purchases by 
.. ' • . ' • • I 
drawing on their accounts with a member bank •. Bank. dealers pay by 
l debiting their own reserve account. In either case, member bank re-
serves will be reduced. 
If the Federal Reserve wants to perform an epen market operation 
in Treasury bill~., the usual procedure is to instruct the Trading Desk 
to contact each dealer firm and ask fer a bid er an offer. With all 
dealers contacted, the Desk will select the most favorable quotatiens 
I•. 
to cemplete the open market transaction. In eases where maturity 
issues other than bills are involved the Trading Desk appre~hes only 
those dealers wh0 have made quota~ions on such issues at an earlier 
date. If the earlier dealer quetatiens are still standing., the Desk 
may be able t0 perform the operation without farther soliaitation. 
It is not necessary fer a dealer to res~nd with a bid or an 
offer each time he is eontae:ted by the Trading Desk. However., sheuld 
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he fail to respond for a prolonged period of time, he runs the risk 
ef being eliminated from the Federal Reserve' s list of, recogt1ized 
dealers. 
Market Quotations 
Treasury bills are quoted in the market in terms of yields and 
such quotatiens are refined to .Ol ef one percent or one "basis point." 
Thus, a 91-day bill may be qu,ted in the dealer market at 3.50 percent 
bid and 3.47 percent offered. Since yields are, inversely related to 
pri.ces., the dealer's sale price ef a block of bills with a given par 
or maturity value will be greater than the dealer 1 s purchase price 
for the same block of billso The spread between a dealer's bid and 
offer quotation constitutes one of the sources of dealer income. 
Spreads are also maintained for trading certificates, notes and 
bonds. But market quotations for such issues are expressed in terms 
of prices rather than yields. A block of Treasury bonds bearing a 
three percent rate of interest and having a maturity value of $1,000,000, 
for example, may be quoted by dealers at 99.8 bid and 99.16 offered. 
The figures after the decimal point represent thirty-seconds. The 
previ.0us qu®taticrm would actually be read as 99 8/32 bid and 9916/32 
8 offered. 
8rf the deale'r I S\ offer was accepted in this example, the buyer 
would have to pay the dealer (0.99 16/32)($1,000,000) = $9951 000 •. 
An acceptance of the dealerts bid, on the other hand, would require 
the dealer t© pay a principal amount of (0.99 8/32)($1.~ 000, 000) = 
$992,500. In addition to the principal amou~t, the purchaser must 
pay the seller any interest accrued from the last inte.rest-payment 
date to the date of delivery .. 
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Dealer Financing and Dealer Profits 
:Bank dealers use mainly the bank's ewn funds t0 finance any se-
curities they acquire. Nonbank dealers, on the other hand, are in 
continuous need of borrowed funds to pay for the securities they main-
ta.in in their invent0ries. Securities dealers are not required to 
meet Fed~ral Reserve margin requirements. Borrowed funds may b!:! ob-
tained on a margin as low as twe percent for leng-term bonds and one 
percent for intermediate-term b,c:mds. Ne, equity capital is re·quired 
for buying Treasury bills. The dealer may borrow an amount equal to 
the total cost of the bills. Thus, the greatest part of dealer in-
ventory positions is financed through borrowing. The ratio ot total 
positions to net worth is around twenty-five to one.9 
The nonbank. dealers rely primarily upon two sources for borrowed 
funds. These are call loans and repurchase agreements. Call loans 
represent short-term funds such as Federal funds advanced by banks to 
securities dealers. The duration @f such loans is usually one day. 
The securities purchased with the proceeds of the loan are used as 
collateral. Repurchase agreements invGlve the sale of securities under 
the provision that the seller will repu~chase the same securities at 
a future date. Dealers who enter into repurchase agreements use the 
proceeds to finance their positions.10 The length of time for which 
the agreement is extended varies from evernight to several weeks. 
9scott, p. 101. 
1°For the importance of the repurchase agreements in dealer 
financing, see Federal Reserve Bank ef Cleve~and, Money Market 
Instruments (Cleveland, 1965), PP• 19-30. 
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Repurchase agreements are made with both private institutions and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Among the principal users of re-
purchase agreements are nonfinancial corporations and commercial banks 
outside New York City. The rate of interest that dealers have to 
pay for repurchase funds is lewer than the call loan rate.ll Although, 
as was indicated in Chapter IV, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
uses repurchase agreements with dealers as an instrument of monetary 
policy, the dealers look upon suPh transactions as another sou+c~ of 
borrowed funds. Repurchase agreements are usually nll;lde at the initia-
tive of the New York Bank and only nonbank dealers are elegible to 
enter into such transactions •. The rate of interest that the Federal 
Reserve charges the dealers for repurchase money is normally equal 
to the discount rate~-except during periods of easy money when the 
rate may be lower.12 
Dealer profits may be derived from c~pital gains, interest, and 
trading. Capital gains are realized when the prices of securities in 
the dealer's inventory rise~ Interest profit is pessible if the in~ 
terest that the dealer receives.from his security holdings is greater 
than the interest cost involved in financing his inventory positions. 
The difference between interest reoei ved and interest pa.id, however, 
is not always positive. During the period 1948-1958 dealers paid more 
interest than they received in ea.ch of the years 1956, 1957, and 1958.13 
11Ibid., P• 29. 
12scott, P• 106. 
l3Ibid., p. 113. 
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Finally~ another source of dealer profits is the spread which dealers 
maintain between bid and offer quotations. 
How Dealers "Make Markets" 
"Making a market" simply means that the deale:i;- is willing to enter 
into a transaction involving purchases or sales of securities. Thus, 
one of the conditions for making markets is that the .dealer stand 
ready to quote bids and offers for all securities traded. Willingness 
on the part of the dealer to narrow his spread reflects a greater in-
terest on his part to make markets. The dealer ' s willingness, how-
ever, to make markets is tempered by the possibility of incurring 
capital losses. Dealers, as a rule, act as principals and not brokers • 
. 
That is, they buy and sell securities for their own accounts. When, 
then, a dealer takes a position in which he acquires securities he runs 
the risk of suffering capital losses if the price of the securities 
should decline. But the making of markets requires that the dealer 
maintain adequate levels of inventories so that he can meet customer 
demands. Therefore, the volumes of dealer trading and inventory 
positions during a given period reflect the ex.tent by which the dealer 
has been able to make markets during that period. 
Volume of Trading 
Judged in terms of t he "volume of trading" the technical function-
ing of the securities market has shown an improvement during the period 
196()-64. This conclusion is supported by the record of dealer trans-
actions in Government securities whether these transactions are 
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considered in total of all maturities or are broken down by maturity 
sector. The examination of the data in Tables X.V and X.VI will verify 
this statement~ 
TABLE X.V 
DEALER TRANSACT'IONS IN (}OVERNMENT SECURITIESa 
Month 1960 1961 1962 1963 . l.964 
(Par Value in Milli@ns of Dollars) 
January 1, 615 l, 717 1,871 2, 144 
February 1, 364 1, 970 2, 350 1, 089, 
March 1, 568 1.,675 1.,694 1,685 
April l., 523 1,689 l, 788 1,849 
May 1, 519 l, 694 1,639 l, 702 
June l, 383 1,681 1, 574 l, 488 
July 1, 783 1.,682 1, 775 1,936 
August l, 395 1, 603 l., 308 l, 453 
Septemb~r 1,049 l, 442 1, 913 l, 799 l, 510 
October 1, 46o l, 690 l, 967 l, 575 1, 749 
November l, 435 1,686 l, 770 l, 713 1,864 
December l, 547 l, 653 2,071 1, 719 2, 052 
Average for 
the Year l, 373b l, 552 l, 786 l, 734 1,770 
aData are averages of daily figures based on the number of trading 
days in the period. 
bBased on data from September through December. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
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Table XV shows the volume of dealer transactions in terms of 
monthly and yearly averages.14 The yearly figures indicate that the 
' 
volume of transactions has increased in the 1960-64 period. The vari-
ation in the monthly volume of transactions suggests that the growth 
over the five-year period has been somewhat irregular. Nevertheless, 
the average volume of transactions based on daily figures during 1964 
was $1,770 million, as compared with an average of $1,373 million 
during 196o and $1,552 million during 1961 which is . the first full 
year with data on dealer transactions. The 1964 figure represents an 
increase of 28.9 percent in the average volume of transactions over 
196o and 14.o percent over 1961. 
Table XVI shows the volume of dealer transactions in the various 
maturity sectors. The figures are annual averages based on daily 
figures. 
A~rt from securities in the intermediate sector, the volume or 
dealer transactions in al l other maturity sectors increased over the 
five-year period. In issues maturing within 1-5 years, the volume of 
transactions dropped from an average of 283 million in 1960 to an aver-
age of 220 million in 1964. This was a decrease of 22.3 percent . On 
the other hand, the average volume of transactions during the same 
l~he transactions data combine the ~ar value of Government se-
curities purchas·ed or sold in t he ma:ri,cet 'as reported by the major 
securities dealers to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Excluded 
from these ·transactions are allot~ents of and exchanges for new Govern-
ment securities, redemptions of called or matured issues, securities 
under repurchase agreements, and securities under reverse repurchase 
agreements (i.e., those purchased by dealers under the stipulation 
that they would have to be resold to the original owner at a future 
date) . 
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period rose by 39.0 percent in issues maturing within a year, by 103.2 
percent in those maturing within 5-10 years, and by 20.6 percent in 
those issues maturing after 10 years. 
TABLE XVI 
DEALER TRANSACTIONS IN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES BY MATURI'l'Ya 
Year 
196ob 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
Within 
1 Year 
994 
1,203 
l, 401 
l, 324 
l, 382 
1-5 
Years 
(Par Value 
283 
266 
228 
218 
220 
5-10 After 
Years 10 Years 
in Millions of Dollars) 
62 34 
53 30 
121 37 
143 50 
126 41 
aAverages of daily figures based on the number of trading days in 
the year. 
bBased on data from September through December. 
Source: Computed from data in Appendix Table II. 
Thus, the study of relevant data on dealer transactions does not 
indicate a deterioration in the performance of the securities market 
but rather an improvement of it. 
Dealer Inventory Positions 
As in the case of dealer transacti@ns in Government securities, 
the Federal Reserve apprehensions regarding the possible adverse effects 
that open market operations in long-term securities might have on dealer 
inventory posi~ions seem to have been unwarranted . ' The empirical evi-
dence fro~ Tables X::v~I and XVIII make this point clear. 
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TABLE XVII 
DEALER INVENTORY POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT SECURITIF.Sa 
Month 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
(Par Value in Millions of Dollars) 
January 2, 970 2,778 4,021 3, 582 
February 2,794 2, 265 3, 410 3, 475 
March 2, 077 3, 056 3, 547 2, 775 
April 2, 463 3, 771 3, 467 2, 393 
May 2,808 3, 642 3, 494 3,087 
June 2, 253 3, 777 3,093 3, 475 
July 2, 610 2,881 2,881 3, 817 
August 2, 535 2, 647 3,096 4, 313 
September 2, 649 2, 497 3, 177 3,689 3, 954 
October 2,294 3, 227 3, 569 3, 538 3, 358 
November 2, 394 3,808 4, 013 3, 546 3, 692 
December 2, 977 2, 939 4, 268 3, 090 3, 252 
Average for 
2, 578b the ;Year 2, 748 3, 3,20 3, 406 3, 431 
, aAverages of daily. figures based on number of tradin~ days in the 
period. 
- bBased on data for September through Dece~ber. 
Source : Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
-Table XVII shows the average volume of dealer inventory positions 
by month and by year.15 '!'he data indicate that the volume of dealer 
positions has increased steadily in the 1960-64 period. The average 
l5Positi ons figures are -reported on a commitme~t basis. This 
means that securities are ad4ed to the dealer's position at the time 
the dealer agrees to purchase them and deducted from -positions when 
a copunitment to sell is ma9-e. The figures include all securities sold 
by dealers under repurchase contracts, but exclude those that dealers 
have purchased under conditions t0 resell them to the original owner. 
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volume 0f dealer inventaries rose by $853 million during this period. 
Expressed as a percentage, this rise amounted to 29.6 percent. 
The data in Table XVIII show that average volume of dealer posi-
tions in l-5 year issues decreased, while the volume of inventories 
in issues maturing within a year and a~er five years rose over the 
p~ri od 1960-64. Of particular importance is the fact that inven-
t ories i n long-term issues rose from an average of $146 million in 
196o t o $217 mill ion in 1964. It was this area that the Federal Re-
serve had predicted would be most adversely affected by the extensi on 
of open market operations to long-term securities . 
TAJ3LE XVIII 
DEALER INVENTORY POSITI ONS IN GOVERNMENT SECURITIF.8 BY MATURITYa 
Within 1-5 After 
Year l Year Years 5 Years 
(Par Value in Millions of Dollars) 
196ob l, 936 496 146 
1961 2, 357 338 54 
1962 2, 9'23 276 122 
1963 2, 876 385 145 
1964 2, 901 313 217 
a Averages of daily f i gures based 0n number of trading days in the 
p~riod. 
bBased on dat a from September through December. 
Source: Computed from data in Appendix Table I II. 
I n short t hen, t he overal l evidence indicates that the condit ion 
of t he dealer inventory posi t ions has i~proved during the years 1960-64. 
Furthermore, if the volume of i nventories r epresents the dealers' 
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willingness te take risks, as Sproul and the Federal Reserve have indi-
cated, then the increased volume of inventories during this period leads 
to the conclusion that the dealers' willingness to take position risks 
has increased also. 
Erratic Price Movements 
The third criterion that Sproul has suggested for judging the 
technical performance of the securities market is the extent of :fluc-
tuations in security prices. 
The prices of securities are inversely related to security yields. 
Therefore, the question of price fluctuations can be dealt with by 
examining the variation in security yields. 
In Chapter VI, the analysis of time series indicated that the 
yields of every maturity class during the period 1956-60 fluctuated 
more widely than their counterparts for the period 1961-64. Such. 
ev;i.dence does not suppert the Federal Reserve.predictions that the ex-
tension @f open market operations to long-term securities would create 
wide fluctuatiGms in security prices. 
In additipn t£> the evidence of Chapter VI, Table. XIX shows the 
degree of variation in the yields of various maturities for the periods 
1956-60 and 1961-64 as mea'Sured by standard deviations. It is obvious 
that the values of the standard deviations in every maturity class de-
creased during the 1961-64 period. In bills, the standard deviation 
in yields for 1956-60 was 08039 percent as compared to a value of .4529 
percent for the standard deviation in the 1961-64 period. The differ-
ences in standard deviati.ons for the two. periods WE;?re even more profound 
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in the other three maturity clas1:>es. In long-term bonds, f'or example, 
the value of the standard deviation for the 1961-64 period was almost 
- .. -· .. . . -··· 
four times smaller than the standard deviatic:m ef the preceding five-
year period.16 
'!'ABLE XIX 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS DI YIELDS OF GOVEBNMEN'l' SECURITIES BY MATUBI'l'Y 
. 91-Day 9-12 :M(),ntli 3-5 Year Lohg-'l'erm 
Period· Bills Issues Issues Bends 
· (Percent) 
1956-196o .8039 .9022 .6772 .4290 
1961-1964 .4529 .3551 .2559 .1198 
Th.ere is, clearly, no evidence that the terminatiGn of bills only 
has produced.wider price er yield movements. 
l6The author recognize's that for a given yield change in tw0 differ-
ent maturity issues the price of the longer maturity will change mere 
than the price of the shorter maturity issue. Thus, it is not correct 
to compare the standard deviations computed from yields of two differ-
ent maturity issues and th.en draw conclusions about price fluctuations 
in issues involved. The standard deviation of .4290 in the yields of ' 
long-term bonds during the period 1~56-6o, for example, is slightly 
over half the value of the standard deviation of .8039 for' 91-cl.ay 
· bills. '?his does not mean that bill prices fluctuated more widely 
than prices of long-term bonds, It is, however, cerreet to say that 
a standard deviation ef' .4290 as cempared with a standard deviation ef 
.1198 for 1,he p~riod 1961-64 indicates that the price of l0ng-term 
bonds for the period 1956-60 fluctuated more than in the period 1961-
64. . 
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Summary and Conclusions 
The present chapter has dealt with the question of whether the 
termination of the bills only policy bas affected the technical func-
tioning of the securities .. market in an adverse way. 
After examining the issues and the difficulties involved in an 
evaluation of the technical performance of the market, it was decided 
that the market performance be judged strictly on the criteria that 
Allan Sproul had suggested,·namely, the-volume of dealer transactiGlls, · 
the velume 0f inventory positions, and erratic price movements. These, 
criteria are quite similar to the ones that the Federal Reserve had 
used on various occasionse 
Data on dealer transactions and inventory positions have become 
available since September, 196o. Their examination., however, shows 
no evidence that the technical performance of the securities market 
has worsened in recent years. On the contrary, the steady growth in 
the volume of dealer transactions and.inventory positions for the 
period starting with the last four months of 196o up to the end. of 
1964 suggests that the performance of the market has,_ actually improved 
with respect te these two criteria. The same holds true with regards 
to erratic price movements. The evidence is that security prices' and 
yields have fluctuated less during the period 1961:-64 than they did 
during 1956 .. 6o. 
Thus, the technical functioning of the securities marltet, against 
the belief's and pronouncements of the ad hoc subcommittee and other 
Federal Reserve officials, does not seem to depend on wh~ther or not 
open market o~ratiens a.re confined t0 bills only. 
CHAPrER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary purpose of this dissertation has been to appraise 
certain issues arising out of Federal ~eserve open market policy in 
recent years. The process of defining and evaluating these issues, 
however, has required the review of several topics directly or indir-
ectly related to open market operations, such as the various theories 
in regard to the term structure of interest rates, the economic con-
ditions and monetary obJectives during the 1961-64 period, the record 
of Federal Reserve transactions for the years 1954-64, and others. 
Federal Reserve actions in the open market were governed by two 
different policies during the period 1953-64. The first of these two 
policies, which was in effect from 1953 until 1961, has been generally 
referred to as the bills only doctrine. The main provisions of this 
policy were the restriction of open market operations in all cases 
other than disorderly conditions in the securities market te shert-term 
securities and the limitation of open market intervention to such a 
minimum as dictated by the credit needs of the economy. Since 1961, 
the Federal Reserve has followed an open market policy which, in effect, 
constitutes a reversal of the previous policy in terms of both restric-
tions 0n the magnitude of open marltet interventien and the particular 
sector that intervention may take place. Thus, open market transactions 
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during the 1961-64 peri~d have been characterized by a greater volume 
and by a wider range of maturity issues bought and sold. 
The decisien to limit open market operations to a minimum and to 
bills only was the result 0f a st.udy tilad}~-P¥·,an ad hoc.subcommittee 
during 1952-53· The study reeemmended t;tie confinement of open market 
operations to short-term securities because it believed that such con-
finement would impre>ve the technical performance of the securities 
market in terms of depth, breadth, and resiliency. Little considera-
tion was given to the theories regarding the role and term structure 
of interest rates. It was merely pointed out that insofar as.the 
subcommittee was ccmcerned any changes in shert-term yields would be 
transferred to the ot};l.er ·. sectors of tbe market through the forces of 
arbitrage, speculation, and substitution. Later, in 1958, when the 
Federal Reserve published a reappraisal of its open market policy, the 
theoretical implications of the bills only p©licy were e~mined in 
greater detail. In·fact, at that time, the main line Gf defense on 
behalf of the bills only doctrine shifted from technical to theoretical 
arguments. 
Again, the Federal Reserve stressed the roles of arbitrage, specu-
lation, and substitution and emphasized that long-term interest rates 
are not insensitive to short-term interest rate changes. In addition, 
the 1958 reappraisal advanced the argument that epen market operations 
influence interest rates primarily through their effects on member bank 
reserves. Thus, operatiens in long-term securities.would produce al-
most the same results on long-term rates th•t would have been realized 
if.the operatiens were performed in sb0rt-term securities. But 
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operations in leng-term securities, the Federal Reserve peinted out, 
carry.th! danger.of' creating mistaken expeetati,ns en the pa!t e:f' pro-
:f'essienal dealers and other market participants which could upset the 
,· 
technical :t'unctiening e:f' the market. 'rb.us, the advisability of' epen 
market operations in long-term securities was rejected by the Federal 
Reserve in the final analysis cm the basis of' technical considerations. 
Several :f'aeters contributed to the termination of the bills only 
p©licy in February, 1961. The do~trine was placed under scrutiny as 
soen as it became knewn. For.the most part, academic economists reached 
critical oenclusiens about bills only. Such criticisms eenstituted a 
major factor in the abandonment of' the doctrine. 'fhe emergence of' de-
:f'icits in the balance e:f' payments provided another important argument 
in favor of changing this policy. 
Monetary policy during the 1961-64 period was directed toward the 
achievement of higher short-term interest rates in relation to long-
term rates fer the purpose 0:f' redu~ing short~term capital outflows 
. . 
without discouraging domestic investment. '!'his peliey has been labeled 
operation twist. One of' the ma.Jor instruments used by the Federal Re~ 
c 
serve for the implementation ef operatien twist was open market opera-
tions. 
The reyiew of ep,n market operations ~uring the p,riod 1953-64 
' I, 
suggested the need for an empirical examination of three questie~s e:f' 
relevance to open market poliey. 'fhe first of' these was the question 
of whether and to what extent yield changes in a given maturity sector 
are r.0llewed by similar changes in ether sectors. The data used te 
evaluate this question were weekly yields en various maturity issues 
for the period 1956-64. The week-by-week examination of the direction 
in yield changes for two different maturity issues showed that there 
is very little evidence to support the Federal Reserve contention that 
there is a great deal 0f parallel movement in the yields of short- and 
long-term securities. About one-third of the weekly changes in these·· 
• w~ 
two yields were in the oppesite directien. Yield movements between 
intermediate- and long-term rates were more consistent with the Federal 
Reserve assumption. In about 15 percent of the weeks, the yields of 
these two issues changed in opposite directions. These findings cor~ 
responded closely with the results of correlation analysis. The highest 
coefficients were obtained from the yield correlation of 3i5 year 
· issues and long-term bonds. The results of correlating short- and long-
term rates indicated that, generally,.·· only 25 percent of the variation 
in long-term yields could be attributed to the variation in short-term 
yields. The degree of association between the differences in yields 
from week-to-week was found t© be, alse, low. In short, the assumption 
that y;i.eld changes in the sho:rt-term sector are promptly transferred 
to the other maturity sec·to.rs of the mark~t d@es not seem t@ be supported 
by the empirical findings. Furthermore, the failure to find any lags 
between short- and long-term yields casts doubt upon the view that 
short-term changes are of prime importance in determining rate changes 
in the long-term sector. These findings imply that the Federal Reserve 
cannot control long-term rates by limiting its actions to affecting 
short-term yields. Some control over long-term rates is possible if 
Federal Reserve influence is extended to the intermediate sectors. 
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But, if the Federal Reserve wants to control the absolute level of 
long-term rates, then it must be willing to extend its operations to 
the long-term sectoro 
The second issue that was examined empirically concerned an 
evaluation of whether the objectives of @peratio~ twist were achieved. 
The evidence from time series and yield curves showed that since 1961 
the yield differential between shert- and long-term issues declined 
progressively and consequently the yield curve became alm®st flat. 
Thus, the @bjective of raising short-term rates relative te long-term 
was achiev~d. The effect that the extension of open market operations 
to the long~·term sector had on the achievement· of higher sh©rt-term 
rates relative tG long-term rates cannot be established exactly. The 
FederaJ Reserve, however, may have had to prcvide bank reserves by pur-
chases of short-term securities had it not; been able to purchase longer-
term issues during the 1961-64 period. This eventually would have ex-
erted downward pressure en short-term yields. 
Finally, the third major issue discussed was the question of 
whether the e.x:tension of open market @peraticms to longer-term securi-
ties had adverse effects on the technical functioning of the securi-
ties market. The study of dealer transactiens and dealer inventory 
positions for the period beginning September, 1960, through December, 
1964, showed an increase in the volume of both variables over this 
period. The examination of yield movements showed less fluctuation 
for the period 1961-64 than fer the period 1956-6o. Also, the dis-
persion of weekly yields measured in terms of standard deviations 
was smaller during the 1961-64 period than that of the period 1956-60. 
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Such evidence is contrary to the Federal Reserve argument that open 
market operations in long-term securities would affect the performance 
of the market in an adverse way. 
In conclusion, it might be mentioned that the present study did 
not consider directly the question of whether or not the bills only 
policy was an incorrect policy. However, the assumptions regarding 
parallel yield changes and the technical functioning of the market, 
on which this policy was based, were found to be unwarranted.· There-
fore, the bills cmly policy.!' judged 0n the merit of its assumptions, 
would appear to have been ill-cenceived. 
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APPENDJ;X TABLE I 
WEEKLY llELDS OF U. s. GOVEBNMENT SECURITIESa 
\'?>212 3-Month 3-5 • Leng~Term. 
Week Ending :Billsb Month Iseuesc. Yea.r" IssuesC Bends 
(Percent) ,. 
1956-Ja.n. 7 2.51 2.69 2.87 2.92 
14 2.53 2.58 2.81 2.90 
21 2.39 2.41 2.68 2.87 
28 2.28 2.39 ~.66 2~87 
., 
Feb. 4 2.29 2.40 2.65 2.85 
ll 2.26 2,34 2.63 2.85 
18 2.36 2.34 2.63 2.84 
25 2.40 2.41 2~67 2.87 
.. 
.· ·i 
Mar. 3 2.24 J.47 2.f1 . 2.87 
10 2.24 '2.42 2.75 2.89 
17 2.36 2.44 2.81 2.92 
24 2.26 2.42 2.~9 2~95 
31 2.19 2.42 2.94 2.98 
. i 
Apr. 7 2.38 2.68 3.d2 3.04 
14 · 2.55 2.78 3.(17 3.07 
21 2.74 2.93 3.18 3.10 
28 2. 71,; 2~9'2 3.lp 3.09 
··_!: 
May 5 2.61 2.91 3.1:b 3.03 
12 2.55 2.88 3.11 3.00 
19 2.67 2.87 3.08 2.98 
26 2.65 2.75 2°27 2.94 
June 2 2.;5 2.74 2,.91 2.92 
9 2.53 2.82 2.91 2~22 
16 2.51 2.72 2.85 2 .• 91 
23 2.41 2.60 2.83 2.92 
30 2.48 2.6o 2.90 2.95 
July 7 2.33 2.56 2.85 2.94 
14 2.33 2.54 2.90 2.97 
21 ~L26 2.55 2.96 3.01 
28 2.32 2.74 3.09 3.05. 
Au,~. 4 2.29 2.85 3.19 3.09 
11 2.4p 2.92 3.26 3.11 
18 2.64 3.00 3.37 3.16 
25 2.82 3.10 3.43 3.22 
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APPENDIX TABLE I (Centinued) 
3-Mont~ 9-12 3-5 Long-Term 
Week Ending Bills Month Issuesc Year Issuesc Bands 
(Percent) 
Sept. l 2.72 3.10 3.46 3.22 
8 2.68 3.14 3.49 3.24 
15 2.79 3.19 3.48 3.23 
22 2.91 3.16 3.36 3.19 
29 2.94 3.18 3,39 3.20 
Oct .. 6 2.87 3.11 3.25 3.3.7 
13 2.96 3.10 3.25 3.18 
20 2.94 3.06 3.23 3.19 
27 2.86 3.02 3.34 3.24 
Nov. 3 2.85 3.09 3.45 3.27 
10 2.91 3.09 3.45 3.28 
17 2.98 3.10 3.42 3.28 
24 3.04 3.16 3.45 3.30 
Dec .. l 3.08 3.23 3.60 3.35 
8 3.12· 3.26 3.67 3.35 
15 3.24 3.30 3.68 3.37 
22 3.27 3.37 3.66 3.45 
29 3.20 3.40 3.57 3.44 
1957-Jan. 5 3.14 3.38 3.63 3.50. 
12 3.08 3.23 3.47 3.45 
19 3.09 3.14 3.33 3.33 
26 3.10 3.09 3.31 3.26 
Feb. 2 3.16 3.11 3.34 3.24 
9 3.05 3.15 3.27 3.18 
16 3.01 3.24 3.29 3.19 
23 3.15 3.29 3.36 3.26 
Mar. 2 3.25 3.29 3.38 3.27 
9 3.18 3.33 3.29 3.28 
16 3.15 3.38 3.37 3.26 
23 3.00 3.35 3.39 3.26 
30 2~97 3.35 3.38 3.24 
Apr. 6 3.03 3.36, 3.42 3.25 
13 3.13 3.41 3.46 3.28 
20 3.11 3.44 3.49 3.34 
27 3.02 3.44 3.51 3.38 
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APPENDIX TABLE I (Continued) 
3-Mont~ 9-12 . 3..;5 Long-Term 
Week Ending Bills·. Month Issuesc Year Issuesc Bonds 
(Percent) 
May 4 3.00 3.43 3.54 3.38 
ll 2.93 3.36 3.55 3.37 
18 2.98 3.35 3.60 3.40 
25 3.14 3d5 3.63 3.41 
June l 3.26 3.42 3.72 3.47 
8 3.30 3.51 3.69 3.49 
15 3.27 3.53 3.68 3.52 
2:2 3.36 3.59 3.84 3.66 
29 3.23 3.58 3.86 3.64 
July 6 3.19 3.66 3.82 3.59 
13 3.13 3.68 3.83 3.56 
20 3.04 3.70 3.90 3~59 
27 3.18 3.74 3.98 3.65 
Aug. 3 3.34 3.79 3.91 3.63 
10 3.29 3.83 3 .. 91 3.63 
17 3.40 3.98 3.97 3.66 
24 3.32 3.96 3.91 3.63 
31 3.47 3.99 3.87 3.6:2 
Sept. 7 3.54 4.oo 3.86 3.59 
14 3.55 4.oo 3.91 3.60 
21 3.58 4.0l 3.94 3.71 
28 3.48 4.06 3.98 3.72 
Oct. 5 3.49 4.0:2 3.97 3.72 
1:2 3.54 3.91 3.94 3.71 
19 3.64 3.99 4.04 3.76 
26 3.59 3.89 3.99 ].74 
Nov. 2 3.59 3.90 4.0l 3.74 
9 3.50 3.77 3.91 3.68 
16 3.38 3.54 3.8o 3.6:2 
23 3.12 3.34 3.43 3 .. 49 
30 3.14 3.38 3 .. 32 3.48 
Dec. 1 3.07 3.33 3.18 3.37 
14 3.01 3.12 3.09 3.31 
21 3.12 3.01 3.00 3.29 
28 3.10 2.96 2.96 3.26 
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APPENDIX TABLE I (Continued) 
3-Month . . . 9-12 .. 3 .. 5 .. Long-Term 
Week Ending Billsb, Month Issuesc Year Issues0 Bonds 
(Percent) 
1958-Jan~., 4 2.77 2.84 2.84 3.22 
11 2.75 2.73 2.79 3~20 
18 2.57 2.59 2.74 3.21 
25 2.37 2.52 2.77 3.27 
Feb. l 1.92 2.29 2.78 · 3.28 
8 1.65 2.09 2.78 3.27 
15 1.69 2.05 2.72 · 3.25 
22 l.62 1.93 2.67 3.25 
Mar. l 1.22 1.69 2.54 3.27 
8 1.39 1.76 2.53 3.27 
15 1.39 l.77 2.53 3.27 
22 l.33 1.85 2.50 3.24 
29 1.11 1.73 2.45 3.21 
Apr. 5 1.08 1.54 2.44 3.19 
l2 1.10 1.29 2.4o 3.15 
19 1.13 l.,31 2.32 3.10 
26 1 •. 13 1.32 2.22 3.07 
May 3 1.23 1.39 2.30 3.14 
10 1.11 1.33 2.29 j.14 
17 1.02 1.26 2.26 3.15 
24 0.74 l.13 2.23 3.13 
31 0.58 1.01 2.20 . 3.13 
.June 7 0.71 0.91 2.14 3.14 
14 0.83 0.91 2.17 3.15 
21 0~92 0.97 2.28 3.21 
28 0.90 1.10 2.39 3,26 
July 5 0.79 1.13 2.45 3.26 
12 0.95 1.25 2.51 3.31 
19 0.94 1.44 2~57 3.39 
26 o.88 1.36 2.50 3.38 
Aug. 2 0.94 l.49 2.65 3,44 
9 1.20 1.68 2 •. 86 3.53 
16 1.58 1.97 3.03 3.6], 
23 l.91 2.39 3.16 3.62 
30 2.23 2.62 3.44 3.67 
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APPENDIX TABLE I (Continued) 
.I.., 
3-Month ·9-12 3-5 Long..:Term 
Week Ending Billsb Month Issuesc Year Issuesc Bonds 
(Percent}· 
Sept. 6 2.32 2.76 3.56 3.72 
13 2-37 2.81 3.56 3.75 
20 2.45 2.83 3.55 3~76 
27 2.48 2.85 3.56 3.74 
Oct. 4 2.70 3.04 3.72 3.83 
ll 2.64 2.98 3.58 3.72 
18 2.67 2.76 3.52 3.74 
25 2.69 2.74 3.67 3.77 
Nov. l :2.53 2.67 3.66 3.75 
8 2.49 2.87 3.62 3.75 
15 2.71 2.90 3.59 3.71 
22 2.73 2.94 3.60 3.69 
29 2.72 ~?.96 3.58 3.67 
Dec. 6 2.79 3.30 3.63 3.73 
13 2.82 3.30 3.61 3.77 
20 2·.82 3.27 3.65 3.83 
27 2.71 3.18 3.68 3.84 
1959-Jan. 3 2.67 3.04 3.70 3.83 
10 2.72 3 .. 00 3.73 3.84 
17 2.86 3.27 3.87 3.89 
24 2.97 3.47 3.97 3.96 
31 2.77 3.38 3.92 · 3.94 
Feb. 7 2.70 3.44 3.94 3.93 
14 2.72 3.4o 3.92 3.92 
21 2.63 3.33 3.77 3.91 
28 2.76 3.34 3.77 3.90 
Mar. 7 2.84 3.51 3.78 3.87 
14 2.85 3.63 3.88 · 3.92 
21 2.77 3.59 3.89 3.92 
28 2.76 3.53 3.94 3.94 
Apr. 4 2.84 3.50 3.96 3.95 
ll 2.96 3.52 3.99 3.97 
18 3.09 3.70 4.04 4.0l 
25 2.98 3.78 4.09 4.05 
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APPENDIX TABLE I (Continued) 
3-Mont~ 9-12. 3-5· Long~Term 
Week Ending · Bills Month Issuesc Year.Issu~sc Bonds 
(Percent) 
May 2 2.81 3.80 4.08 4.05 
9 2.83 3.86 4.10 4.05 
16 2.76 3.93 4.18 4.09 
23 2.85 3.97 4.17 4.11 
30 2.92 3.93 4.18 4.08 
June 6 3.15 3.99 4.28 4.10 
13 3.27 3.97 4.31 4.09 
20 3.24 3.88 4.33 4.09 
27 3.22 3.98 4.36 4.10 
July 4 3.16 4.13 4.40 4.12 
ll 3.28 4.38 4.42 4.13 
18 3-37 4.33 4.38 4.08 
25 3.15 4.32 4.41 4.10 
Aug. l 3.01 4.25 4.40 4.10 
8 3.00 4.14 4.37 4.08 
15 3.17 4.14 4.31 4.06 
22 3.50 4.34 4.44 4.08 
29 3.73 4.59 4.63 4.15 
Sept. 5 3.95 4.69 4.71 4.24 
12 4.02 4.73 4.73 4.25 
19 4.13 4.91 4.86 4.30 
26 3.98 4.78 4.79 4.27 
Oct. 3 4.10 4.88 4.82 4.21 
10 4.02 4.75 4.76 4.14 
17 4.24 4.77 4.72 4.13 . 
24 3.99 4.53 4.58 4.06 
31 4.oo 4 .. 47 4.65 4.09 
Nov. 7 4.03 4.62 4.70 4.09 
14 4.04 4.62 4.71 4.10 
21 4.20 4.73 4.75 4.13 
28 4.24 4.80 4.78 4.15 
Dec. 5 4.50 4.93 4.90 4.21 
12 4.48 4.99 4.92 4.22 
19 4.49 4.98 4.95 4.25 
26 4.57 5.00 5.00 4.32 
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APPENDIX TABLE I (Continued) 
3-Mont~ 9-12 3-5 Long-Term 
Week Ending Bills Month Issuesc Year Issuesc Bonds 
(Percent) 
1960-Jan. 2 4.40 5.00 4.99 4.37 
9 4.59 5.11 4.97 4.42 
16 4.53 5.00 4.91 4.37 
23 4.27 4.87 4.81 4.35 
30 4.0l 4.75 4.80 4.36 
Feb. 6 3.94 4.61 4.69 4.29 
13 3.67 4.41 4.61 4.20 
20 4.04 4.63 4.64 4.16 
27 4.14 4.63 4.70 4.22 
Mar. 5 3~92 4.55 4.58 4.22 
12 3.60 4.14 4.35 4.ll 
19 3.41 3 .. 84 4.17 4.05 
26 2.84 3.47 4.02 4.oo 
Apr. 2 2.88 3.69 4.11 4.07 
9 2.96 3.57 4.06 4.10 
16 3.56 4.23 4.25 4.18 
23 3.34 4.17 4.32 4.21 
30 3.19 4.14 4.34 4.20 
May 7 3.08 4.11 4.37 4.17 
14 3.32 4.08 4.35 4.13 
21 3.50 4.34 4.51 4.18 
28 3.29 4.26 4.48 4.16 
.June 4 2.94 3.87 4.24 4.07 
11 :2.61 3.47 4.12 4.oo 
18 2o31 3.15 3.99 3.96 
25 2.39 3.29 4.0l 3.97 
July 2 2.18 3.20 3.99 3.96 
9 2.27 3.23 3.87 3.91 
16 2.41 3.18 3.76 3.87 
23 2.31 3 .. 12 3.67 3.84 
30 2.24 3.00 3.54 3.81 
Aug. 6 2.13 2.86 3.49 3.75 
13 2.18 2.84 3.52 3.78 
20 2.31 2.93 °3~52 -3.81 
27 2.43 2.90 j.47 _ 3.81 
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APPENDIX TABLE I (Continued) 
3-Month 9'-12 3-5 Long-Term Week Ending Billsb Month Issues0 Year Issues c Bonds 
(Percent) 
Septo 3 2.53 2.93 3.51 3.84 
10 2.56 2.98 3.51 3.84 
17 2.58 3.03 3.53 3.84 
24 2.43 2.98 3.47 3.79 
Oct. l 2-35 2.99 3.50 3.81 
8 2.40 3.05 3.60 3.88 
15 2.54 3.07 3~65 3.92 
22 2.23 3.02 3.62 3.93 
:29 2.ll 2.93 3.57 3.90 
Nov. 5 2.20 2 .. 84 3.59 3.90 
12 2.40 2.86 3.63 3.91 
19 2.46 3.08 3 .. 69 3.92 
26 2.38 ·. 3.08 3.72 3.94 
Dec. 3 2.35 3.05 3.75 3.97 
10 2.28 2.93 3.59 3.93 
17 2.25 2.76 3.49 3.86 
24 2.24 2.74 3,46 3.86 
31 2.18 2.61 3.40 3.82 
1,961-Jan. 7 2.28 2.67 3-39 3.84 
14 2.28 2.72 3.52 3.90 
21 2.25 2.74 3.59 3.92 
28 2.17 2.65 3.57 3.89 
Feb. 4 2.29 2.72 3.57 3.88 
11 2.35 2.76 3.56 3.84 
18 2.40 2.87 3.56 3.81 
25 2.51 2.93 3 .. 48 3o76 
Mar. 4 2.56 2.99 3.49 3.77 
ll. 2o44 2.91 3-36 3.75 
18 2.35 2.81 3.44 3.78 
25 :2.28 2.78 3.45 3.80 
Apr. l 2-38 2s86 3.43 3.81 
8 2.36 2.92 3.45 3.82 
15 2.31 2.82 3.40 3.81 
22 2.25 2,79 ··3.38 3.81 
29 2.23 2.81 3-32 3o78 
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APPENDIX TAl3Ll: I (Continued) 
3-Montt ', . 9-12''' ... · .... 3-5' .... Long..;Term 
Week Endi~g 'Bills· Month Issuesc Iea;c Issuesc :Bonds 
(Percent). 
May 6 2.22 2.76 3.23 3.72 .. 
13 2.23 2.75 · 3.15 3.70 
20 2.29 2.82 3.24 3.71 
27 2.39 2.91 3 .. 43 3.78 
June 3 2.38 2.98 3.56 3.79 
10 2.40 3.02 3.69 3.86. 
17 2.32 3.01 3.67 3.86 
24 2.31 j.02 3.74 3.90 
July l 2.27 3~01 3.71 3_.93 
8 2.31. 2.98 3.69 3.92 
15 2.25 2.88 3.72 3.92 
22 2.19 :2.82 3.66 3.88 
29 2.22 2.84 3.68 3.99 
Aug. 5 2.28 2·.85 3. 74- 3.95 
12 2.38 3.02 3.86 4.03 
19 2.50 3.11 3.83 4.01 
26 2.43 3.09 3.77 4.0l 
Sept. 2 2.34 3.06 3.77 4.01 
9 2.32 3.06 3.81 4.02 
16 2.29 3.05 3.80 4.06 
23 2.26 3.03 3.76 4.02 
30 2.25 2.98 3.70 3.98 
Oat. 7 2.28 2.91 3.65 3.98 
14 2.34 2.96 3.67 4.oo 
21 2.29 3.02 3.66 3.98 
28 2.:29 2.97 3.62 3.96 
Nov. 4 2.28 2.91 3.61 3.95 
ll 2.40 2.89 3.63 3.96 
18 2.53 2.96 3.70 4.oo 
25 2.54 2.99 3.69 3.98 
Dee. 2 2.56 2.98 3.73 4.01 
9 2.58 3.03 3.82 4.05 
16 2.59 3.02 3.84 4.06 
23 2.61 3.04 3.·'81 '4.-06 
30 2.66 3.04 3.81 4.07 
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APPENDIX TABLE I (Continued) 
3-Month · 9-12· 3-5 Long.;,.irerm 
.Week Endint5 Billsb Month IsauesC Year Is·su.es0 Bonds 
(Percent) 
1962-Ja.n. 6 2.72 3.07 3.79 · 4.06 
13 2.78 3.13 3.83 4.08 
20 2.73 3.09 3.87 4.08 
27 2.67 3.04 3~85 4.08 
Feb. 3 2.69 3.04 3.88 4.10 
10 2.70 3.06 3.83 4.09 
17 2.81 3.14 3.78 4.08 
24 2.74 3.20 3.73 4.12 
Mar. 3 2.69 3.09 3.62 4.08 
10 2.74 3.04 3.60 4.06 
17 2.74 3.02 3.61 4.02 
24 2.70 2.96 3.49 3.97 
31 2.73 2 .• 93 3.50 3.96 
Apr. 1 2.72 2.88 3.43 3.90 
ll+ 2.74 2.94 3.47 3.89 
21 2.72 2.96 3~48 3.88 
28 2.73 2.98 3.52 3.90 
May 5 2.74 2.97 3.52 3.87 
12 2.67 2.91 3.47 3.85 
19 2.67 2.99 3.55 3.87 
~6 2.69 3.04 3.57 3.90 
June 2 2.68 3.00 3.53 3.89 
9 2.65 2.97 3.50 3.88 
16 2.69 2.97 3.46 3.87 
23 2.73 3.03 3.50 3.90 
30 2.84 3.12 3.60 3.95 
July 7 2.9'2 3.18 · 3.66 3.99 
14 2.97 3.22 3.71 4 .. 03 
:21 2.95 3.27 3.73 4.03 
28 2.88 3.25 3.71 4.02 
Aug. 4 2.85 3.22 3.68 4.03 
ll 2.83 3.19 3.64 4;00 
18 2.84 3.15 3.58 3.98 
25 2.82 3.08 3.51 3.94 
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APPENDIX TABLE I (Centinued) 
. ' 
· 3-Month . 9-12 3-5 Long-Term 
Week Ending Billsb Month Issues<: Year Issuesc Bonds (Percent) 
Sept. l 2.80 3.06 3.52 3.94 
8 2.82 3.08 3.56 3.96 
15 2.78 3.01 3 .. 59 3.95 
22 2.77 2.97 3.57 3.94 
29 2.75 2.95 3.51 3.93 
Oct. 6 2.75 2.92 3.44 3.90 
13 2.76 2.91 2.46 3.90 
20 2.74 2.88 3.46 3.88 
27 2.74 2.89 3.48 3.89 
Nov. 3 2.74 2.87 3.45 3.87 
10 2.82 2.89 3.43 3.86 
17 2.82 2.91 3 .. 46 3.87 . 
24 2.84 2.94 3.49 3.88 
Dec. l 2.86 2.95 3.48 3.88 
8 2 .. 85 2.97 3.48 3.89 
15 2.84 2.94 . 3.44 3.88 
22 2.88 . 2.94 3.41 3.86 
29 2.89 2.96 3.41 3~85 
1963-Jan. 5 2.89 2.99 3.44 3.87 
12 2.90 2.99 3.45. 3.87 
19 2.90 2.96 3.44 3.87 
26 2.93 2.97 3.50 3.91 · 
Feb. 2 2.93 2.95 3.50 3.90 
"9 2.95 2.89 3.47 3.92 16 2.93 2.87 3.46 3.91 
23 2.90 2.88 3.46 3.92 
.Mar. 2 2.90 2.93 3.50 3.94 
9 2.89 2.99 3.49 3.92 
16 2.88 2.97 3.49 3.93 
23 2.90 2.99 3.51 3.94 
30 2.91 3.01 3.53 3.95 
Apr. 6 2.91 3.02 3.53 3.95 
13 2.90 3.01 3.54 3.96 
20 2.90 3.04 3.59 3.99 
27 2.89 3.00 3.59 3.98 
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.· 3-Mont~ · ... 9-12 . 3-5 "Long-'l'erm 
Week Ending Bills Month · Issues0. Year Issues0 Bonds· 
(Percent) 
May 4 ~.90 3.00 3.56 3.98 
ll 2.91 3.00 3.54 3.97 
18 2.·90 3.03 3~55. 3.96 
25 2.94 3.10 3 .. 59 3.97 
June l 2.98 3.17 3.64 3.99 
8 3.00 3'.21 3.68· 4.oo 
15 2.98 3.18 3.66 3.99 
22 2.98 3.15 3.68 4.oo 
29 2.99· 3.14 3.67 4.oo 
July 6 3.03 3.20 3.72 4.02 
13 3.22 3.35 3.80 4.03 
20 3.19 · 3.40 3.80 4.02 
27 3.19 3.35 3.79 4.oo 
Aug. 3 3.24 3.30 3.77 3.99 
10 3.26 3.28 3.77 3.99 
17 3.32 3.36 3.80 3.99 
24 3.36 3.51 3.83 3~99 
31 3.39 3.54 3.85 3.99 
Sept. 7 3.36 3.54 3.88 4.03 
14 3.36 3.54 3.88 4.05 
21 3.41 3.54 3.89 4.05 
28 3.38 3.53 3.88 4.04 
Oct. 5 3.41 3.57 3.88 4.04 
12 3.45 3.56 3.90 4.06 
19 3.47 3.58 3.91 4.07 · 
26 3.44 3.62 3.93 4.07 
Nov. 2 3.47 3.61 3.94 4.09 
9 3.54 3.66 3.98 · 4.12 
16 3.55 3.68 3.97 4.10 
23 3.51 3.75 3.98 4.10 
30 3.48 3.74 3.97 4.10 
Dec. 1 3.52 3.76 3.99 4.12 
14 3.50 3.78 4 .. 02 4.12 
21 3.53 3~77 ·4.06 4.15 
28 3.52 3.77 4.07 · 4.-16 
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3.;.Month ·. 9-12 3:..5 ·. ·. · ... Long ... Term 
Week Ending Billsb Month Issuesc Year Issuesc Bonds 
(Percent) 
1964-Jan. 4 3.52 3.75 4.08 4.15 
ll 3.53 3.68 4 .. 08 4.16 
18 3.54 3.59 4.07 4.16 
25 3.52 3.66 4.04 4.15 
Feb. l 3.50 3.67 4.04 4.15 
8 3.51 3.66 3.99 4.14 
15 3.52 3.66 4.oo 4.14 
22 3.53 3.58 4.02 4.14 
29 3.56 3.61 4.05 · 4.15 
Mar. 7 3.56 3.64 4 .. 10 4.16 
14 3.54 3.65 4.12 4.17 
21 3.54 3.67 4.16 4.18 
28 3.54 3.72 4.23 4 .. 20 
Apr .. 4 3.52 3 .. 71 4.21 4.20 
11 3.48 3.68 4.19 4.20 
18 3.47 3.64 4.18 4.20 
25 3.45 3.58 4.16 4.19 
May 2 3.45 3.56 4.14 4.19 
9 3.49 3.55 4.10 4.)..8 
16 3.47 3.52 4.04 4.16 
23 3.47 3.84. 4.07 4.14 
30 3.47 3.84 4.06 4.14 
June 6 3.47 3.84 4.05 4.15 
13 3.47 3.84 4.04 4.14 
20 3.49 3.84 4.04 4.13 
27 3.47 3.85 4.02 4.12 
July 4 3.48 3.76 4.01 4.11 
11 3.48 3.68 3.99 4.12 
18 3.43 3.64 3.98 4.13 
25 3.46 3.70 4.oo 4.14 
Aug. l 3.46 3.67 3.99 4.14 
8 3.48 3.68 3.98 4.14 
15 3~51 3 .. 71 3.99 4.14 
22 3.50 3.76 3.99 4.14 
29 3.50 3.78 4.oo 4.14 
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·3-Morit\ 9-12 3-5 Long.:Term. 
Week Endin~ I c . c Bends· Bills· Month s1:1ues · Ijai: Issues ·_ · 
(Percent . . · · 
Sept. 5 3.50 3.82 4.03 4.16 
12 3.52 3.84 4.04 4.17 
19 3.54 3.83 4.05 4.17 
26 3~54 3.80 4.02 4.16 
Oct. 3 3.55 3.82 4.02 4.15 
10 3.57 3.84 4.05 4.16 
17 3.58 3.84 4.06 4.17 
24 3.58 3.84 4.05 4.17 
31 3.56 3.82 4.03 4.15 
Nov. 7 3.56 3.82 4.02 4.12 
14 3.58 3.82 4 .. oo 4.11 
21 3.61 3.83 4.02 4.ll 
28 3.78 4.oo 4.11 4.15 
Dec. 5 3.82 4.04 4.11 4.15 
12 3.81 3.97 4.06 4.12 
19 3.86 3.92 4.06 4.13 
26 3.86 3.95 4.07 4.14 
aExoept for long-term bonds, weekly yields are averages computed 
from daily closing bid prices. Weekly yields f0r long-term bonds are 
averages of daily figures for u. s. Government bonds maturing or 
callable in 10 years·or more. 
£>:Market yields, _ 
0Selected note and bond issues. 
Source: Except for long-term bond yields for 1956 and 1957, Federal Re-
serve Bulletin's February issue for the years 1957-65; long--
term bond yields for 1956 and 1957 a.re taken from Federal Re-
serve Bulletin., Vol. 44 (January., 1958)., p. 84. .. -
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APPENDIX tABLE. II 
DEALER TRANSACTIONS IN U. S. GOVERNMEN~ SECURITIES BY MATURITYa 
Within 1-5 5-10 Af·ter··· 
Period l Year Years Years 10 Yee.rs 
(Par Value in Millions of Dollars) 
1960-Sept. 760 197 58 35 
Oct. l, 160 227 45 28 
Nov. 1,006 323 78 28 
Dec. 1,049 386 67 45 
1961-Jan. l, 113 422 57 23 
Feb. 934 353 46 32 
Mar. l, 144 320 70 33 
Apr. 1,200 206 82 35 
May 1,092 299 92 36 
June 1, 143 175 42 23 
July l,,441 281 49 13 
Aug. l, 173 162 41 19 
Sept. l, 185 177 47 34 
Oct. l, 389 254 27 20 
Nov. l, 295 309 41 43 
Dec. l, 328 228 45 52 
1962-Jan. 1,478 149 64 26 
Feb. l, 520 295 95 60 
Mar. 1, 332 217 69 56 
Apr. l, 350 l8o 114 45 
May l, 338 218 114 24 
.June l, 357 191 100 33 
July 1, 457 139. 63 23 
Aug. l, 318 158 94 33 
Sept. 1, 432 293 147 4o 
Oct. l, 517 263 159 28 
Nov. 1,266 262 210 33 
Dec. l, 446 366 222 38 
1963-Jan. l, 484 226 124 · 36 
. Feb. l, 646 400 230 75 
Mar. l, 241 224 149 79 
Apr. l,,438 195 105 50 
May l, 160 282 127 69 
June l, 208 168 165 33 
July 1, 440 172 134 29 
Aug. 1,060 139 88 21 
Sept. 1,280 207 214 100 
Oct. 1, 261 144 124 46 
Nov. l., 300 252 131 29 
Dec. l, 348 213 122 37 
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Within 1-5 5-10 . After· ..... 
Period l Year Yea.rs Years 10 Years 
(Par Value in Millions of Dollars) 
1964-Jan. l, 656 264 159 65 
Feb. l, 336 272 145 56 
Mar. ly 361 213 81 31 
Apr. l, 528 234 70 18 
May l., 264 248 165 25 
J"une lp20l 170 97 19 
July 1, 433 216 208 79 
Aug. l, 099 197 123 34 
Sept. l.?214 155 102 39 
Oct. l.9476 141 92 41 
Nov. l, 426 271 127 40 
Dec. ly 596 261 146 49 
aThe transactions data combine market purchases and sales of u. s. 
Goverpment securities dealers reporting to the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. They do not include allotments of and exchanges for new 
U. s. Government securities, redemptions of called or matured securi-
ties, or purchases or s~les of securities under repurchase agreements, 
reverse repurchase (resale), or similar contracts. The averages are 
based on the number of trading days in the period. 
Source~ Federal Reserve:Bulletin, varli.0us issues. 
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DEALER POSITIONS IN U.S. GOVERNMENT SECURI'rIES BY MATURI'l'Ya 
Within 1.;.5 · After·· 
Period l Year Years 5 Years 
(Par Val,ue in Milli0ns of Dollars) 
1960-Sept. 2,055 435 16o 
Oct. l, 749 4oe 143 
Nov. l 600 639 155 J 
Dec. 2, 341 510 126 
1961-Jan. 2., 338 519 113 
Feb. 2.,.128 578 88 
Mar. l, 600 388 90 
Apr. 2, 115 223 126 
May 2, 227 484 98 
June l, 973 300 -20 
July 2,247 323 40 
Aug. 2, 350 175 10 
Sept. 2, 339 144 15 
Oct. 3,044 194 -12 
Nov. 3, 272 464 71 
Deco 2, 655 260 23 
1962-Jan. 2, 589 184 5 
Feb. 1, 914 297 54 
Mar. 2,721 228.· 106 
Apr. 3, 388 252 131 
May 2, 985 403 255 
June 3, 398 261 118 
July 2,818 94 -32 
Aug. 2,484 72 91 
Sept. 2, 643 323 211 
Oct. 2,991 383 194 
Nov. 3, 319 447 256 
Dec. 3, 829 365 74 
1963-J'an. 3,622 368 30 
Feb. 2,863 473 74 
Mar. 2., 439 563 543 
Apr .. 2,934 355 178 
May 2,810 640 44 
June :2, 666 347 80 
July 2, 505 357 21 
Aug. 2,871 307 -82 
Sept. j.9099 290 300 
Oct. 2,899 196 444 
Nov. 3,008 430 1-08 
Dec. 2,8oo 295 ·-4 
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Within 1-5 · After 
PQriod l Year Years 5 Years 
(Par Value in Mil:Lions of Dollars) 
1964-Jan. 3,218 272 92 
Feb. 2, 787 468 219 
Maro 2,486 323 -34 
Apr. 2, 316 156 -78 
May 2, 670 164 253 
June 3,217 91 167 
July 3, 121 229 468 
Aug. 2, 978 552 782 
Sept. 3, 302 373 280 
Oct. 2,966 231 160 
Nov. 3, 073 479 140 
Dec. 2, 675 419 159 
aT:b.e figures include all securities sold by dealers under repur-
chase contracts regardless of the maturity date of the contract unless 
the contract ilil matcbed by a reverse repurchase (resale) agreement or 
delayed d.elivery sale with the same maturity and involving the same 
amount of securities. Included in the repurchase contracts are some 
that more.clearly represent investments by the holders of the securi-
ties rather than dealer trading positions. Averages of daily figures 
based on number of trading days in the period. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
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